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Abstract 
 
The Second World War has captured the interest of people around the world, 
and has fascinated generations of historians. Despite the time that has elapsed 
since the events, and the opening of the official papers in 1977, one thing remains 
the same, the under-examination of British foreign policy during the war. The 
history that has been written has struggled to break from the picture Churchill 
painted in ‘The Second World War’, presenting the inevitability of the Anglo-
American special relationship and minimising the important contributions of 
Eden and the Foreign Office. 
In an exercise in anti-Whig history, this thesis attempts to right this historical 
wrong, and suggest that this was not the only outcome available to Britain as a 
result of the Second World War. By examining the Foreign Office records, it 
presents a different picture: that traditional British foreign policy was still going 
strong, and that the Foreign Office, with Eden at the helm, had its own vision for 
the post-war world. In this vision Britain would remain a great power with an 
independent foreign policy, and would be involved in a global post-war 
organisation designed to maintain European and World peace.  
This work will examine the origins of this vision, and trace its development 
through the early years of the war, highlighting the plans that were brought 
forward and the efforts that were made to make this official policy. It will also 
assess the reasons for the apparent failure of this policy, and offer suggestions of 
possible outcomes for Britain had it been implemented. This vision fundamentally 
differed from Churchill’s, but ultimately could have supplemented it, had the great 
man allowed it to do so. 
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1) Introduction 
 
In 2002 Winston Churchill was voted the greatest Briton by a nationwide poll 
conducted by the BBC,1 mainly because of his efforts during the First, but more 
noticeably the Second World War. People around the world find a particular 
interest in both Churchill and the Second World War, and both topics have been 
and continue to be subject to scholarship by historians and academics from other 
fields. This is, in no small part, down to the man himself. Churchill was not only 
responsible for directing the British war effort, creating and enacting policy; 
delivering speeches, many of which are still famous today; leading the country to 
victory; but also for writing and publishing that history afterwards. Consequently, 
post-war historical study centred on the myths, legends and facts laid down in 
Churchill’s ‘The Second World War’, partly due to the compelling nature of the 
work, and partly because at the time it was one of the only places where 
publication of official documents could be found. The opening of the papers for 
the Second World War period in 1977 paved the way for a great mass of detailed 
studies, provoking much debate on many topics. But when it came to the study of 
British foreign policy during the Second World War, the Churchillian line 
remained more or less intact. 
That this should have been a less popular area of historical debate is possibly 
no surprise if the BBC is to be believed, as whilst Churchill was not the only Prime 
Minister on the list, Anthony Eden, a famous Prime Minister but more importantly 
one of Britain’s premier Foreign Secretaries, did not make the top 100 greatest 
Britons shortlist, nor did any other Foreign Secretary.2 Many historical works, as 
shall be examined later, focus on the foreign policy of Churchill rather than that of 
the Foreign Office and, therefore, look to explain the origins and development of 
the ‘special relationship’, emphasise the importance of the American alliance for 
Britain’s war effort, and highlight Britain’s determined focus on winning the war 
                                                 
1 http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/parliamentary-archives/archives-
highlights/archives-churchill/. 
2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/tv_and_radio/2208671.stm. 
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at all costs. Significant emphasis is also placed on Anglo-German relations, 
especially the effort to explain appeasement; and on studying the development of 
a world divided by the Cold War. Despite its role in the build up to the war, its 
involvement for two years as a neutral power and its active involvement for four 
years as an ally of Britain, there have been comparatively few detailed works 
examining the relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union. More has been 
written about the relations between Britain and France, unsurprisingly as they 
were allies throughout the war and had been co-operating together in the build up 
to the war. There is, however, still relatively little on the particular area to be 
examined by this thesis, the British foreign policy that never was. This was the 
policy that came to be favoured by Eden and the Foreign Office, centring on post-
war planning, particularly regarding Europe, but also on a global scale, and the 
conflict that arose between this policy, and the pro-American policy of Churchill. It 
aims to reconstruct Eden and the Foreign Office’s view of planning for the post-
war world, and examine how coherent this vision was. Due to the limitations 
placed upon this thesis, it is impossible to examine this in the entire scope of 
British foreign policy, so it will concentrate on two of the most important 
European Powers with whom Britain had to deal during this period, the Soviet 
Union and France, as well as looking at the influence that the United States had on 
foreign policy. This should allow an examination of whether the Foreign Office did 
have a specific policy based around the idea of post-war planning, and how 
successful this policy was. Likewise, the wording restriction prevents a study of 
the entire war period, so this work will focus on the period from Eden’s return to 
the Tehran Conference, as the decisions of Tehran meant that, for most of 1944, 
military thinking and preparation for Overlord was the main focus of British 
policy. Churchill’s version of events cannot be ignored, but this study hopes to 
show, through detailed use of the archives and other primary and secondary 
sources, the existence of an alternative foreign policy, and examine why this never 
came to fruition - and the potential results if it had.  
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The study will begin in chapter two by examining what the historiography 
has to say on this topic to show where this thesis fits, and look at the background 
and events in the first two years of the war so that any change in policy coming 
from Eden’s return to the Foreign Office can be set against the existing policy 
direction. Of most use here will be biographies of Eden and Halifax, memoirs of 
contemporaries which contain thoughts about Eden’s appointment, as well as 
more general works on the Second World War which will provide the background 
to the period under investigation. Excavating from the archives a foreign policy 
direction favoured by Eden, the thesis will move on to examine how this 
developed through the course of the war as events unfolded, and will follow a 
generally chronological structure. That is not to say that it was Eden alone who 
was responsible for formulating schemes and policy ideas, but that his experience 
and differing outlook to Halifax helped the Foreign Office view things with a 
different perspective, which could have yielded different results. Eden’s job, after 
all, was to be the Foreign Office representative in Cabinet, as well as being its chief 
diplomat and senior manager, so it would be difficult to suggest that, even with 
his high work rate and undisputed talents, he could have regularly drawn up new 
policy in addition to his other responsibilities. Chapters three and four will 
examine the immediate and longer term impacts of Eden’s arrival at the Foreign 
Office, and this is where more of the archival evidence will be brought in, 
particularly the Foreign Office papers and Eden’s own correspondence to examine 
what he thought of the previous policies, and what his priorities should be upon 
taking the Office. 
 
The main task of this thesis will be to examine, through detailed use of the 
archival sources, particularly the Foreign Office records, what was happening in 
the Foreign Office during this period, and whether or not Eden and his 
Department actually had a clear policy that they were attempting to follow. 
Chapters five though seven take up this challenge, looking particularly at the key 
issues of the Soviet Frontier demands and the means by which these can be 
integrated with Britain’s own war aims, and the necessity to maintain and foster a 
9 
French resistance movement which often caused more contention than assistance 
to the allied cause. Again the official documents found in the Foreign Office papers 
at the National Archives will be crucial to explain the actual thinking of Eden and 
his contemporaries, particularly the many folders in FO 371 that cover these 
particular topics,3 but memoirs and diaries will also be useful to show how 
personal and political opinions may have differed. Some of the secondary works, 
such as Barkers ‘Churchill and Eden at War’ will be particularly useful here as they 
discuss how some of the Foreign Office aims started to link together with the day 
to day management of Anglo-French and Anglo-Soviet relations. Once their policy 
is discovered, it will be important to see exactly what this policy was. There is 
plenty of evidence supporting Churchill’s policy, which favoured America and 
focussed on winning the war rather than planning for the future. One famous 
example of this was his quote that “we shall not overlook Mrs Glass’s Cookery 
Book recipe for Jugged Hare – ‘first catch your hare’”.4 There is, however, 
relatively little historical discussion of any other strands of foreign policy that may 
have been at play, except when alternate policy ideas caused friction in the 
Churchill-Eden relationship. In particular, a foreign policy which focussed on the 
need to prepare for the post-war world during the war, and involved collaboration 
in a European or World organisation would be hard to pick out of the existing 
historiography. It will be a key task of this thesis to examine whether or not this 
was actually the policy of the Foreign Office, or whether it was just an idealist side 
project that they worked on whilst supporting Churchill in his military and 
political quest.  
If it was the case that this was a genuine foreign policy initiative, and they 
were actually working towards post-war European or Worldwide co-operation 
then it will be crucial to examine and analyse speeches, initiatives and any policies 
they put forward as the war progressed, regardless of their implementation, to 
fully understand what they were trying to achieve. Whilst examining these it will 
                                                 
3 For example TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/32876-32879 on Anglo Soviet relations and FO 
371/31872, FO 371/31897 and FO 371/31940 on the Free French.   
4 TNA, Prime Ministers Papers, PREM 4/100, Churchill’s minute to Eden on the ‘Four Power Plan’, 
18 October 1942. 
10 
be important to ignore the overall success of the individual policies and look at the 
big picture of what was trying to be achieved. The chronological structure is useful 
here, as it reduces the risk of drawing a line backwards to events during the war 
from events that came later, which might give events more or less significance than 
they may actually have had at the time. Chapters’ eight to eleven take up this task, 
and see significant discussion of detailed policy work by the Foreign Office that is 
contained in the archives, though not really discussed in the historiography. The 
Foreign Office files are incredibly illuminating here, as there are a large number of 
folders and files that examine and consider post-war plans, be they military or 
political, sensible or spurious, which help form what eventually developed as the 
Foreign Office policy.5 Here the secondary work becomes less helpful, as many of 
these plans are not discussed, but memoirs and diaries, particularly those of 
Gladwyn Jebb and the edited volume on Charles Webster, do offer assessments of 
some of them, and it is always illuminating to see the thoughts of contemporaries, 
and the thinking of the men who wrote a good deal of these papers.  
Some references to events after the war will be used occasionally to 
demonstrate where policy ideas that were not implemented could have provided 
different results to those that were. In works that do mention some sort of 
European foreign policy, there is variation as to when this comes about, so this 
structure will also be useful in determining timeframes and also what Eden and 
the Foreign Office were doing in the meantime. 
It will also be interesting, as the thesis develops, to establish how far such a 
policy was a result of internal ideas and decisions, or whether it was one that was 
forced on the Foreign Office by military circumstances or political decisions in 
other fields or even other countries. Was it, for example, a result of internal 
prejudice towards the United States that the Foreign Office sought to work in a 
broader framework than Churchill envisaged, or was it because Churchill crowded 
them out of the American relations that they had to opt for this course? Arising 
from this is a question about the ideological impetus for such a policy, and the 
                                                 
5 For example TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/35339-35341 which contain many proposals for a 
European post-war settlement submitted to the Foreign Office in early 1943 
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thesis will consider whether or not this policy came about due to an ideological 
leaning towards the Soviet Union within the Foreign Office, or whether they were 
acting along the lines of realpolitik, and this just happened to coincide with Soviet 
demands, such as over the 1941 Frontiers.  
If there is no evidence of such a policy, or insufficient evidence to claim that 
what the Foreign Office was working on was a cohesive vision or idea, then this 
will lend substance to Churchill’s view of the war, and an argument as to why 
historians tend to focus more on Churchill. To not undertake this examination, and 
to assume that because Churchill’s vision came to pass that is what is important to 
study, does the history of the war, and particularly those involved in its foreign 
policy aspect, a great disservice. 
 
The final task will be to consider, depending on the results of this 
examination, what was achieved. Did efforts by Eden and the Foreign Office 
actually result in political progress with this policy, did it influence decisions made 
elsewhere, and did it have any lasting results?  This will require investigation of 
events both within and outside the time period of this thesis, and some 
counterfactual discussion, but these will be required to demonstrate whether any 
lasting impact can be seen from the ideas put forward. This will also show whether 
any outcomes other than the ‘special relationship’ would have been possible for 
Britain as a result of this foreign policy.  
 
12 
2) Background 
 
 There appears to be little direct scholarship that examines this particular 
topic, so in order to study the historiography one must look at the historiography 
of the Second World War in general, and locate those works that reference this 
subject, most notably those specific to the study of Eden. Most of the secondary 
literature on the Second World War, and especially that concerning foreign policy, 
is very much dominated by Churchill. He was the leader who brought Britain 
through the Second World War as one of the victorious allies, and in hindsight, his 
views, or some of them at least, can certainly be seen to be responsible for this. 
However, the light shone on British foreign policy is very much pointed towards 
America, and this phenomenon is generally accredited to Churchill. For the other 
powers involved in the defeat of Germany, and certainly the Soviet Union, which 
was arguably more significant in Europe than America, the limelight was very 
much shining the other way. Both the Soviet Union and France can be overlooked 
when examining the struggle between Britain and Germany, though France 
receives a little more attention due to the conflicts between Churchill and de 
Gaulle, and that it started the war fighting against Germany. Both these countries 
played a role in the British war effort, whether directly and intentionally or 
indirectly and unintentionally, yet the relationships between them and Britain can 
get neglected in comparison to America. Their importance becomes apparent, 
however, when studying the man who was Foreign Secretary for much of the war, 
Anthony Eden. As will be seen his views on foreign policy differed from 
Churchill’s, and were often based more on “stark realism”1 and perspective than 
Churchill’s emotional and whimsical views, though it must be noted that Eden did 
occasionally get “in rather a flap”.2 What remains to be seen is whether Eden’s 
particular brand of foreign policy came to anything. The lack of historical 
discussion suggests results were limited.  
 
                                                 
1 Carlton, D. Anthony Eden, A Biography, (London, 1981), p. 192. 
2 Dilks, D [Ed.]. The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, (London, 1971), 31 December 1940, p. 345. 
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Based on his significant experience in European diplomacy, and his former 
responsibility for the League of Nations, it is unsurprising that Eden would have 
looked at policy with a view towards post-war co-operation between powers. The 
secondary work supports this, though not always in great detail. There are many 
references to Eden and ‘post-war planning’ or ‘post war co-operation’, but these 
are not always well explained. Elisabeth Barker gives the clearest account of 
Eden’s foreign policy during the war, and in her book ‘Churchill and Eden at War’ 
the idea of Eden following a post-war plan can be traced throughout the war, 
though Barker herself provides no detailed analysis. She does, however, assert that 
as early as 1942 Eden was formulating ideas that could help shape post-war 
Europe and the peace. The example she cites is the Four Power Plan, proposed by 
Eden in autumn 1942, which would allow “for joint responsibility by the US, 
Britain, the Soviet Union and China in keeping peace”.3 He argued that “My 
design is to have a basis of a foreign policy now, which policy, if the basis is sound 
today, should carry us over into the peace”.4 This was a sensible strategy, as it 
would have ensured the three main powers, along with China, were involved and 
cooperating from an early opportunity, giving time for relations to develop, and 
alleviating fears that any one power was being left out (most notably the Soviet 
Union). This plan receives limited coverage in the historiography, perhaps a 
suggestion of its failure. It was important, however, as it shows Eden’s long-term 
foreign policy goals from an early date and received Cabinet approval. 
Conversely, David Carlton’s biography suggests that it was 1943 before Eden 
began exploring this particular policy. He argues that until 1943 Eden had tried to 
delay any idea of a deal with the Soviets out of fear of the frontier question. Victor 
Rothwell goes further, and suggests that “he did have much to contribute on some 
of the issues which were to become more important … during 1944, including 
post-war arrangements in east and central Europe; policy in Italy … the future of 
Germany; and, last but not least, the future of France”.5 Given the disparity in the 
                                                 
3 Barker, E. Churchill and Eden at War, (London, 1978), p. 211. 
4 Ibid, p. 211. 
5 Rothwell, V. Anthony Eden: A Political Biography, 1931-57, (Manchester, 1992), pp. 70-71. 
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biographies of Eden on this topic there appears room for this study to undertake 
further examination and see if the archival sources can provide a firmer 
understanding of Eden’s policy and its origins. 
Virtually all sources record Eden’s advocacy of recognising the 1941 Soviet 
Frontiers at the start of 1942, though they generally suggest this was on the 
grounds of stark realism as opposed to being part of Eden’s long-term European 
plan. Carlton and John Charmley hint that this could be with the post-war 
landscape of Europe in mind, but only in the context of Eden’s memorandum to 
the Cabinet which stated that, on the assumption Germany is defeated, “there will 
be no counterweight to Russia in Europe … Russia’s position on the European 
continent will be unassailable”.6 This is one of the points which may well be 
influenced by Churchill’s legacy, as he rejected Eden’s pleas for accepting the 
frontiers at this stage in favour of the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. If looked at 
from Churchill’s perspective with his developing American friendship, this was a 
good choice to make; however, if looked at differently, it clearly hampered Anglo-
Soviet relations, and thus Eden’s attempts to create greater European 
understanding and co-operation. Churchill’s works emphasise the importance of 
America, and this particular issue is a good example. He goes to great lengths in 
‘The Grand Alliance’, to show how firmly he impressed upon Eden his support for 
America, publishing a minute to Eden that told him point blank that nothing was 
of more importance than “those principles of freedom and democracy set forth in 
the Atlantic Charter”.7 Barker, Charmley, and Carlton argue that from 1943 Eden’s 
policy had at least some grounding in an idea about the structure of post-war 
Europe, and the European Advisory Commission can be seen as an example. 
Barker also notes that some of Eden’s ideas for post-war Europe became part of the 
set up of the United Nations. There is scope here to examine in more detail why 
Eden urged the acceptance of the Soviet frontiers when he did, and why he felt 
that post-war collaboration with the Soviet Union was desirable as far as British 
                                                 
6 Carlton, Eden, pp. 192-3 and Charmley, J. Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biography, (London, 
1995), p. 485. 
7 Churchill, W.S. The Second World War, Volume III: The Grand Alliance, (London, 1985), p. 616. 
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interests were concerned. Was this in line with an idea of a post war European 
policy, or was there something else underlying the actions of Eden and the Foreign 
Office. Martin Folly’s ‘Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45’ is one of 
the few works that actually examines in detail the Anglo-Soviet relationship 
during the war, and his study suggests that there was a genuine idea amongst 
British Officials, made from observation and debate, that the Soviet Union would 
continue to co-operate with the Western powers after the war.   
The most commonly suggested start point for a European based post war 
policy was after Eden’s visit to Washington in March 1943, though this appears to 
be based on distrust of America, rather than a sudden change to being pro-Soviet 
or pro-European. The suggestion is that he was unconvinced of American 
sincerity, and thus made it the role of the Foreign Office to effectively plan against 
Churchill for a European post-war system which would not be influenced by the 
Americans. As David Dutton remarked in his biography, Eden was very worried 
about “placing Britain's eggs in a single [American] basket”, and he “believed that 
an Atlantic partnership would need to be balanced by her [Britain’s] position in 
Western Europe, particularly in association with a revived France, and, if possible, 
by continuing friendship with Russia”.8 Thus we can see the idea of balancing both 
sides, so that if things didn’t go to plan with the American alliance, there would 
still be something left for Britain. The idea of Eden being wary of America is one 
that comes across in many of the works, although they differ on the degree. 
Charmley argues in ‘Churchill: The End of Glory’, that Eden saw the American 
Alliance as potentially ruinous to Britain, suggesting it was “endangering the 
whole future of Anglo-French relations - and with it any hope of a British foreign 
policy independent of America”.9 Here we clearly see Eden’s hope lay firstly in 
Europe, working with France particularly to create a post-war European system 
that would ensure peace, and secondly the desire for the British to act 
independently of the Americans. Barker, however, argues that his anti-American 
                                                 
8 Dutton, D. Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation, (London, 1997), p. 146. 
9 Charmley, End of Glory, p. 544. 
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attitude was not as strong as Oliver Harvey’s, for example, and that it was also 
pragmatic. In October 1943, for instance, she noted his willingness to accept an 
American compromise proposal over the administration of France after liberation 
as he saw it as the Americans moving in the right direction.10 Some allowance must 
also be made for Eden here, as he was the head of the Foreign Office, which was 
quite strongly anti-American, and feared the spread of American influence in 
Europe. He thus had to balance any particular leaning he had with those of his 
Department. He also had Harvey as his Private Secretary, who was pro-Soviet and 
anti-American, which may well have influenced his views. How far this affected 
Eden is hard to gauge, but it is clear that there was some anti-American sentiment 
to Eden’s policy, especially around Tehran with the American refusal to treat 
Britain as an equal, which confirmed his desire for a pro-European policy.  
 
One thing evident in the secondary sources is the idea that Eden may have 
been following a pro-European policy because of his sympathy towards the Soviet 
Union. In 1935 he was the first British statesman to meet the Soviet Dictator, 
Joseph Stalin, a meeting which left both men with good impressions of the other. 
He had also volunteered his services in 1939 during the attempts to gain an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, and despite support from his predecessor, Lord 
Halifax, was turned down by the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. Whilst 
outside the Foreign Office he was in contact with the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan 
Maisky, and was generally in favour of an alliance with Stalin. Once back at the 
Foreign Office, Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, noted that 
Eden made it one of his main priorities to improve relations with the Soviet Union. 
Harvey noted in his diary in December 1941 “that A.E. is the one man in England 
who is ready to put their [Russia’s] case”11 and this can be seen throughout the 
war. There was concern that Harvey could have influenced Eden, as Carlton 
illustrated with a quote from the Permanent Under Secretary Sir Alexander 
                                                 
10 Barker, Churchill and Eden, p. 101. 
11 Harvey, J [Ed.]. The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945, (London, 1978), 18 December 1941, p. 
77.  
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Cadogan’s diary from 23 May 1942: “I think he'll be all right. But he is subject to 
temptation and that ass Harvey's advice”.12 In fact, Harvey’s influence on Eden 
was often limited, and Cadogan had commented shortly after Eden’s appointment 
that he was “glad to find A. not ‘ideological’ and quite alive to uselessness of 
expecting anything”13 from Russia. It is interesting, however, that both Carlton and 
Charmley suggest that in their reactions to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, 
Churchill was far more exuberant and enthusiastic than Eden initially, and that 
Eden and the Dominions Secretary, Viscount Cranborne, had to remind Churchill 
that “half the country” regarded the Soviet Union as being “politically ... as bad as 
Germany”, and they took the “Tory standpoint” that aid should be “purely 
military”.14 Churchill’s interest soon waned, partly because, contrary to his and the 
military’s expectations, the Soviet Union was not quickly defeated;15 partly because 
collaboration with Russia brought up the topic of war aims and post-war planning, 
something Churchill wanted to avoid; and partly because he was reluctant to treat 
the Soviet Union as an equal partner, as evidenced by his veto of Eden’s proposed 
visit to Moscow early that year on the grounds of Eden’s safety, a concern that he 
had never shown to any of Chamberlain’s visits to Hitler.16 A passage in Dutton’s 
biography is, however, very revealing. He noted that “After a period when the 
scope for diplomatic initiative had been limited, after the setback of his two-month 
odyssey to the Middle East and in the context of an administration in which 
Churchill would always reserve for himself some of the main components of 
British foreign policy, relations with the Soviet Union came to assume a central 
importance for Eden, particularly after the Nazi invasion of June 1941. Diplomacy 
towards a country which was certain to emerge - assuming an Allied victory - as 
one of the great powers of the post-war world became a key issue for Eden - his 
preserve in a way that Anglo-American relations could never be”.17 This suggests, 
with some accuracy, that Eden focussed on the development of Anglo-Soviet 
                                                 
12 Carlton, Eden, p. 198. 
13 Dilks, Cadogan Diary, 6 January 1941, p 347. 
14 Charmley, End of Glory, pp. 455-6. 
15 Ibid, p. 456 and Carlton, D. Churchill and the Soviet Union, (Manchester, 2000), p. 84. 
16 Barker, Churchill and Eden, p. 226. 
17 Dutton, Eden, p. 181. 
18 
relations as they were the only other major power he could court. His 
determination to do so, however, resulted in some historians levelling the charge 
of appeasement against him.18 Churchill held the American card for himself, so it 
was left to Eden and the Foreign Office to deal with Russia. This also meant 
dealing with the questions of war aims, the immediate effects on Europe and post-
war planning by default, so it is logical that they would try and develop policy 
that took these into account. Whether it was because of Russia that they came up 
with this policy, or because of this policy line that Eden looked favourably on 
Russia is hard to determine, but the fact Churchill was occupied with America 
meant, in theory at least, that Eden could focus on this policy without American 
influence. Although some in the Foreign Office, mainly personified by Harvey, 
had an ideological leaning towards the Soviet Union, the department as a whole 
was more balanced, and so it is unlikely, especially given the strength of Churchill 
in Cabinet, that a policy dictated by ideology would have arisen or made any 
progress. Indeed, the closest thing to an ideology that comes across from the 
Foreign Office is anti-Americanism, and this is something that shall be examined 
in greater detail as the thesis progresses.    
 
Conversely, it could have been a sign of arrogance that Eden wanted a 
preserve of his own. If Churchill’s was to be the USA, the next best thing was the 
USSR. Gabriel Gorodetsky, in ‘Grand Delusions’, implied that Eden was bordering 
on arrogance with his views towards Anglo-Soviet relations when he became 
Foreign Secretary, suggesting that he seemed “to believe naively that the mere 
announcement of his appointment would lead to an improvement in relations”.19 
Thus the idea that this came across in foreign policy is one that certainly has some 
standing. It is often mentioned that Eden was looking for recognition, and in a way 
that is no major issue, but perhaps he also believed some of the rhetoric of being “a 
man going home”.20 He himself noted in his papers that “the Russians profess to 
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regard me as one who has no prejudice against them”.21 It is undeniable that ego 
and vanity played their part in Eden’s views, but so too, it will be argued, did a 
genuine vision about what sort of post-war settlement would suit Britain best. 
 
The hand which Eden had to play was heavily influenced by the dire 
situation he inherited in December 1940. The relationship with France, Britain’s 
great ally, had gone from high hopes to enmity. During the first year of the war 
tensions grew between the two, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Finland on 
30 November 1939.22 Initial reactions were muted, but the spirited Finnish 
resistance led to a change of heart and significant pressure from the French 
required action to be taken. The fall of Prime Minister Edouard Daladier in March 
194023 accentuated this pressure, and consequently the ill-fated Narvik campaign 
was planned. This pressure irritated many in Britain, with Cadogan commenting 
with annoyance that “They [France] talk about ‘vigorous prosecution of the war’, 
which means that we should do it, provided that we remove the war as far as 
possible from France!”.24 Unfortunately for the French, war soon came to them, 
and by 22 June an armistice had been signed between the new French Government 
under Marshall Philippe Pétain25 and Germany, and by 25 June Hitler was 
boasting that “The war in the West is ended”.26 The armistice agreement left much 
of French territory being ruled by this newly formed Vichy regime. Whilst not 
entirely loyal to Germany, it was often thought to have, as Churchill put it, 
“effectively placed its every resource at the disposal of the enemy”.27 Churchill had 
backed the rebel Free French General Charles de Gaulle, so there existed the germ 
of a possible democratic restoration should France be liberated, but events were 
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proving him to be a difficult protégé. There is no room to look in detail at the 
wider aspects of this division on the French colonial possessions, or its impact on 
the support or otherwise for the allied cause in different parts of the French 
Empire, but this is covered in great detail by Martin Thomas in his book ‘The 
French empire at war, 1940-45’.28 The nature of post-war France would be critical to 
British and European security; but in 1941, it took an effort of imagination to see 
France restored and sitting alongside the British at the end of hostilities. 
 
The Soviet Union was a different matter entirely. Since 1917 they had been 
controlled by the Bolsheviks, a Leninist Communist party, and an authoritarian 
one at that, directly opposing liberal democratic Britain. Not only that, but some in 
Britain, such as Churchill during the 1930s, actually saw the Soviets as being worse 
than the Nazis, and there was often more sympathy felt towards Hitler as a leader 
than Stalin. These attitudes were largely reciprocated, as Vladimir Lenin believed 
that Britain represented “the undoubted leader of the capitalist conspiracy” which, 
it was claimed, was out “to destroy the first communist state”.29 Throughout the 
inter-war period there were many examples of ideological differences, probably 
the two most notable were the Russian Civil War, where Britain, France, Germany 
and the USA all sent troops to fight against the Bolsheviks in favour of the pro-
Monarchy White forces;30 and the raid on the All-Russian Co-operative Society 
(ARCOS) and the Soviet Trade Delegation premises in 1927 which led to a break in 
diplomatic relations.31 Many in the pre-war Government, including Chamberlain, 
held strong anti-Soviet views, and indeed it has been argued that “personal 
prejudice” and “ideological antipathy” were partly responsible for Chamberlain’s 
decision making when it came to attempted pre-war agreements with the Soviet 
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Union.32 After the Nazi-Soviet Pact the totalitarian powers were effectively allies, 
so in 1941 it was hard to look upon the Soviet Union with the same kindness that 
would have been afforded an invaded democracy. Anthony Peters suggested that 
at the start of the Second World War, “Anglo-Soviet relations were still 
characterised by suspicion and thinly veiled hostility”,33 and much of this was due 
to the ideological conflicts during the interwar years. 
Ideology was not the only issue standing between Britain and Russia. History 
also played a part in shaping the relations of the two powers. The Crimean War 
[1853-1856] was fought by Britain and France against Russia on Russian territory;34 
Russia went to war with Britain’s ally Imperial Japan in 1904;35 and most notably 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks had pulled Russia out of the First World War with the 
signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,36 leaving Britain, France and America to 
shoulder the remaining burden of defeating the Germans. Thus historical 
apprehension and ill feeling was the base for relations during the inter-war period, 
and the ideological differences did little to help the situation. Russian actions 
during the period of Appeasement and during the opening year of the Second 
World War did little to thaw the cold atmosphere. Although the Soviet Union 
made some trade and economic agreements with France, it made no similar 
commitments to Britain, and come 1939 it remained unclear as to where the Soviet 
Union stood if a general conflict broke out. The answer was soon discovered as 
Britain was an unwilling partner in the negotiations for an agreement with the 
Soviet Union in 1939, and the stalling of these negotiations contributed to the 
signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.37 In Cabinet on 24 August Halifax commented that 
“it appeared to be contrary to good faith that, while we were conducting 
negotiations with the Russians in all confidence, they should have been 
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negotiating with Germany behind our back”.38 Anglo-Russian relations returned to 
the freezer for at least another eighteen months. 
The Russian decision to side with Germany was one thing, but its continued 
belligerency annoyed Britain. It had invaded Eastern Poland, a country which had 
been guaranteed by the allies against German aggression, had essentially annexed 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia,39 and then followed this up by invading Finland. 
This last act was a major problem for the allies. Finland was a democracy and a 
bystander, and had been attacked without cause. Churchill, however, managed to 
find the light in both these events, and suggested that both were necessary for 
Soviet security, an argument he could have made but did not make about Russian 
frontier demands in 1942. In the case of Poland he commented that “We could 
have wished that the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as 
the friends and allies of Poland instead of as invaders. But that the Russian armies 
should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the 
Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern Front has been created 
which Nazi Germany does not dare assail”.40 He took the same line on Finland, 
believing that “any strengthening of Russia’s position in the Baltic was desirable”41 
both for Soviet security, and the overall situation of Europe at that particular time. 
These events, whilst not wholly relevant to this study, are worth noting for as an 
early example of Churchill’s notable swings in policy. On this occasion he moved 
from inter-war hostility towards the Soviet Union, to appeasement proposals for a 
‘Grand Alliance’, through support for aggressive Soviet military activities, to be 
followed by the return to anti-Soviet rhetoric in support of the Finnish resistance. 
This was a clear example of the changing mood of Churchill’s foreign policy, 
something this thesis will go on to suggest happened on more than one occasion, 
thus making it particularly difficult for Eden, as Foreign Secretary, to get on with 
his job.  
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Having looked at where Britain stood in its relations with France and Russia, 
there remains the issue of Britain’s own political standing at the beginning of 1941. 
After being diplomatically outmanoeuvred by Germany and the Soviet Union 
before the war, Britain was very much on the back foot. Instead of fighting 
alongside France and Russia, the failed negotiations meant Britain and France 
alone went to war against Germany after the invasion of Poland, though no real 
fighting commenced until spring 1940. The closest Britain came to fighting in the 
first months of the war was a proposal to send military aid to Finland against the 
Soviet Union, a seemingly bad idea from whatever angle it is viewed. When the 
‘phoney war’ ended, the British found themselves driven from Europe and in a 
position more parlous than any since the era of Napoleon. The defeat at Narvik 
brought Churchill (who had been largely responsible for it) to office in May 1940, 
and the death of Chamberlain in November 1940 brought him to the leadership of 
the Conservative Party. But his erratic judgment and his egotism, both of which 
were in evidence from the time he returned to Government in September 1939, 
were not forgotten. 
 
If the outbreak of war had brought Churchill back into the Cabinet as First 
Lord of the Admiralty, it took longer for Eden to return there. He was brought into 
the Government in 1939, but only as Dominions Secretary.42 As Prime Minister, 
Churchill made him Secretary of State for War, thus including him de-facto, in the 
War Cabinet.43 Eden’s time at the Dominions Office was quieter than Churchill’s at 
the Admiralty, and Eden himself suggested that his role in the Cabinet as 
Dominions Secretary was “anomalous, not to say humiliating”44 with nothing 
major to do, though this was perhaps more a frustrated comment than a true 
reflection of working in Government during wartime. He became far more active 
after his promotion to the War Office, applying himself to this new job with 
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“enthusiasm”.45 He took a more active part in the high level discussions of the war, 
and accompanied Churchill to the Franco-British Supreme War Council meeting in 
June 1940.46 He also visited the Middle East on what would become the first of 
many wartime missions, developing invaluable contacts with the Middle East 
Commander, General Archibald Wavell; he successfully reorganised and re-armed 
the Army after its evacuation from France and formed the Home Guard volunteer 
force, though had Churchill to thank for its name.47 Despite a failed attempt to 
return Eden to the Foreign Office in September 1940, Churchill was still keen on 
the idea; but it was not until December 1940 that the opportunity arose. When 
Philip Lothian, the Ambassador in Washington, passed away, Churchill 
considered Halifax for the post, and with Halifax accepting, there was a vacancy at 
the head of the Foreign Office, and Churchill “had no doubt who should fill the 
vacancy”.48 Eden's promotion was announced on 23 December 194049 and his 
return was described as “like a man going home”.50 
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3) A Man Going Home 
 
Lothian’s death allowed Churchill to send Halifax, tainted by his association 
with appeasement, to Washington. The political Left regarded him as an opponent 
of cooperation with the USSR,1 though Andrew Roberts defends Halifax from such 
a charge, noting that Cripps’ appointment was his idea, that he helped maintain 
relations during the winter war with Finland and did not condone the Soviet 
invasion of Poland, which prevented further alienating Russia.2 Halifax had also 
warned of the danger of the French maintaining inadequate defences as a result of 
their defeatist attitude, thus leaving Britain alone to face the might of Germany.3 
Despite this, there was increasing discontent with his position, and Churchill was 
conscious of this, believing that “his record in the years before the war and the 
way in which events had moved left him exposed to much disapprobation and 
even hostility from the Labour side of our National Coalition. I knew that he was 
conscious of this himself”.4 This seems an odd sentiment when Halifax would have 
been preferred as Chamberlain’s successor in May 1940 by the Left, but, as we 
know from many sources, including Halifax’s own diary,5 Churchill was looking 
for a way to move him from the Foreign Office. As we have seen, Churchill 
described Eden’s return as being “like a man going home”.6 Though he had 
enjoyed his time at the War Office, Eden knew that “there could not be any 
argument”, and accepted his increased responsibility.7 He was, however, glad that 
he would now be Churchill’s colleague at the Foreign Office rather than his 
subordinate with the Army.8 It is important to note that Eden’s return to this high 
post was down to Churchill’s desire to have him there, and his gratitude for this 
was something that can be seen to weigh on his conscience throughout the war. 
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Eden was the obvious choice, not least with regard to the USSR. In his 
previous stint as Foreign Secretary he was in favour of working with Russia, and 
in 1935 had been invited to Moscow to meet Stalin,9 a meeting that was marked 
with friendliness and openness according to Molotov.10 He could make a plausible 
claim (provided no one looked too closely11) to have been an anti-appeaser; he had 
worked with the League of Nations to try and maintain European co-operation in 
a difficult period; and that part of the political spectrum which distrusted Halifax 
could greet Eden with some enthusiasm. His ability, his Foreign Office history and 
his tireless work ethic meant he earned the loyalty and devotion of his officials, 
some of whom were notable in their own right, and many of whom were as 
experienced, if not more so, than their new master.12 His return also renewed a 
partnership formed during the mid 1930s with Cadogan. Under Eden’s first period 
as Foreign Secretary he was instrumental in bringing Cadogan back from China as 
Senior of the Deputy Under-Secretaries in the Foreign Office, and had even tried to 
promote him in place of Sir Robert Vansittart as Permanent Under-Secretary in 
1936.13 Eden was seemingly the ideal choice to try and navigate Britain through the 
difficulty of the war, ensuring that it maintained its position and did not find itself 
isolated.  
Eden’s problems were immense, however. Effectively isolated by a German-
dominated Europe, still under threat of defeat, Britain’s first priority was survival. 
Trying to focus on diplomacy to create the sort of post-war world which would 
make the sacrifices of war worthwhile was no small challenge whilst dealing with 
Churchill, the American President Franklin Roosevelt, Stalin and General de 
Gaulle. 
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Eden was well-placed to deal with the pressing issue of relations with the 
USSR. He had met Stalin and been an advocate of Anglo-Russian cooperation in 
the late 1930s; he had volunteered to go to Moscow in 1939 to try and secure an 
agreement;14 and had maintained good relations with Maisky. He consequently 
believed that “the Russians profess to regard me as one who has no prejudice 
against them”.15 With the pro-Soviet Harvey reappointed as his Private Secretary, 
no one could accuse Eden of hostility towards the Russians. 
Eden’s record on France was less suggestive of possible progress. Despite the 
fact that Halifax had raised the idea of staging a coup against the Vichy authorities 
in Dakar in July 1940,16 he received little political blame for its failure, and appears 
to have sustained a better working relationship with both the Free French and 
Vichy than was maintained with the Soviets. Indeed, Roberts argues that 
“Halifax’s skill in dealing with the raw and sensitive French mood was ultimately 
of great value”,17 providing a Foreign Office supported financial agreement to back 
de Gaulle, as well as a modus vivendi with Vichy after the release of the terms of 
the Franco-German treaty in October 1940. Thus in Anglo-French relations Eden 
had a harder act to follow. Thanks to Churchill, Eden’s involvement in relations 
with France began before his return to the Foreign Office. He had accompanied 
Churchill to France in June 1940 to meet then Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, as 
well as Pétain and General Maxime Weygand.18 During this trip Eden realised that 
the end of French resistance was imminent, and there could be two French 
Governments after any surrender. Even Weygand, whom he regarded very highly, 
gave the impression of “reserved fatalism”.19 Eden shared Churchill’s early good 
impression of de Gaulle when they met, and it seems that, unlike Churchill, he was 
to find de Gaulle more manageable over the long term, and under his leadership, 
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the Foreign Office was to prove less of a block on enthusiasm for the Free French 
than under Halifax.20 On this visit Eden was already thinking that de Gaulle might 
be at the head of one of the French groups, most likely the one responsible for 
carrying on the French resistance from the colonies.21 When he returned to the 
Foreign Office, however, he found that Britain was thinking of Anglo-French 
relations simply in terms of relations with the Vichy Government of Pétain, and 
thus was largely ignoring the Free French Movement and de Gaulle. Whilst 
holding good impressions of de Gaulle, Eden was not fully convinced he was the 
man to lead France. This left Eden with a problem, as he doubted the reliability of 
the Vichy government, but did not have confidence in its likely alternative. 
Consequently, he was initially prepared to follow Churchill’s policy of talking to 
all sides to try and get as much as possible from each, not entirely dissimilar to 
previous British foreign policy. 
But even with his “keen desire to improve our relations with the Soviet 
Government”,22 and determination to set relations with France on a more stable 
and normal footing, Eden was frustrated by current events. As he came to office 
the fall-out of Soviet Foreign Minister Vaycheslav Molotov’s visit to Berlin and the 
Nazi-Soviet tussle over Bulgaria was in full swing, as well as the Italian war with 
Greece. There was disillusionment over trade talks with Russia, with Cripps 
threatening to withdraw from negotiations, frustrated with their lack of co-
operation. Additionally, relations with Vichy were being strained by the varied 
allegiances of its leaders, with some, such as Admiral Francois Darlan, pushing for 
economic negotiations with Germany, and others stating that this was out of the 
question; not to mention the increasing tension between Vichy and the Free French 
Movement over de Gaulle’s activities, especially in North Africa.  
Eden also found himself “horrified at deadness of Foreign Office and its 
wooliness”,23 and Harvey was “equally appalled by [its] anti-liberal attitude”.24 It 
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is hard to see where this idea originated except, perhaps, the continued inclusion 
of Vansittart, now Chief Diplomatic Advisor, though more likely this was simply 
Harvey’s more eccentric views clouding his judgement on the personnel in the 
Foreign Office, many of whom were remnants from the Munich era, a group of 
people he particularly detested.25 It seems that, along with the change of Foreign 
Secretary, changes in attitude and personnel were required before any significant 
change could be brought to foreign policy. Thus as well as calming Cripps and 
convincing him to continue negotiations, Eden had to adjust the attitude of the 
Foreign Office and restrain its more anti-Soviet elements, otherwise it “would 
indicate to the Soviets that the new Foreign Secretary intended to initiate a policy 
of toughness rather than conciliation”.26 He also needed to continue Foreign Office 
support for the apparently dwindling Free French Movement, as well as trying to 
prevent Vichy falling to the Germans. His initial actions, therefore, were not 
designed to introduce a new era of friendly relations, but principally to prevent 
any deterioration from their already low ebb, to bring a steadying influence to the 
Foreign Office and take it out of its policy of apparent drift.  
 
Unfortunately, attempts to change attitudes or personnel would have to wait, 
as current events were threatening to overtake the British. On 10 and 11 January 
1941 Germany and Russia signed several new agreements: a Frontier Treaty 
setting out the borders between the Soviet Union and Germany after the admission 
of Lithuania into the USSR; a new economic agreement regulating the trade of 
materials until August 1942; and an agreement concerning repatriation and 
property claims in the Baltic.27 According to Pravda the negotiations were 
“conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding and confidence in keeping with 
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the friendly relations existing between the USSR and Germany”.28 This was 
problematic for the British. Germany and Russia were able to come to terms over 
grievances, whereas the British had comparatively little to offer the Russians in 
any negotiations, a factor that had hampered the 1939 talks.29 These agreements 
came into force immediately and, for the time being, heralded a closer co-operation 
between Russia and Germany, making it harder for the British to achieve anything. 
This did not improve Cripps’ mood, and during November he commented that “it 
looks like we are in for a long spell of ‘negative’ action here, that is just ignoring 
this country & vice versa and merely writing notes to one another of complaints”.30 
A later diary entry revealed how correct that assessment had been. It read “the 
only thing that looks fairly clear for the moment is that they don’t want to have 
anything to do with us! I still haven’t seen any of them since mid-November”.31 
This isolation, coupled with the January agreements, led Eden to conclude that 
“After that, and their failure to respond to any of our various approaches, there 
can, I think, be no question of our making any further political or economic offers 
to the Soviet Government”.32 
Another issue hampering British attempts to improve relations was the 
outstanding question of the Russian annexation of the Baltic countries during the 
summer of 1940. In their first meeting since becoming Foreign Secretary, Maisky 
treated Eden to “a monologue about the outstanding Baltic States dispute”,33 
considering this of fundamental importance, and informed Eden that “a British 
recognition of the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States was a prerequisite for a 
significant improvement in relations”.34 Maisky highlighted three key points of 
conflict: the Baltic gold which Britain had seized as compensation for the 
nationalization of British property; Baltic ships seized in Britain, and the fate of the 
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sailors on board the seized ships.35 Whilst Eden saw room to progress on the last 
point, and authorised Cripps to negotiate a settlement on this issue,36 overall he felt 
that Britain could not “hope to gain anything in the present circumstances by 
making fresh attempts to reach a settlement on the various outstanding Baltic 
questions […] Maisky has approached me urging that we should make an effort, 
and we have made a start with a minor point of repatriation of Soviet sailors. But, 
despite his assurances, I see no sign of Russian willingness to co-operate, nor, I 
think, shall we see any such signs”.37 Such a statement showed that Eden, like 
Cripps and Halifax before him, thought relations would not improve, as they 
realised that the Baltic question, especially after the January agreements, was not 
going to be easily solved.  
There was the possibility, however, that Anglo-Russian relations could 
improve as new opportunities arose. At the end of January, Eden, against the 
advice of some in the Foreign Office who felt the British should retaliate against 
Cripps’ poor treatment in Moscow by refusing to see Maisky, had another meeting 
with the Ambassador. He complained that Molotov had not seen Cripps in several 
months38 and, with Maisky providing only a feeble explanation, Eden warned that 
“if Cripps continued to receive such cold treatment, Maisky could expect the 
same”.39 This resulted in a rapid change of fortunes for Cripps, who, on 1 
February, had his first meeting with Molotov since the previous summer. There 
was, however, little to discuss, and Cripps noted with dejection that the talks were 
“unproductive”.40 However, the confidence gained from this meeting prompted 
him to remark to the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Andrey 
Vyshinsky, that current Soviet policies “could affect Britain’s attitude to any 
German peace proposals”41 if they were along the lines that “Western Europe 
should be returned to its former status, while Germany should be unhampered in 
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the expansion of her 'living space' to the east”.42 He also proposed that Eden, 
whilst visiting Egypt, Greece and Turkey, should come to Moscow to meet Stalin. 
This idea was unanimously rejected: Vyshinsky informed Cripps that “the time 
had not yet come”43 for such a meeting; Churchill vetoed the idea, informing Eden 
that “I would hardly trust them for your personal safety or liberty”.44 This was an 
ironic statement considering the lack of regard shown for Chamberlain’s safety or 
liberty in three visits to Germany in September 1938. Eden himself was disinclined 
to go to Moscow without official invitation, and informed Cripps that it was bad 
policy for the British to “run after the Russians”.45 It could also be assumed that, 
had Churchill heard of Eden’s incident whilst flying between Cairo and Cyprus, he 
wouldn’t have wanted him spending any more time than necessary on a plane.46 
Eden did not visit Moscow but as a compromise, he suggested that Cripps visit 
him in Ankara.47  
At the beginning of March Cripps went to Turkey, where he discussed the 
Balkans, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Baltic question with Eden. His diary revealed 
little success in relation to Russia, though he hoped that he had persuaded Eden to 
take some action over the Baltic.48 Unfortunately there is no room for a full 
examination of the whole Baltic question, but Kaarel Piirimäe’s recent study 
provides and in depth discussion on the question, from the often overlooked 
perspective of the Baltic powers.49 He had some success in improving Russo-
Turkish relations, helping to ensure a Russian declaration that, in the event of 
Turkey being attacked “and forced into war for the defence of its territory, it could 
then, in accordance with the non-aggression pact existing between Turkey and the 
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USSR, count on the complete understanding and neutrality of the USSR”.50 This 
indirectly helped Anglo-Russian relations, as it alleviated the fear of hostile 
Russian designs on Turkey, and thus on the Balkans as a whole. Richard Austen 
‘Rab’ Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
announced that the agreement was “regarded by the Government as eminently 
satisfactory”, and that the Government “hoped that such developments would 
draw closer our relations with the Soviet Government”.51 It is worth noting, 
however, that Butler was later forced to concede “that I cannot report any progress 
with these matters so far”52 in relation to the hope that the Russo-Turkish 
agreement would improve Anglo-Russian relations. 
 
While relations with the Soviet Union were progressing, affairs with France 
were also a key focus, and Eden wanted to “have done with the whole apparatus 
of backstairs diplomacy” which he felt had “reduced Britain’s policy towards 
Vichy to such an unsatisfactory muddle”.53 His efforts were directed towards 
ending the system of diplomacy by personal relationship and opening up more 
formal channels. His first step was to send a Treasury Official to France54 in an 
effort to settle outstanding financial matters and to institute a formal contact with 
Vichy. Next he proposed that Churchill, using his relationship with Roosevelt, 
send a message to Pétain via the US ambassador in Vichy, Admiral Leahy. He 
failed, however, to take into account that Leahy was sympathetic to Vichy and was 
strongly suspicious of Britain, thus rendering this approach ineffective. 55 Whilst 
Pétain had no intention of acting on the British suggestion that he should move the 
French Government to North Africa, one positive that came from this message was 
that Weygand requested supplies alongside a vague promise that Morocco would 
one day resume the fight against Germany alongside the British.56 It seemed that 
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this, together with the courting of Weygand that had been occurring over the past 
few months under Churchill’s encouragement,57 was thawing the General’s 
loathing of the British. Unfortunately, Weygand, who felt the idea of a continued 
struggle from Africa ridiculous,58 was simply throwing out feelers in an effort to 
make the British reveal their hand, and, as he suspected, it was a weak one.59  
Whilst attempts to seduce Weygand were proving futile, there were other 
difficulties. One of these was the post-armistice situation with Vichy regarding the 
internment of British and French citizens and service personnel by the other. Vichy 
had interned, at various points of its African empire, 200 British service 
personnel.60 Likewise the British had detained two French submarine crews who 
had surrendered to Britain, but who remained loyal to Pétain and the Vichy 
regime. Although a delicate situation, Eden and the Foreign Office saw this as a 
chance to take a positive step in relations with Vichy, who had proposed that the 
crew of the two submarines should be exchanged for all British service personnel 
held in French Africa.61 Whilst this meant Vichy would receive more personnel 
than the British, the Foreign Office were happy to accept as it avoided Vichy 
breaking the terms of the Armistice agreement with Germany, and it was hoped 
that, in facilitating this, the British might earn some goodwill from Vichy. 
Unfortunately, a delayed response from Vichy, and changing circumstances meant 
that the proposal was never implemented. The Foreign Office, despite the 
references in minutes and communication with Churchill, didn’t count on just how 
seriously the “fear of the Germans”,62 felt by some Vichy officials, would affect 
their decision making, a feature of relations which had not been uncommon since 
the armistice. 
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This fear would also figure in another Foreign Office scheme to improve 
communication with the French. This was the “Lancelot” mission, an attempt by 
the Foreign Office to secretly contact Weygand, via an emissary acting on behalf of 
General George Catroux.63 Though introduced in late 1940, Eden took an interest in 
the scheme when he returned to the Foreign Office, and was particularly keen to 
see “Lancelot’s” report on his return to London in January 1941. The report 
suggested that Weygand was “looking forward to the time when he can resume 
hostilities but that the time is certainly not yet”.64 This came as no surprise to Eden, 
as this had always been Weygand’s standpoint, though he took encouragement 
from Weygand's more restrained demands for support, and his assurances that 
“there can be no question of cession of bases in French Empire to Germany or to 
Italy” and that “any policy of alliance between France and Germany is absolutely 
out of the question”.65 This could have been convincing had the report not 
contained serious hints of the unwillingness to act on these assurances. It 
contained numerous references to the fear of Germany felt in France, with 
“Lancelot” commenting that Weygand did not want to commit to anything so as 
“not to arouse German suspicions” or “give the Germans a pretext to occupy the 
rest of France”.66 Thus the mission did not reveal anything new to the Foreign 
Office, but was successful in opening up a new channel of communication with 
Weygand. As this scheme was constructed under Halifax’s tenure of the Foreign 
Office, Eden’s interest in it suggests that no fresh impetus had accompanied his 
appointment, and that he was reluctant to break with current policy.  
This was soon to change, however, as Eden was considering taking a firmer 
line with Vichy. Cranborne wrote to Eden expressing concern at the situation with 
France. He condemned what he saw as the “twilight policy”, and was pleased that 
Eden was proposing to “take a firm line”.67 Whilst recognising that the situation 
                                                 
63 “Lancelot” – Mr. Mittelman, former French Naval Liaison Officer and member of Free French 
Movement, Egypt, TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/28243, W.H.B Mack’s minute, 5 Jan 1941. 
64 Report of “Lancelot” mission, TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/28243, FO to Lampson, 13 
January 1941. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 TNA, Avon Papers, FO 954/8A, Cranborne to Eden, 29 April 1941. 
36 
was not overly promising for this change of policy, it was acknowledged that 
waiting would simply allow Darlan and the pro-German elements within Vichy 
time to prepare for possible action against Britain. It was also hoped that Britain 
could “force the pace” and coerce “Vichy to declare themselves”, thus enabling 
Britain to “bring in North Africa on our side … and we might finally expose 
Darlan to the United States”.68 This certainly seemed a good idea, as if Vichy could 
be exposed to be, under Darlan’s influence, drifting ever closer to Germany, then it 
would ease British relations with the USA over this complex issue. This would be 
advantageous to the British, as American favouritism of Vichy, and disinterest in 
de Gaulle, a man towards whom Roosevelt developed “a visceral dislike”69 made it 
difficult for them to conduct their ideal strategy, which was to support de Gaulle 
as the alternative to Vichy since he was willing to carry on the fight against 
Germany. Thus if Britain could prove to America that Vichy was essentially hostile 
to the British war effort, then they would look more favourably on British support 
of de Gaulle, and British policy regarding France would not have to tip-toe around 
American support for Vichy.  
It was not just policy with Vichy that Eden was under pressure to change, he 
also faced demands to change the way policy towards the Free French Movement, 
and especially de Gaulle was conducted. A telegram from the British Governor of 
Equatoria, Martin Parr, suggested that de Gaulle was “extremely tired” and 
“exceedingly depressed” by the situation in France and the way he was being 
treated by the British Government.70 De Gaulle considered that only Churchill fully 
understood the “moral importance of the Movement” at that point in time, and 
Parr suggested that Eden encourage Churchill to write to de Gaulle in an attempt 
to allay the despair he felt of “ever persuading His Majesty’s Government to attach 
all the importance warranted” to his mission. 71 It seems de Gaulle was more 
fragile mentally than the Foreign Office believed, and was sensitive to the fact they 
were also dealing with Vichy. This implies that de Gaulle needed plenty of 
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encouragement and support just to keep going, let alone push his movement 
forward or take an active part in the war, something which would become 
important later.    
Despite efforts from both outside and within the Foreign Office to alter their 
policies, the muddle to which R.T. Thomas referred appears to have remained 
unsolved. Indeed, muddle was the appropriate word, as it was the very phrase 
used within the Office in May 1941. When discussing a telegram from General Sir 
Edward Spears the “unjustified lack of enthusiasm for the Free French Movement” 
was picked upon as particularly concerning, the suggested explanation being 
“muddled thinking” on the part of British officials, both home and abroad, who 
had a distinct “lack of understanding of the Government’s policy”.72 It was felt that 
if this could be solved, it could pave the way for better relations with the Free 
French Movement. The solution was to be a pamphlet, created by the Spears 
Mission in collaboration with the Political Intelligence Department, which could be 
distributed both at home, and amongst the fighting services and Government 
missions abroad. This would serve to educate on Government policy and publicise 
the Free French Movement. Whilst this was despatched in large quantities, its 
impact was limited, as later reports suggest that its advice was not heeded.   
 
Eden was finding there was a muddle with regard to both the direction and 
the running of foreign policy. Though other departments rarely interfered in the 
business of the Foreign Office, with many department heads on good terms with 
Eden and not feeling the need to challenge him in the foreign policy sphere, Eden 
faced difficulties from one particular source. That, of course, was Churchill, and 
this relationship would need significant management if it was to prove an 
enduring partnership. For a man who resigned in 1938 due in no small part to 
Chamberlain’s attempts to control foreign policy, it would not be a stretch to 
imagine Eden having difficulty working with Churchill should a similar situation 
arise. On 10 January 1941 Eden set out his position to Churchill in a strongly 
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worded telegram, stating that “it should be made plain that the responsibility for 
advising you and the War Cabinet on the conduct of foreign policy is that of the 
Foreign Secretary and of the Foreign Secretary alone. This responsibility extends, 
of course, to the whole sphere of foreign policy”.73 Eden was apparently firing a 
warning shot at Churchill, letting him know exactly where he felt both he and his 
department expected to stand when it came to all things foreign policy related. He 
goes on in the communication to make it clear to Churchill that “we can none of us 
wish to re-enter a period of divided responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
policy”.74 We can see how Eden felt about the idea of someone else interfering with 
foreign policy, though it is not clear if this was a ploy to provoke a response from 
Churchill; an attempt to look strong in the eyes of his department; a statement 
born out of arrogance or over-confidence in his own importance, or a genuine 
concern about the future control of policy. What ever the reason, Eden had made 
his stand, and as shall be seen throughout this thesis, his position in relation to 
Churchill was a concern that always sat close to the surface. Eden makes no 
reference to this in his memoirs, however, stating instead that “In wartime 
diplomacy is strategy’s twin. There is a strict inter-play of interests”.75 This 
suggests he accepted the idea of some collaboration between himself and Churchill 
with regard to foreign policy. Maybe this was a sign of a post-war mentality of 
trying to explain events so as not to damage the author’s credibility, maybe it was 
an effort to provide a favourable picture of the role the author played in shaping 
the circumstances that existed at the time of writing, or maybe he had simply 
forgotten. Either way, it is interesting that it wasn’t mentioned. 
 
Since Eden’s appointment as Foreign Secretary, despite some positive efforts, 
British foreign policy towards Russia and France appeared quite restrained. 
Although Eden was decisive in preventing relations from deteriorating, most 
notably ensuring that Cripps was able to continue his work in Moscow and 
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stopping de Gaulle from giving up, there was no decisive shift in policy. Eden was 
reluctant to visit Moscow, and he did not want to raise the British offer regarding 
the Russian annexation of the Baltic States from that given in the previous October 
under Halifax. He was also reluctant, although gradually less so, to take a firm line 
with Vichy, yet also to fully commit to supporting de Gaulle’s Free French 
Movement. This would indicate that the replacement of Halifax by Eden did not, 
as was hoped, provide for a direct improvement of relations, and there is no 
evidence that had Halifax gone to Turkey as Foreign Secretary, rather than Eden, 
the outcome would have been different. Thus it would appear that the summary 
given by Gorodetsky that “the change in scenery did not entail a change of 
policy”76 is, on the whole, accurate. It seems Eden did not bring with him a change 
of policy, it could be argued that he brought a change of intentions, but that the 
biggest change was simply a change of appearance and style. 
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4) ‘An Enemy under a Very Thin Disguise’ 
 
Though the initial impact of Eden’s return to the Foreign Office was quite 
limited, it seems that as 1941 progressed, he began to bring a clearer sense of 
direction to British foreign policy. Whether he needed a bedding-in period to 
understand running the Foreign Office in war time, or simply needed time to 
understand the diplomatic situation and the Foreign Office mindset is unclear, but 
whatever the reason, it seems that during the spring Eden began to assert himself. 
This was as much due to circumstance as planning, as outside events provided 
new opportunities that could be exploited, though these did not always lead to 
positive results. It also saw the beginnings of what could be considered post-war 
thinking, particularly with Eden’s speech in May which looked to the future 
freedom of the continent of Europe, and began to speculate how this would look 
and, importantly, how this could be achieved.  
 
April started with a good deal of promise. Russia had reached a new 
agreement with Turkey, and issued statements against the entry of German troops 
into Bulgaria, which warned that “the German Government must understand that 
it cannot count on support from the U.S.S.R. for its acts in Bulgaria”.1 This 
suggested a cooling of relations between Russia and Germany, and amplified the 
British hope that Russia might see the German danger, and become more co-
operative. This hope was increased by the Russian Non-Aggression Treaty with 
Yugoslavia,2 signed after political instability had resulted first in a Yugoslav 
decision to join the Axis, then a coup d’état.3 This step both rebuffed German 
territorial expansion and increased Soviet security in the area, and consequently 
the security of British interests in Turkey. Molotov informed Schulenburg that “the 
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Yugoslav Government had proposed to the Soviet Union the negotiation of a 
treaty of friendship and nonaggression, and the Soviet Government had accepted 
the proposal. In its decision . . . the Soviet Government had been actuated solely by 
the desire to preserve peace”.4 The agreement was meant to bring Germany back 
to the negotiating table, but unfortunately resulted in the German invasion and 
occupation of Yugoslavia.5 This situation created an imminent German threat to 
Russia, and consequently the clear policy aim to warn Russia, and thereby 
improve relations. In a meeting with Vyshinsky which Cripps described as “the 
most useful I have had since I came”,6 he was informed of the Russian agreement 
with Turkey, and felt this demonstrated “a new spirit in the Kremlin”,7 which was 
less enthusiastically pro-German. This feeling increased with the German victory 
in Yugoslavia, and Eden saw an opportunity to “consider Anglo-Russian relations 
afresh”.8 
It seems this new policy began to take effect, as in Moscow and London there 
appeared to be new feelings towards an agreement between the two powers. 
Based on the events in the Balkans, together with evidence reaching the Foreign 
Office about German plans to attack Russia, Eden spoke to Maisky on 16 April, 
informing him that “it was our conviction that Germany’s military ambitions were 
boundless. Russia, I was quite sure, was threatened”.9 This was the first of many 
communications between Eden and Maisky along these lines, as British 
intelligence gained more accurate information of German intentions, and the 
Soviets appeared increasingly unwilling to act upon this. Cripps mirrored this 
attitude and was “firmly convinced . . . that Germany and Russia would be at war 
‘before summer’”.10 Even Churchill, who had taken little interest in Russian affairs, 
took it upon himself to help this cause. Upon receiving military intelligence 
regarding German troop movements in Eastern Europe from Cadogan, not his 
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own intelligence briefing as he suggested in ‘The Grand Alliance’,11 he responded 
that “Stalin must be warned”12 and began drafting a telegram to do just that. This 
telegram, however, was to become a source of contention between Eden and 
Churchill.13 It was short and cryptic to “arrest his [Stalin’s] attention and make him 
ponder”.14 Unfortunately it was beaten to the punch by a telegram from Eden 
which, in less cryptic terms, spelled out the issue,15 and also by an approach made 
by Cripps to Vyshinsky.16 Having delivered his message, and with his inability to 
see Stalin,17 Cripps felt the message from the Prime Minister would be shorter, less 
detailed, less emphatic and a serious tactical mistake.18  
Eden agreed with Cripps’ assessment and told Churchill that “I think there 
may be some force in Sir S. Cripps’s arguments against the delivery of your 
message. If you agree, I would propose to tell him that he need not now deliver the 
message”.19 Churchill downplayed Eden’s actions in ‘The Grand Alliance’, 
mentioning the telegram but not commenting about Eden standing against his 
position.20 Churchill blamed Cripps for the failure to deliver the message, despite 
Eden supporting the Ambassador, overruled them and the message was finally 
delivered to Vyshinsky, as Molotov again refused to see Cripps.21 Eden’s trust in 
Cripps’ judgement was well placed, as he was clearly reacting to events as they 
occurred, recognising their significance, whereas Churchill was acting on the 
significance of one event, and was trying to force this onto everyone else. This is 
not to remove blame from Cripps, who disobeyed direct orders to deliver the 
message, but it is important to see that Eden agreed with Cripps that the message 
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should not be delivered, and stood up for the Ambassador against Churchill. It 
also highlights that Churchill’s version of events cannot be taken at face value, as 
investigating this incident reveals that Eden was as much at fault as Cripps, yet 
Churchill lays no blame at his door. This incident shows that the Foreign Secretary 
and Ambassador were on the same page, and were both acting along the lines of 
the same policy, the first time this can be seen in the study so far. This also 
indicates that Eden's labour to refresh the attitude of the Foreign Office was 
beginning to deliver some rewards.  
 
While there were promising developments in the situation with Russia, 
relations with France were heading in the other direction. Vichy France was 
drifting ever closer to Germany, to the point where it was seen by some as "an 
enemy under a very thin disguise".22 This was compounded by the influence of 
Darlan, who Churchill described as "a bad man, with a narrow outlook",23 
especially after he visited Hitler in May to discuss renewed Franco-German co-
operation, the position of the French fleet and a plan by German Foreign Minister, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, for France to attack Britain.24 Whilst not taking this threat 
too seriously, the British were particularly concerned about the French Navy, and 
its possible effects on their threatened Mediterranean supply-lines. Fortunately, 
this concern was shared in America, and pressure was put on Vichy to resist 
German demands over their fleet so as to protect the Atlantic supply lines. But, 
unfortunately for Eden, the Americans saw Vichy as a regime still able to keep 
some distance from Germany, and maintained diplomatic relations with it.25 Eden 
and the British saw the Vichy French as German puppets. The result was an area of 
long-term Anglo-American disagreement. Eden felt compelled to push for a 
strengthening of the blockade to prevent supplies reaching German occupied 
territory. The Americans, seeing Darlan's negotiations, felt the time was right to 
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increase the supplies sent to Vichy as a way to bolster their opposition to 
Germany. Unfortunately for Eden, his policy involved asking the Americans, 
whom it was felt held greater influence at Vichy, to pressure them not to make 
new agreements with Germany and to ensure supplies sent to North Africa did 
not reach German occupied territory.26 Thus whilst Eden attempted to strengthen 
British policy, his methods inadvertently blocked his intentions, resulting in 
increased American aid to North Africa and Vichy, and Eden having to back down 
from taking a firm line.  
So far then it seemed that, whilst Eden and the Foreign Office were making 
steps in the right direction in Anglo-Vichy relations, the complications of the 
Vichy-Free French dilemma, along with the conflicting ideas coming from America 
about which French group to support, meant little had been, or indeed could be 
achieved in the present climate. The British policy of blockading Vichy was 
continually being thwarted by American aid, and concern over American public 
opinion over the plight of the French people meant that Britain could not risk 
taking a firm policy against Vichy. At this time there was also little that could be 
done with regard to the Free French Movement, and maintaining de Gaulle's ego 
was not high on anyone's priority list, in spite of his complaints that the British 
were not offering him enough support in trying to promote and facilitate the 
operation of the Free French Movement. 27 Thus as summer approached there was 
a distinct frostiness to relations with both the Free French and Vichy, as on the one 
hand the situation meant little concern could be paid to the Free French, while at 
the same time little could be done to improve the situation with Vichy. While there 
were good intentions, it seems these were not born out in the early months of the 
year.  
 
With the fall of Yugoslavia, and the failure of Britain’s “pre-emptive 
occupation”28 strategy in Greece, British troops were once again involved in direct 
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fighting with German forces, though they were rapidly forced off the mainland, 
and came under heavy assault in Crete and Egypt. With German influence spiking 
in the Middle East, particularly with the Rashid Ali coup in Iraq, the British 
position in this area looked very weak. Eden used this Middle East situation in his 
Mansion House speech, given on 29 May 1941, as an example of how far the 
tentacles of Hitler’s New Order had spread. In this speech he considered the 
unstable situation, went on to discuss some of the aims to combat this New Order, 
and from this set out some aims for post-war Europe, and plans for what sort of 
foreign policy would be needed to achieve these. He stated that “While all our 
efforts are concentrated on winning the war, His Majesty’s Government have 
naturally been giving careful thought to this all-important matter”.29 Unfortunately 
he went on to say that they had decided to agree with Roosevelt’s message to 
Congress of January 1941, where he declared his desire to create “a world founded 
upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and 
expression … The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own 
way … The third is freedom from want … The fourth is freedom from fear – 
anywhere in the world”.30  
Whilst there can be no doubting that, compared to Hitler’s New Order, these 
were indeed very solid principles to work towards, simply agreeing to the 
American ideals does not seem to have taken a great degree of thought. 
Fortunately, more thought went into how to realise these ideals, and Eden went on 
to discuss what was envisioned in a practical sense by freedom from want. This 
vision foresaw the economic re-organisation and rebuilding of Europe, a Europe to 
be helped by international finance organisations, and, most importantly, a united 
Europe working with the aid of the British Empire and the USA to rebuild itself as 
an entity.31 Here Eden was not thinking solely about the restoration of one or two 
countries, but of the continent as a whole, as he saw this as the only way in which 
any of the ideals could be achieved. It is worth noting that, whilst the measures 
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would allow Germany to play its part, they, along with political and military 
measures decided at the peace, would be designed to “prevent a repetition of 
Germany’s misdeeds”.32 Thus we can see that already there was some thinking 
within the Foreign Office that looked towards the post-war future of Europe, and 
whilst mainly following the American ideals, there was at least thought as to how 
these could be practically achieved. Considering Europe was enveloped by the 
Cold War in the wake of the Second World War, it is unsurprising that this is not 
regarded as particularly important, barely getting a reference in his biographies or 
his memoirs, but it is hard to say that the Europe that developed, the European 
Economic Community and eventually the European Union, share nothing in 
common with the ideas set forth in this speech. 
 
There was little time to build on this thinking, however, as events in the 
Middle East, and particularly the threat to Egypt caused by the arrival of German 
aircraft in Syria, were to cause the British a diplomatic headache with the French. 
So far, the Free French had been unable to take an active part in the war effort, 
despite de Gaulle’s suggestion in April that Free French forces should occupy 
Beirut, Damascus and the aerodrome at Rayak to remove the Vichy element, 
prevent German support of the new regime in Iraq and use of Syrian facilities.33 
Whilst his foresight was impressive, his timing was less so, as Eden decided that 
they should not to go ahead with this plan at the time, though the arrival of the 
German aircraft led to its reconsideration. Spears commented from the, now–
threatened, Cairo that "We are surely not going to allow the Germans to take over 
Syria by default",34 and Churchill noted, despite the launch of the German assault 
on Crete earlier that same day, that "we must go in".35 For Eden, this meant foreign 
policy concerns had become overpowered by the military necessities of the 
situation, and rather than improving relations with Vichy, Britain was now 
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planning for an active military campaign against them. Despite Wavell's heavy 
burden defending Crete and planning a counter offensive against Rommel, he was 
tasked with assembling a force which, along with six battalions provided by the 
Free French, would essentially carry out de Gaulle’s proposal to take Damascus 
and Beirut, thus removing German and Vichy interest in the area and allowing the 
Free French to gain control of an important part of the French Empire. The 
offensive against Syria began on 8 June,36 and though the campaign was short, it 
was politically damaging.  
That the Syrian campaign involved direct fighting between British and Free 
French forces on one side, and Vichy French forces on the other made it a political 
nightmare. Fortunately, the campaign was short lived, as the Vichy army did little 
more than slow down the British and Free French advance, thus minimising the 
political fallout, but it was enough to force serious questions about the conduct of 
the war, as well as cause a drop in de Gaulle’s prestige. That the British had made 
important strategic gains deflected some of the heat from the issue, and the 
recognition that the Vichy troops, stuck between a rock and a hard place, were 
simply doing their duty, helped make the campaign seem less horrendous from 
the British point of view. For de Gaulle, the fact that the Free French had been 
involved caused a problem, as the Vichy representatives were unwilling to 
negotiate with his Movement, and thus the peace was concluded between Vichy 
and Britain, minimising the gains of the Free French. The involvement of the Free 
French also failed as a recruiting tool as, rather than being seen to be France taking 
the fight to the enemy, de Gaulle was seen as responsible for a "fratricidal French 
conflict",37 pitting Frenchmen against Frenchmen. Consequently, only one in seven 
French soldiers joined the Free French Movement after the campaign, the rest 
being repatriated, with an increased sense of Anglophobia. Unfortunately, the 
difficulties of resourcing the Syrian campaign had a cumulative effect on Wavell, 
who found himself weakened in his preparations for Operation Battleaxe.38 
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Ultimately, the struggle in Syria, and the inability to defend Crete was frustrating 
Churchill, and talk of replacing the General began. In fact, so frustrated was 
Churchill, that he made the claim that "the Middle East had been very badly 
managed. If he could be put in command there he would gladly lay down his 
present office".39 The claim appears to have been serious, as his Private Secretary, 
John Colville, noted in his diary that he would "even renounce the cigars and 
alcohol!"40 
It was the Syria campaign and its outcomes which set the scene for relations 
between Britain and the Free French for the next few months. De Gaulle, having 
suffered politically, had major concerns over the campaign and the terms of the 
armistice. In late June, whilst the campaign was still ongoing, he criticised the 
Middle East Headquarters over its conduct, believing they saw the Syrian 
campaign as a "tiresome and unnecessary military commitment; whilst he 
regarded it on the much higher level of international politics and the whole future 
of Anglo-French relationship".41 He believed that Free French needs were being 
ignored, and that the action taken was to meet British interests. This train of 
thought continued after the conflict, when he was highly critical of the armistice 
terms, especially as British troops were left in occupation in Syria. In a message to 
Churchill de Gaulle commented that he and the Free French "consider this 
convention as basically opposed to military and political interests of Free France ... 
and in its form extremely painful for our dignity".42 At a meeting with Churchill in 
September this criticism continued, but fortunately the personal relationship 
between the two men meant Churchill was able to calm de Gaulle and reassure 
him that Britain sought "no selfish advantage, pursued no Imperial ambitions in 
Syria", and that they had "no desire what ever to supplant France".43 It is 
interesting to note how different personnel led to different outcomes, as a few days 
later de Gaulle spoke with Eden along the same lines, but was much less inclined 
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to agree with Eden, despite being told much the same as he had been by 
Churchill.44  
One thing Eden took from these conversations was an admiration for the 
General's spirit and tenacity, and he acknowledged that this was part of what 
helped de Gaulle keep the flame of France alive. Eden also commented that "As the 
war unfolded we were to have experience enough of de Gaulle's tenacity. If it 
made him seem contumacious, especially to our American allies, perhaps we 
should have learnt from it. Some of the faults of later years might have been 
avoided if we had shown more of the same spirit".45 This was clearly Eden writing 
with hindsight, but as we shall see, such ideas were also held, if not ultimately 
pressed, by Eden at the time. 
 
The replacement of Wavell by General Sir Claude Auchinleck in July46 was 
accompanied by political change. Churchill’s old friend and liaison with de Gaulle, 
Edward Spears, had complained about lack of coordination between the military 
and political spheres, and it was decided to create a Minister of State in the Middle 
East, with full authority to co-ordinate the activities there.47 The man selected was 
Major Oliver Lyttelton, then President of the Board of Trade, whose friendship 
with Churchill ensured he had his confidence, and whose hard work and 
dynamism endeared him to Spears, who noted that his arrival "transformed the 
whole scene".48 Other changes were also afoot, as a set of reforms, commissioned 
by Eden and presented by Sir Malcolm Robertson,49 recommended the 
amalgamation of the Consular Service with the Foreign Office and Diplomatic 
Services, and the introduction of a broader system of entry and increased grants 
and allowances.50 It was hoped that these changes, along with Eden's proposed 
pension plan, would enable the Foreign Office to recruit the best people and 
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maximise their potential. Whilst some of the plans could not be implemented 
during the war, they were approved, and Eden began preparations for a White 
Paper on the issue, which came before Parliament in January 1943. All this, it was 
hoped, would allow for the improvement in diplomatic relations by improvement 
of personnel. The suggestion does not seem a bad one, as the ability to utilise the 
best personnel to the best of their potential should have meant a reduction in chaos 
and confusion that often hampered diplomatic relations. The necessity for this was 
born out by a telegram from Lyttelton which warned that de Gaulle was playing 
off the multiple parties in the Middle East as a result of the poor communications 
and slow decision making process, and that, if left unchecked, "Spears and my 
position becomes compromised".51  
The final personnel change was the removal, by Vichy, of Weygand, who had 
been used as the American justification to continue their policy of aid to North 
Africa, as he was seen as a block on Vichy from within, having spoken against the 
Paris Protocols, and protested about the supply of French war material from North 
Africa to Germany.52 His removal suggested German pressure had finally been felt 
at Vichy, and should have been the catalyst for a strong policy of support for the 
Free French. Whilst the initial American response to suspend economic assistance 
to North Africa gave some hope, this was short lived, and they soon made excuses 
to continue the supply of aid. The Foreign Office was relatively unmoved by the 
news, having "never set much hope on Weygand",53 and didn't see the situation as 
being radically altered. The pro-active changes in personnel looked to be a 
necessary way to try and improve the situation, though their success would only 
be visible in time. The limited reaction to Weygand's dismissal in Britain suggests 
that the policy of collaboration was coming to an end, and Churchill’s comment 
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that "it is now or never with the Vichy French, and their last chance of 
redemption"54 supports this.  
So it seems that, as the end of 1941 approached, little had been achieved in 
improving Anglo-French relations. The attempts to further the Free French 
Movement by involving them in the Syrian campaign backfired, as it reduced de 
Gaulle's prestige, and that of the Movement, and failed both as a recruiting tool 
and an attempt to increase control in North Africa for the Free French. The attempt 
to negotiate with Vichy and bring them on-side had many stumbling blocks, the 
most obvious one being the American insistence that supplies to Vichy were the 
best way to bring them over to the allies, and unfortunately even the removal of 
Weygand failed to change the American policy. The attempts to change personnel 
had limited success, as some of the proposed reforms would not come into effect 
until after the war, though the change of military command was supposed to 
provide renewed impetus in Britain's war effort. The creation of a Minister of State 
in the Middle East was the most positive personnel change, aimed at improving 
the co-ordination of both political and military policy, though it appears the 
practicalities of multiple people with responsibility in the Middle East was also a 
downside, as it still resulted in confusion and slow communications, a situation 
which could be exploited by de Gaulle. As shall be seen below, however, a 
possible explanation for the limited and unsuccessful efforts to resolve the French 
situation was the fact that much of Britain's political energy was being focused on 
the change in the diplomatic and military alignment that came as a result of the 
Russian entry into the war. 
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‘A favourable reference to the Devil’ 
 
Despite their best efforts, the British initiative to warn Russia of the German 
danger had thus far been met with indifference, and was considered an attempt to 
embroil Russia in an unnecessary war with Germany.55 In order to hide any idea of 
collaboration with the British, Russia embarked upon a period of ‘appeasement’ 
towards Germany in an effort to maintain peace. One such act was the Soviet-
Japanese neutrality pact of April 1941, which provided that the two powers would 
“undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between themselves and 
mutually to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other 
contracting party”.56 This, and the ceremony surrounding the visit of Japanese 
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, was designed to show that Russia was moving closer 
towards the Axis, a view confirmed by Matsuoka when meeting the German 
Ambassador in Moscow, Count Friedrich von der Schulenburg, after its 
conclusion.57 Conversely, Maisky attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince Eden the 
pact was simply an extension of the Soviet desire “not to be drawn into 
hostilities”58 and did not mean Russia was being drawn towards Germany, making 
Eden suspect that Maisky was not fully informed of Soviet policy.59 After this, it 
seems that the telegram affair and the changed attitude of Moscow meant that 
Eden had, for the time being, decided to stop chasing after Russia, feeling that “if 
the Russians made no approach after my conversation with Maisky, this would 
show that they were not yet prepared to revise their policy towards Germany”.60  
That Eden made this decision seems to show a degree of foresight, as the 
prevailing attitude in Russia during April and May was one of conciliation 
towards Germany, making it difficult for the British to improve relations. The 
continuing activity of concession prompted Cripps to note that these actions “seem 
to point on giving in to German pressure. We all feel pretty certain this country 
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will go to the very furthest limits possible to avoid war”.61 After a difficult period 
where Russia was solely concentrating on Germany, the increasing evidence of an 
impending German attack on Russia led to the decision that a final attempt to 
improve relations should be made, and that Cripps should return home for 
consultation.62  
 
This decision was made partly for consultation, but also because many in the 
Foreign Office felt Cripps had become too inconsistent with his policy attitude, 
which was seen as contradictory to the Department’s view. Cadogan commented 
that “it cannot be good that we take one line while our Ambassador takes two or 
more others in Moscow”.63 Cripps returned to England in June, which caused 
concern in Moscow as Rudolph Hess, Hitler’s deputy, had flown to Britain in May 
on an ill-fated peace mission. Stalin feared that Cripps’ withdrawal meant Britain 
was planning to sign a peace agreement with Germany, an idea Cripps 
encouraged in warnings to Vyshinsky and Molotov during April. Maisky was also 
worried by this, and urgently asked to see Eden and Sir Walter Monckton, 
Director-General of the Ministry of Information and a close friend of Cripps, to 
discuss this issue. Eden assured him that Cripps had been asked to “come home 
for a brief spell for consultation . . . it was our habit to seek to maintain contact 
with distant Embassies in this way”64 and Monckton assured him that Cripps “had 
not contemplated returning finally to this country”.65  
Desirous of making a final attempt to improve relations, Eden held frequent 
meetings with Maisky to update him on intelligence reports. On 2 June he 
informed Maisky that “Germany was making considerable concentrations of land 
and air forces against Russia”.66 Maisky accepted this, though did not believe that 
Germany would actually attack Russia, suggesting “it would be a very big 
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undertaking, the Soviet army was well equipped and would not have to fight with 
sticks, as it did last time”.67 He asserted that Germany had never fought large 
armoured divisions, and its ten armoured divisions could face up to fifteen 
Russian armoured divisions, though Eden was sceptical of this figure.68 Maisky 
displayed confidence in the Russian ability to defend in the unlikely event of a 
German attack, and had good reason for this, as Russian military combat strength 
had seen a 280% increase since 1939.69 It had also increased its military manpower 
from 2 million to over 5 million, from under 100 divisions to over 300.70 Thus on 
the eve of war, the Russians were confident that Germany would not attack, but 
equally confident that if they did, they would be more than capable of defending 
themselves. This helps explain why, during June, the British were unsuccessful in 
attempts to bring Russia closer, despite the continued presentation of intelligence 
information, as Russia felt no need of an alignment which might provoke a 
German attack. In a telegram to Roosevelt, Churchill informed him that “From 
every source at my disposal, including some most trustworthy, it looks as if a vast 
German onslaught on Russia was imminent”.71 Even though the two were not 
allied, the British were showing a genuine concern at the German troop build-up 
and honestly felt that it was important to warn Russia, not just as a sign that the 
British were not out to see the Soviets destroyed, but also because it would earn 
them goodwill with the Soviet leadership for making such an effort. Unfortunately 
the Russians denounced the warnings as “clumsy fabrications”,72 still believing 
Britain was trying to bring them into an unnecessary war. The one ray of light was 
the conclusion of an agreement over the Baltic sailors, and by 20 June preparations 
were complete for them to be dispatched to the Soviet Union. However, by the 
time Maisky received his final instructions, the Soviet Union was at war with 
Germany.73  
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Early on the morning of Sunday 22 June, just as Cripps had predicted the day 
before,74 and with the accuracy of movement and aims he had predicted as early as 
March 1941,75 Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Colville received the news, and 
immediately informed the guests staying at Chequers, noting in his diary that this 
“produced a smile of satisfaction on the faces of the PM, Eden and [John] 
Winant”.76 At mid-day, Molotov made a broadcast informing Russia about the 
attack, which came with no declaration of war, another Cripps prediction,77 and 
placing the blame on Germany for their aggressive and “bloodthirsty”78 actions. 
Maisky referred to the German actions as “sheer banditry”,79 and told Eden he 
hoped there could now be an understanding between the two countries.80 That 
evening Churchill made a speech that had taken so long to compose it was not 
ready until twenty minutes before it was due to be delivered. This meant neither 
the War Cabinet, nor Eden had reviewed it.81 The day before, Churchill had 
remarked to Colville that “he will go all out to help Russia”,82 and later stated that 
“he had only one single purpose – the destruction of Hitler – and his life was much 
simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell he would at least make a favourable 
reference to the Devil!”83 In his speech he made several favourable references to 
Russia, more so than Eden had contemplated,84 but he never referred to the 
Russians as allies, a proviso given to him by Eden and the Chiefs of Staff.85 His 
speech allayed the Russian fear that Britain would sign a separate peace with 
Germany, and helped to boost morale in Britain and confidence in Churchill’s 
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Government. It also provided a clear and undeniable aim, to beat Germany and 
support Russia. Despite the argument made by Rothwell, that “never can two 
countries have become allies under less amicable circumstances than Britain and 
the Soviet Union in June 1941”,86 allies they had become, although not yet in name, 
and thanks to Eden’s efforts in the preceding months, the circumstances were 
more amicable than Rothwell may have liked to admit.  
 
The fact Russia had suddenly been brought in on the British side required a 
major rethink in Anglo-Soviet relations. Britain had to go from viewing Russia as a 
potential enemy to virtually an ally over the course of a weekend, and this 
required new diplomatic, military and economic strategies. One of the first 
agreements concluded was the provision of military equipment to aid Russia in 
their defence against the German assault. Despite experiencing a rapid, if brutal, 
technological advance under the leadership of Stalin, Russia was still behind her 
western counterparts, and so the British thought they could gain cheap goodwill in 
Russia by giving supplies, information about new military designs, and details of 
German aerial tactics, having experienced these first hand. In July Cripps had an 
interview with Molotov, and his report repeatedly stressed the need for 
maintaining a stream of good quality information, noting that "we must go all out 
even if we think that there is some risk involved ... if we want the Russians to fight 
our battle all out".87 The fact that there was a continued supply of information, 
alongside an exchange of military missions, suggests that Britain was committed to 
the Russian cause after it had passed its initial danger period following the 
invasion. Maisky commented to Eden that he was "very glad we had acted so 
promptly in the despatch of our missions to Moscow",88 especially compared to his 
experience two years previously during the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet 
alliance. The history of slow progress in relations was one that was going to be 
hard to overcome, but the fact Britain had acted quickly, thus straying from their 
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traditional speed of diplomacy, certainly presented the appearance that they were 
sincere in their desire to assist Russia. This attitude wouldn’t be surprising, as it 
was in Britain’s best interest to maintain the Russian resistance, as the more time 
and energy Germany spent fighting Russia was breathing space for Britain, but not 
everyone was initially convinced that the resistance would hold out.   
As part of the co-operation between the two powers, and as a method of 
improving relations and testing the apparent sincerity of the British, Stalin 
suggested at a meeting with Cripps in early July that a Joint Declaration should be 
issued. He felt that, without this, "co-operation was not possible", and suggested 
that it should be of a "purely general nature", under the two headings of mutual 
help and no separate peace.89 Whilst Cripps initially thought this might be 
difficult, the terms don't appear to have been that controversial and later in the 
same meeting he suggested that "His majesty's Government were wholly 
determined upon both these points".90 When put before the War Cabinet, this was 
seen as an unobjectionable solution; not least because Churchill had decided the 
night before that it should be accepted, subject to approval from the Dominions.91 
Neither Churchill nor Eden made much of this in their post-war writing, but the 
diaries of Cadogan and Harvey suggest this was a more contentious issue than 
Eden or Churchill made out. Cadogan notes that, in a conversation with Eden, Sir 
Orme Sargent, the Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, and Butler, he 
was "in favour of giving them all they want - no haggling. Winston wants to do the 
same and to send a personal message to Stalin. A. against that".92 Interestingly, 
Harvey wrote the day before that "A.E. again pressed P.M. for more support to be 
given to Russia"93 but the next day wanted to restrain Churchill from sending an 
impetuous message to Stalin. Harvey suggests that "A. is having some difficulty 
with the P.M. who likes to take all the decisions and get all the credit!",94 a 
suggestion backed up by a minute sent by Eden to Churchill on his proposed 
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personal telegram to Stalin, where Eden showed clear signs of frustration with the 
meddling of the Prime Minister. He commented that "I do not want you to become 
involved in the day to day details of diplomacy ... this is beneath Prime 
Ministers!"95  
Whilst the proposal of a joint declaration was relatively innocuous, it is 
interesting that it caused a disagreement between Eden and Churchill over the 
protocol and procedure of the conduct of foreign policy. Ultimately, Eden backed 
down and Churchill's personal message was sent. “Winston insisted, and the 
sheep baa'ed in chorus"96 remarked Cadogan at his Foreign Secretary’s inability to 
stand against Churchill. This would not be the only time Eden and Churchill 
would have such a disagreement. After a brief exchange of drafts, a satisfactory 
text was achieved, and Cripps was authorised to sign it, much to his delight. The 
agreement, signed on 12 July, was regarded as being the "foundation stone in the 
system of Anglo-Soviet relations during the Second World War"97 and for Cripps 
its signature allowed him to reflect that "I feel at last that I have accomplished 
something worthwhile".98 The main terms were that neither country would sign a 
separate peace treaty with Germany, and both countries would offer each other 
any mutual assistance and support possible, though the wording was careful to 
avoid any specific quantification of assistance. Perhaps Churchill failed to mention 
this in his writing as wanting to go all out to help Russia would go against his 
presentation of the importance and inevitability of the Anglo-American special 
relationship, and Eden’s neglect possibly stems from the fact he was generally 
more favourable towards Russia, and didn’t want this appearance and distinction 
from Churchill blighted by revelations that he tried to restrain offers of support. 
The truth may never be known, but it is an interesting historical conundrum.   
Whilst there was no formal quantification of assistance at this point, it was 
felt that Churchill’s message to Stalin in his initial reaction to the German invasion 
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(codename Barbarossa) was sufficient evidence of Britain’s level of commitment.99 
Indeed the Russians took it to mean that Britain would go all out, and within a 
month both Maisky and Stalin were making demands for Britain to open a Second 
Front in Western or Northern Europe against Germany to relieve some of their 
burden.100 This issue was one that would re-appear many times, and Churchill 
noted in his memoirs that “the Russian pressure for the establishment of a Second 
Front was initiated at the very beginning of our correspondence, and this theme 
was to recur throughout our subsequent relations”.101 Whilst pressing firmly for a 
Second Front, Stalin also made demands for the use of British troops on the 
Russian front, but Eden had reservations about offering this level of assistance. 
Not only were there severe resource and shipping limitations on the amount and 
type of aid that Britain could supply, there was also a significant unwillingness, 
born out of a sense of hypocrisy, to aid Russia when Britain had been left alone 
during the previous year. A telegram from Cripps suggesting Russia thought 
Britain was standing back and resting102 received the angry reply from Eden that 
“They certainly have no right to reproach us. They brought their own fate upon 
themselves … We were left alone for a whole year […] If we had been invaded and 
destroyed in July or August 1941 [sic], or starved out this year in the Battle of the 
Atlantic, they would have remained utterly indifferent … We have done our very 
best to help them at the cost of deranging all our plans for rearmament … We will 
do anything more in our power that is sensible, but it would be silly to send two or 
three British or British-Indian divisions into the heart of Russia to be surrounded 
and cut to pieces as a symbolic sacrifice”.103 Eden was not alone in this view, as 
Churchill noted that “Up to the moment when the Soviet Government was set 
upon by Hitler they seemed to care for no one but themselves … Now, having 
been deceived and taken by surprise, they were themselves under the flaming 
German Sword. Their first impulse and lasting policy was to demand all possible 
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succour from Great Britain and her Empire”.104 Whilst spiteful, it was a valid 
argument for not providing the level of assistance the Soviet Government 
demanded, as it would have been no concern to Russia if Britain had been 
defeated in1940 or 1941, yet now they expected Britain to risk their own survival 
and war effort by supplying and even fighting alongside the Russian armies. 
Supply convoys and fighter squadrons were sent to Russia, as well as American 
aid shipped via Britain, so clearly such sentiments had only a minor effect on the 
aid sent. Churchill noted that “there was little we could do, and I tried to fill the 
void by civilities”,105 as what little supplies could be sent due to the difficulties of 
both supply and shipping were not enough to quench the Russia thirst for 
assistance.   
 
The balance of international relations was about to be upset, however, as on 
12 August 1941 the Atlantic Charter was signed, and this would cause significant 
problems for Anglo-Soviet relations. Upon his return to the Admiralty Churchill 
struck up a unique relationship and correspondence with Roosevelt, as evidenced 
by three substantial volumes of Kimball’s ‘Complete Correspondence’. It was possibly 
as a result of this relationship that Churchill was, as Charmley suggests, a “rare-
bird”106 in British ruling circles. Unlike Eden and his Department, Churchill 
showed great enthusiasm for America, and was seemingly unconcerned at the 
growing British dependence on the United States and Roosevelt. It was with this 
spirit that Churchill accepted the offer to meet Roosevelt in August 1941. Churchill 
took with him his personal staff, military advisors and Cadogan,107 and the party 
arrived at the rendezvous, Placienta Bay, on 9 August 1941. Though Cadogan 
suggests much of Churchill’s time on the voyage involved playing Backgammon, 
he does note that on one occasion he had to draft something about the Far East for 
Churchill.108 After naval courtesies had been exchanged, the two parties had their 
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first meeting, and were straight to business. Churchill records that Roosevelt 
wanted to draw up “a joint declaration laying down certain broad principles 
which should guide our policies along the same road”,109 and the next morning 
dictated his ideas for these in broad terms to Cadogan, who then managed to make 
a draft of both, and have them approved by Churchill.110 These drafts, which 
would form the basis of the joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter, were 
written by Cadogan, but in his memoirs Churchill doesn’t acknowledge this, 
instead suggesting the draft was “my text” and commenting that “I am glad it 
should be on record that the substance and spirit of what came to be called the 
“Atlantic Charter” was in its first draft a British production cast in my own 
words”.111 Whilst Churchill amended Cadogan’s draft, it seems unfair that there is 
no reference at all to Cadogan in Churchill’s records of the proceedings.  
The first draft of the Charter laid out the five articles covering no territorial 
aggrandisement; no territorial changes against the wishes of the people; the right 
of people to choose their government; fair and equitable distribution of produce; 
and peace and security free from fear and armaments.112 Roosevelt, after seeing 
this, proposed the addition of two new clauses, encompassing safety of the seas 
and oceans and the abandonment of force and the disarmament of nations.113 He 
also proposed an amendment to the British fourth article, which was initially 
unacceptable, but Churchill notes that he gave a compromise wording that would, 
he hoped, be acceptable to the War Cabinet. Though they did not accept this, and 
indeed offered their own draft, Churchill didn’t press the matter, since Roosevelt 
had accepted his other amendments, and the Cabinets insertion of an article on 
social security.114 So it was that, with only a minor snag over some wording, which 
was quickly overcome, the Atlantic Charter was signed on 12 August 1941.  
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That the process was not a difficult one is shown in Cadogan’s diary, as only 
on 10 August does he mention drafting something, and only twice more does he 
mention the draft Charter, one was a quick reference to the fact he had the 
amended texts agreed with Sumner Welles, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State, and 
a second to the fact they were confirmed before being signed.115 It could also have 
been because there was nothing in the text that was seen as controversial. Harvey 
felt it a “terribly woolly document full of all the old clichés of the League of 
Nations period”,116 and Eden, although not mentioning it in his memoirs, 
commented that he was “chilled with Wilsonian memories”.117 Charmley offers the 
amusing critique that it “amounted to little more than a declaration from a 
conference of bishops that they were against sin”.118 Whilst that may have been the 
case, it was the impact of the document, rather than its content, which was to cause 
concern. Churchill believed that it would herald American entry into the war, an 
illusion Roosevelt did little to dispel, but also that its clause on self-determination 
did not apply to the British Empire. The Foreign Office, however, were concerned 
that Roosevelt was trying to “put the USA on top”, with a view to “monopolise the 
limelight of the peace”.119 Whether this was the case only time would tell, but the 
signature of this document was taken as evidence of the need to start thinking as a 
Department when it came to foreign policy, especially in terms of long-term 
policy. It also meant that they had imposed upon them a framework for the 
conduct of the war and the peace, which they would have to act within, thus 
further restricting their freedom of action.  
 
These realisations were to become painfully clear over the next few months. 
In what was the biggest sign of the new found Anglo-Soviet co-operation, in 
September Churchill sent the Minister of Supply, Sir William ‘Max’ Beaverbrook, 
to Moscow for fact finding and to hold high level discussions with Stalin. He was 
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accompanied by Averell Harriman, Roosevelt’s special representative in London, 
and General Hastings Ismay, Chief Staff Officer to Churchill, and was tasked with 
coming to an agreement with Stalin on what assistance the Soviet Union required. 
Britain faced many difficulties in providing the level of assistance Russia was 
expecting, and Cripps felt his limited understanding of the military situation was 
hampering relations, so it was also hoped that this mission would allow for higher 
level strategic discussions to take place between high ranking officials who had 
up-to-date knowledge of British military resources, strategy and capability.120 
Though Churchill makes no note of it in his memoirs, the idea for this originated 
from a conversation between Cripps and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s special 
emissary to Churchill, with Cripps noting in his diary that “we agreed upon the 
way the matter was to be handled. He will see both the Prime Minister and the 
President and will tell them my views as well. I have suggested that it would be a 
good thing for me to go home and then come out again in the position of a 
member of the cabinet with the added authority not to stay but to settle up the 
future plan of help with some representative of the president”.121 Thus Cripps was 
achieving something else useful, as his suggestion to go home and return in a 
different capacity, albeit not taken up, was followed to the extent of sending 
someone, along with an American representative, with authority to discuss 
Russian needs and establish ways of meeting them.122  
Harriman and Beaverbrook arrived in Moscow in one piece on 29 September, 
despite a close encounter with Russian anti-aircraft fire, after which Beaverbrook 
joked that “we do not recommend any more anti-aircraft guns for Russia!”123 
Despite hard bargaining and argument over specific details, an agreement was 
eventually reached, though Cripps noted that “the eventual lists were agreed but 
that does not mean that we have promised anything like all they wanted”.124 
Cadogan commented on Beaverbrook’s return that “Max gave a light hearted 
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account of his Moscow mission which, as I know from my sources, was a complete 
newspaper stunt. He is a scamp!”.125 Unsurprisingly as it was his mission, and he 
was one of the main exponents of aid to Russia in Government, Beaverbrook was 
upbeat about the negotiations, suggesting that “the entire success of the 
Agreement is due to the enthusiasm which the Russians have shown as the 
negotiations have turned out to their liking … The Russians are deeply grateful 
and absolutely confident. I am satisfied that we have a faithful friend now”.126 The 
agreement set out that Russia would receive monthly supplies, either from Britain 
or America, of large amounts of war material. This included 1,800 British 
hurricanes and spitfires, 900 American fighters and 900 American bombers, 1,500 
naval guns and eight destroyers by the end of 1941, as well as a monthly supply of 
1,000 tanks, 300 anti-aircraft guns, 300 anti-tank guns and 2,000 armoured cars.127 It 
will be seen later in this study whether or not this planned program of supply was 
a success, but its creation suggests that Britain was now planning for a longer term 
Russian resistance, and the conversations acted as a good stepping stone to 
improving relations. 
On the political side, Cripps complained that he had not received a report 
from Beaverbrook, and it seems part of the reason for this was that little was 
actually discussed. The records that Beaverbrook eventually sent Cripps show that 
the talks on the first and second days were largely confined to supply, though on 
the first day there was a debate about peace terms which centred on the Atlantic 
Charter. This was generally agreed as a basis for peace, though Stalin raised the 
question of reparations from Germany, which Beaverbrook dodged by restating 
Churchill’s rhetoric that we must win the war first.128 The most interesting political 
point discussed was Stalin’s suggestion of extending the existing agreements to a 
full alliance for the war and the post-war, Beaverbrook said he was in agreement 
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and Stalin felt that the Soviet Government favoured the proposals.129 There was, 
however, no formal agreement on whether this should be taken forward, and 
Cripps’ telegram to Eden after he received Beaverbrook’s report (on 2 November, a 
full month after the talks concluded) suggests that they were not, as he states with 
annoyance that “I am amazed that these most important conversations should now 
be reported to me for the first time and that apparently little notice has been taken 
of them by anyone at all”.130 Whilst in general this may have been true, Eden does 
suggest in his memoirs that “I took up Stalin’s mention of a treaty of alliance and 
told the ambassador that I would be glad to hear any Soviet proposals”.131 That 
Cadogan, Harvey, Cripps and Maisky fail to mention this in their diaries and 
memoirs begs the question of authenticity of this action by Eden, but the archival 
documents suggest that Eden was not just adding in some credit for himself out of 
hindsight, but had actually raised this issue with Maisky, and Folly notes that 
Eden raised this issue with the War Cabinet on 13 October.132 That Stalin had 
raised the point about the future relations between the two countries, and had only 
been met with a non-committal statement about winning the war, had also 
annoyed Cripps, and he was to make this issue one of the recurring themes of his 
telegrams over the following months.  
 
It can, therefore, be seen that, whilst not necessarily friendly with Russia, the 
necessity of having to work together was starting to bring greater co-operation 
between the two powers, as they had to put historic differences behind them in 
favour of the greater aim of winning the war. Whilst it could be argued that 
Churchill's rhetoric about winning the war was right as the two powers were now 
working together in pursuit of the common aim of defeating Germany, it is 
doubtful whether relations would have been as cordial without the background 
work of the Foreign Office whilst Russia was still a neutral party. It is worth noting 
though that the increase in British efforts to improve relations with the Soviet 
                                                 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid, Cripps to Eden, 5 November 1941. 
131 Eden, Reckoning, p. 278. 
132 Folly, M, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45, (Basingstoke, 2000), p. 33. 
66 
Union was a clear sign of change, as even though the two powers needed to work 
together, that alone was no guarantee that they actually would. At many points it 
could be seen that, because Russia had largely ignored British needs between 1939 
and 1941, the British had an argument for ignoring Russian calls for help, but the 
fact they chose not to do this certainly suggests a shift in the mindset of the 
Foreign Office. The sending of the military mission, the speed of which was 
commended, as well as the Beaverbrook and Harriman mission, suggests a clear 
change of the attitude from 1939 where they were reluctant to negotiate, and 
eventually sent a delegation without any authority. As 1941 was coming to an end 
it seems that Britain had gone some way to placate the Soviet Union, though there 
was clearly room for improvement. It also seems that, due to the scale of the 
difficulties in dealing with Russia, it is not surprising that relations with the French 
may have taken a back seat.   
 
67 
5) An Eventful Winter 
 
By the winter of 1941, British foreign policy was still dominated by the need 
survive and, if possible, to win the war. To this end, relations with three countries 
were central. If America could be persuaded to enter the war, all would be 
changed. Russia had entered the war, and that had changed a great deal. Finally 
France, Britain’s original ally, although now split between two competing groups 
– Vichy and the Free French – remained a constant concern. All three nations 
would be critical to the British war effort, and also to Foreign Office attempts to 
begin shaping the post-war world. In the months surrounding the drama of Pearl 
Harbour, it was Anglo-Soviet relations which occupied Eden’s attention; but the 
credit for one of the most significant developments of this period, his mission to 
Moscow, lies, in the main, elsewhere.  
The Cripps–Harriman idea led to Beaverbrook’s mission to Moscow, and it 
was this visit which served as Eden’s cue to step into the spotlight. During 
discussions, Stalin raised the topic of future relations; questioning Beaverbrook 
both on peace terms, and the possibility of extending the Anglo-Soviet agreement 
into a military and political alliance, “not only for war, but for post-war as well”.1 
This theme was to be the central pillar of Eden’s relationship with both Maisky 
and Cripps over the following months. Cripps’ indignation at being kept in the 
dark over this issue, a not uncommon complaint by the man regarded as “a lunatic 
in a country of lunatics” by Churchill,2 led to Eden becoming increasingly 
frustrated with his ambassador.3 That said, Cripps’ insistence on raising this topic, 
and his lengthy telegrams detailing his views on the future shape of Anglo-Soviet 
relations and post-war Europe, helped keep this item at the front of Eden’s mind. 
Gradually this determination, with pressure from others such as Beaverbrook and 
Maisky, began to influence Eden’s thinking. By early November he was informing 
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Cripps that he “hoped to visit Moscow in the near future”,4 when just weeks 
previously he had ruled out such a visit, stating that there was no reason for any 
greater effort from Britain.5 Cripps’ insecurity on being left out was not 
uncommon, but not always without reason, as he was often ignored by Molotov 
and others in Moscow, and though thought of as a lunatic, when there was a 
potential challenge to Churchill’s leadership in 1942 his name was raised as a 
serious contender. In this case he had been kept informed, so had little reason to 
protest. Gorodetsky suggests “the initial idea of sending Eden to Moscow was to 
keep Cripps quiet”,6 a view he may have derived from Harvey's diary,7 but which 
Eden scouted in his memoirs, where he wrote “there had never been any 
question” of him going to Moscow to keep Cripps quiet and that “we thought that 
it would on the whole be better that Cripps should stay”.8 Churchill's 
contemporary message to Cripps stating that “I am sure it would be a mistake 
from your point of view to leave your post and abandon the Russians and the 
Soviet cause with which you are so closely associated”9 appears to confirm the 
view that Eden’s visit had a wider purpose. That said, it could also have been an 
indication that this wider purpose was to impose some more balanced and less 
ideologically driven policy than Cripps had been able to achieve. Churchill sent a 
personal telegram to Stalin, informing him of the intention to send Eden to 
Moscow in the near future to discuss “every question relating to the war” and “the 
whole of this field [post-war organisation] with you”.10 With the dubious 
assistance of an excess of “long, querulous and argumentative”11 telegrams from 
Cripps, the Foreign Office had already begun working on the possibility of Anglo-
Soviet talks, and a memorandum was quickly produced detailing the likely 
political and military points which could be discussed, alongside the likely 
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sticking points. It also included a memorandum for communication to the Soviet 
Union, and a proposed joint declaration. The most interesting part of this 
document is the Cabinet memorandum setting out Eden’s views. This suggests 
Eden felt the post-war focus was to be on Germany; that it was necessary to keep 
the Americans informed but at arms length; and that Britain should abide by the 
Atlantic Charter and make no agreement with Russia regarding territorial 
change.12 It is interesting that some of the points considered essential by Cripps in 
his messages were included in this memorandum, despite being ignored or 
dismissed when they were originally received.13  
But by the time Eden got to the USSR, the global situation had been 
transformed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Against the advice of the 
Cabinet, Churchill set off for America to construct a grand military alliance, a task 
which would henceforth dominate his every waking moment. Eden, by contrast, 
found himself with the difficult task of trying to respond to Soviet suspicions of 
Britain, and the need to respond to Stalin’s territorial ambitions. As something of a 
“prima donna”,14 Eden was not best pleased at his mission being upstaged, and he 
was worried lest Churchill return from America with some new commitments, 
made with limited or no consultation with the Cabinet.15 He was also concerned 
that any agreements made with the United States could erode his control over 
British foreign policy. In his memoirs, Eden reproduces a telephone conversation 
with Churchill, who defended his trip by stating that “the emphasis of the war 
had shifted”.16 Although subsequently saying Eden’s trip was still important 
because of the need to consult “our two great allies”,17 it is hard not to wonder 
whether the simple phrase was a signal to Eden that, no matter what happened in 
Moscow, with America in the war, it would be of little consequence. Eden’s own 
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comment that “before, we had believed in the end but never seen the means, now 
both were clear”18 could also suggest his resignation to the reality that, despite his 
best efforts, any results would be overshadowed by the fact America was seen as 
the deciding factor in victory.  
 
By his own admission, Eden arrived in the Soviet Union somewhat dejected.19 
His past experience of negotiations with the Russians, coupled with the telegrams 
from Cripps complaining of their increasingly impossible demands, did not fill 
him with much hope that his visit would be satisfactory, and now he had the 
added pressure that, with Churchill off to America, his visit needed to achieve 
something meaningful, else it risked being eclipsed. It was in part because of this 
that Eden had an idea for his visit and that was to create a so-called Volga Charter, 
an Eastern equivalent of the Atlantic Charter, which would set out the principles 
of Anglo-Soviet co-operation, their joint vision for the conduct of the war and for 
the future peace requirements. Although an ambitious project, it was not out of 
the question. Cadogan was in charge of the project, and before leaving London 
had drafted a charter which was approved by Eden, though overruled by the 
Cabinet and Churchill as too detailed. The eventual document was so diluted that 
Cadogan considered it “as thin as restaurant coffee”,20 containing only simple 
statements that the two Governments would work together against Germany both 
during and after the war; would adhere to the Atlantic Charter; and would make 
no effort to discuss post-war territorial change.21 Having weakened the Volga 
Charter and restricted Eden’s freedom of negotiation with the Atlantic Charter, 
Churchill, with the Cabinet, and the Chiefs of Staff, also made sure there would be 
no offer of troops for Russia. This decision made Eden question the validity of the 
trip, and almost led to its postponement, but for the influence of Beaverbrook.22 
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His friendship with Churchill made Beaverbrook a good ally for Eden, as he was 
sympathetic towards Russia, and shared Eden’s mindset regarding the need to do 
more to help them. He used the experience of his discussions with Stalin to insist 
that he would “much prefer”23 the provision of machines to men, and, upon 
Churchill’s agreement, this issue was re-examined. The eventual outcome gave 
Eden one strong card to play in the negotiations, being allowed to offer “the 
placing of a strong component of the Air Force, say 10 squadrons, on the southern 
flank of the Russian armies”.24 Whilst this was dependent on British victory in the 
ongoing operations in Libya, it proved sufficient to re-assure Eden that his mission 
was worthwhile.  
On top of these external restrictions, there were other limiting factors. Eden’s 
own thinking, as seen from his Cabinet memorandum, particularly his 
commitment to the Atlantic Charter, narrowed the scope of the discussions he 
could hold. It was also unfortunate that the telegram, sent by Churchill to Stalin, 
had been drafted by Cadogan, so his own deputy had put him in the position of 
discussing a subject that had only just begun to be considered. The archive files 
suggest that it was only in response to telegrams from Stalin that the Department 
began to realise the need for a broader discussion. One particular telegram, noting 
the need for a “definite understanding” on both war aims and plans for the 
organisation of peace, as well as an “agreement” on military assistance against 
Hitler,25 received comments from all ranks within the Office, with Cadogan noting 
the need to “discuss all these matters”.26 Thus it seems that, with these limitations, 
the idea of a charter on general principles was sensible, as it would not require 
Eden to go beyond his remit, would put Anglo-Soviet relations on the same formal 
footing as Anglo-American relations, and would, to an extent, disguise the fact 
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that the British had no set ideas with which to meet Stalin regarding the 
organisation of peace.27   
So Eden was going with a plan which seems to have fitted the small window 
within which he could negotiate. He was accompanied by Cadogan, who, based 
on his past success, was most likely to be able to achieve a draft charter that would 
prove satisfactory to all parties. Harvey was also in the party, though Cadogan 
was concerned about his influence on Eden, as he was strongly in favour of 
working with the Russians, and his diary entries during the trip give clear 
evidence of this.28 Cadogan was more ambivalent and, despite maintaining his 
long standing opinion of the uselessness of Russia, provided balance and 
grounding to the group, a quality for which he has been greatly extolled.29 The 
addition of Maisky, and later Cripps, to this grouping meant that the rational 
thought of Cadogan was, on paper, outnumbered by ‘ideological’ impetus, though 
initially this did not affect Eden’s judgement during the early talks. There are 
many accounts of varying detail of the negotiations, so it would be superfluous to 
offer another overview.30 However, an examination of the terms offered by both 
parties reveals much about the areas which would cause tension between the two 
unlikely allies throughout the rest of the war – and beyond 
 
A Piercing, Icy Blast 
 
Upon arrival, the draft declaration was discussed amongst the British 
delegation and, owing to the influence of Cripps, (considered an “infernal 
nuisance”31 by Harvey) was amended into an agreement, something considered 
more acceptable to Soviet sensibilities. The revised draft dropped the reference to 
the July agreement, and added three new clauses concerning economic and social 
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post-war reconstruction, post-war economic assistance and an undertaking not to 
sign any secret treaty which may affect post-war reconstruction.32 This draft seems 
to have met everything the British wanted at this time, and was not dissimilar to 
the terms of the Atlantic Charter, although it lacked one or two of the more 
idealistic points. In agreement form it also seemed likely to satisfy Russian 
requirements, save for being an actual treaty. Maisky’s memoirs indicate he was 
shown Stalin’s two proposed treaties before the first meeting, and felt they could 
“serve as a basis for negotiations”, and that “it will not be particularly difficult to 
come to an agreement”.33 At the first meeting, the British agreement was presented 
to Stalin, who gave no reaction, but agreed that Eden could take his two draft 
treaties and marry the agreement to them.34 Aside from discussion on a secret 
protocol, which would have resulted in British recognition of the 1941 Soviet 
frontiers, the meeting went smoothly, and there was a reasonable chance of an 
agreement being reached. Despite Harvey’s enthusiasm for the “most successful 
start”35 to the talks, Eden and Cadogan both had concerns over the secret protocol. 
Whilst discussed, but deferred during the meeting on the grounds that Eden 
couldn’t agree without first consulting the Cabinet and America, Cadogan noted 
that “S. [Stalin] indicated his ideas of future frontiers, which would raise a lot of 
questions”36 and Eden felt that “Stalin’s suggestions for this secret protocol 
showed me that the hope we had held in London, of being able to confine the 
discussion of frontiers to the general terms of the Atlantic Charter, had been in 
vain”.37 Eden was in general agreement with most of Stalin’s other proposals and, 
when studying Stalin’s drafts the next day, Cadogan noted that there was 
“nothing much wrong with them”.38 Stalin’s military treaty was short, and didn’t 
go beyond the British agreement. Its articles provided for an alliance and military 
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assistance between the two parties; agreements that neither party would negotiate 
with an aggressive German Government or sign a separate peace, and that neither 
contracting party would enter into any coalition against the other. The post-war 
treaty was even shorter, and its articles noted that the two powers would act by 
mutual agreement on matters relating to post-war organisation, and that they 
would take all steps possible to prevent Germany violating the peace.39 When 
compared to the document, there was nothing in either of the Soviet treaties which 
would have taken the British beyond their agreement and, aside from Eden 
needing approval from the Cabinet, there looked nothing to stop the two countries 
reaching an accord. 
In fact, all the British needed to do was turn the treaties into agreements, and 
they could have been signed there and then. This they did, with the re-drafted 
military agreement differing little from Stalin’s treaty. The post-war agreement, 
however, added a new article recognising the Atlantic Charter commitments; a 
detailed article on post-war reconstruction, the principles of non-aggrandisement 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of others; and an article on post-war 
economic assistance, though none of these were opposed to any views Stalin had 
expressed during the first conversation.40 This effort suggests the British, while 
wanting an agreement with Stalin, were trying to ensure the views of America 
were represented, and also attempting to ensure the post-war commitment of 
Russia to maintain a balance of power in Europe.   
This work had been in vain, however, as Stalin, despite initially commenting 
that it was “interesting”,41 soon began discussing the recognition of the Soviet 
frontiers, which proved to be the sticking point and main focus of the remainder 
of the conversations. Whilst known before Eden’s visit that Stalin wanted to 
discuss this,42 there was no prior indication that he had a detailed plan, and Eden 
had no authority to make a fixed commitment on the issue. Stalin was insistent on 
                                                 
39 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB 66/20/39, Record of Eden’s mission to Moscow, Stalin’s draft political 
and post-war treaties, 16 December 1941.  
40 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB 66/20/39, Record of Eden’s mission to Moscow, British re-draft of 
political and post-war agreements, 17 December 1941. 
41 Ibid, Record of interview between Eden and Stalin, 17 December 1941. 
42 See n.25. 
75 
the issue, however, and it took great effort from Eden to convince Stalin that he 
couldn’t give a definite answer to these questions now, but would consult the 
Government and work hard to get a favourable one as soon as possible. At this 
point Stalin reconsidered the British agreements, but aside from suggesting that 
some reference to frontiers should be made in the post-war agreement, made no 
other comment, so it is hard to tell whether or not he agreed with their content. It 
was at this point that the British delegation began to realise the extent of the 
difficulty that Britain would face in dealing with Russia. Both Harvey and Cripps 
suggested that it would be difficult, if not impossible to continue to refuse the 
Russian demands, with Cripps, in another piece of exemplary foresight, accurately 
predicting the difficulties to come, commenting that “We are already too late, I 
fear, to get any sort of arrangement other than that which they are demanding. 
This will lead to the greatest difficulties with America … I don’t see what we can 
do but agree on the boundaries which they insist upon keeping, but before we 
come to that there will be a most difficult period in our relations”.43 Eden had 
stated to Stalin that “I would like to meet you” over the territorial question, and 
when Stalin’ suggested that the Soviet Union might soon occupy the Baltic, 
responded that “If you were to do so no one would be more delighted than 
myself”.44 These statements suggest that Eden was, at least on a personal level, 
sympathetic towards the Soviet demands, and indeed he may have made the latter 
remark out of a growing realisation that the Soviet Union occupying the Baltic 
countries would have negated the problem of recognising the frontiers.  
It is unfortunate that the remaining meetings were to hinge on the territorial 
issue. The terms of the agreements were only considered towards the end of the 
second meeting, but there was little objection to them, and Eden took account of 
the only comment on content by Stalin, and included a reference to the frontier 
question, though worded so that consultation on these would be part of the peace 
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settlement.45 To supplement this he drafted a letter to Stalin, proposing the 
initiation of tripartite talks between Britain, the Soviet Union and America at the 
earliest opportunity on the whole issue of the Soviet frontiers. He also 
accommodated Maisky’s concern over wording, removing the reference to ‘no 
aggrandisement and no interference in the internal affairs of others’ in the hope of 
placating Stalin.46 Thus in seeking agreement, Eden was willing to sacrifice two 
key principles, and go beyond his instructions by giving Stalin a reference to 
frontiers and proposing a tripartite conference. “For none of this”, notes Carlton, 
“did he have authority from London”.47 It was during the third meeting that real 
difficulty arose, as after agreeing to some minor amendments, Stalin proposed 
adding to the post-war treaty that the powers would work together after the war 
“with full regards to the interests of both parties in their security as well as to the 
interests of the U.S.S.R. in the restoration of frontiers violated by Hitler’s 
aggression”.48 It was this phrase, which Stalin revealed later to mean the frontiers 
violated in June 1941, which was to be the nail in the coffin for the negotiations. 
Despite all the previous protests from Eden, Stalin was still asking the impossible, 
and was determined to gain agreement on this point, even at the expense of the 
general agreements. It was consequently suggested that Eden should return to 
London and carry out his promise with regard to the frontiers before there was 
any further discussion. Eden noted that the meeting “proved completely abortive 
and I was considerably irritated at what I thought Stalin’s unreasonable 
attitude”.49 For Eden to state this about the man he had extolled in 1935 for being 
“well-informed at all points that were of concern to him”50 and having “a 
remarkable knowledge and understanding of international affairs”,51 suggests that 
either Stalin really wasn’t interested in anything other than his own frontiers, or 
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that he had, on this point at least, lost his grip on international affairs. It could also 
have been that Eden was simply not very good at negotiating, though given any 
agreement on any point, no matter how small, would have needed reference to the 
Cabinet, any lack of ability on Eden’s part was probably down to having no hand 
to play. The extent to which either of these assessments is correct is hard to 
determine. Stalin was certainly insistent on the Soviet frontiers, but eventually 
agreed that Eden was not simply obstructing, but was asking to discuss the issue 
with the people who could make the decision, and he showed both an interest in 
and understanding of the British military position and British restrictions 
regarding a Second Front.  
It is hard to know whether Stalin realised he had gone too far, or if the 
complaints session in Eden’s room or Cripps’s long discussion with Molotov 
actually had any effect, but at the next meeting there was considerably less 
argument with regards to frontiers, and more understanding from both sides of 
the others position. In an effort to get agreement, Eden proposed signing both the 
documents originally drafted by Stalin and to give Stalin the letter regarding 
tripartite conversations. He also proposed that they could, upon his return, be 
transformed into full treaties after securing the consent of the Dominions.52 
Unfortunately, Stalin rejected this idea, and suggested the postponement of the 
signature until Eden could consult both the British and Dominion Governments, 
feeling that “if the treaty is signed in London in two or three weeks’ time, it will 
come to much the same thing”53 as if it was signed there and then, which Eden 
was not authorised to do. Stalin’s desire for treaties forced him to concede that, to 
get this wish, he had to allow Eden to proceed correctly, which Eden had 
promised to do, and this concession prevented a breakdown in the negotiations.54 
It also seemed like he had begun to realise the difficulty of not only Eden’s but 
Britain’s position as a whole, suggesting that “as regards your repeated references 
to the necessity… to consult the United States Government, I must confess that I 
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had overlooked this fact and had believed your Government to have more 
freedom of action in these matters”.55 Considering the situation in which he found 
himself, Eden probably agreed whole heartedly with that sentiment.  
Both parties were disappointed not to reach agreement in Moscow, though it 
was Stalin, not Eden, who complained that “I should perhaps have been in a 
position to sign these agreements […] if we had not had these discussions about 
the frontier”,56 as if forgetting that it was he, not Eden, who insisted on repeatedly 
raising this topic, and that his determination to discuss treaties meant Eden 
couldn’t sign the agreements. Had he followed Eden’s suggestions, the 
conversations could have produced two signed agreements, whose content would 
have covered virtually all the demands of both parties, with Stalin in possession of 
a letter from Eden pledging his support and assistance in bringing about a positive 
resolution to the frontier issue. Harvey believed that “if Stalin could sign our 
proposed agreements, it would be fairly easy for A.E. to move Winston to next 
stage of getting the Cabinet to agree to get Roosevelt to tackle the whole 
question”.57 Though this idea was hopeful, it did not seem illogical, and looks to 
have been the best option for Stalin to get what he wanted given Eden saw the 
agreements as “a first step to getting the further agreements which you want”.58 
The requirement to put the question to Roosevelt, however, adds weight to Eden’s 
concern about the dependence on America, and suggests this alliance was already 
preventing Britain from conducting its own foreign policy affairs.  
At the end of the conversations it was decided that a communiqué would be 
issued so that Eden would not leave empty handed, and “recognising failure” as 
Cadogan put it, a “short draft of usual colourless communiqué” was prepared.59 It 
is worth noting that this would essentially be the ‘Volga Charter’ Eden had 
initially hoped to sign, so whilst no further agreement had been reached, Eden 
would have at least achieved his original goal. In fact, the result was better than 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Harvey, War Diaries, 18 December 1941, p. 77. 
58 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB 66/20/39, Record of Eden’s mission to Moscow, Record of interview 
between Eden and Stalin, 20 December 1941. 
59 Dilks, Cadogan Diary, 20 December 1941, p. 422. 
79 
the British delegation could have hoped, as Maisky had been tasked with drafting 
the Soviet version of the communiqué,60 and managed to achieve a document that 
was approved by Stalin, and “longer and actually more satisfactory”61 than the 
British draft, and was quickly accepted by Eden. The British delegation were 
impressed with the contents of the Soviet draft, with Cadogan commenting that it 
was “much better” than hoped.62 The fact Eden’s draft does not appear to be 
reproduced, even in the documents relating to the Moscow conversations, makes 
it hard to tell how much longer and more satisfactory the Soviet draft was, though 
as it was quite short, the British draft really must have been short and colourless. 
Despite the positive response of the British delegation, it seems to have fallen 
short of the credentials they imbued upon it. Those of a more ideological 
persuasion, such as Harvey and Cripps, suggested that it “contained all about war 
and post-war collaboration which had been contained in the two agreements”63 
and that “it goes almost all the way in binding us to post-war collaboration”.64 
What it actually did was state that there had been an “exhaustive exchange of 
views” (presumably in both depth and tiresomeness), which had provided: an 
“identity of views” relating to the conduct of the war, insofar as both parties 
thought Hitler should be defeated and it would be beneficial to prevent future 
German aggression; “important and useful material, which will facilitate a further 
elaboration of concrete proposals” regarding post-war organisation of peace, to 
the extent that one side had concrete proposals over which it would not budge, the 
other had no proposals, and both sides realised from the material gathered that 
this outcome was unlikely in the near future; and a “new and important forward 
step towards closer collaboration”, if only because neither side had really achieved 
anything from the talks, and thus there would need to be more in the future in 
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order to come to a formal agreement.65 Nowhere did it mention that the two 
parties had agreed to do anything about these points, and its only similarities to 
the draft agreements were the inclusion of the statements about Germany. It seems 
that, expecting failure, those in Moscow got caught up in the excitement of the 
moment when they actually came away with something. Barker suggests that the 
British delegation were not particularly successful in their negotiations, and were 
taken in by Stalin’s negotiating tactics. He offered them “first, a pleasing warmth 
(so thawing his visitors defences); next, a piercing, icy blast; finally, a moderate 
glow, so that the visitor left grateful for small mercies”.66 This appears accurate, as 
the first meeting was considered to have gone well; the second and third meetings 
Stalin was forceful and demanding, with a strength of argument that not only 
irritated the British delegation, but also saw them begin to think his views were 
correct and his demands necessary; and then a final meeting where he made some 
concessions which looked of greater significance than they were, followed by a 
pleasant celebratory meal to make the trip appear better in hindsight than was the 
case. This was a tactic he was employ in future negotiations, with both the British 
and many other countries. 
 
Stepping Stones 
 
So does this mean the mission was a failure? This is hard to answer, though 
in the broad sweep of history the fact no formal agreement was reached could be 
enough evidence to condemn the visit as a failure. This is the picture given in the 
secondary work, as there are more examples of works which either suggest the 
mission was a failure or offer no opinion on the matter than works that felt it was 
a success. When examined in closer detail, however, a different picture emerges, 
and one that is significantly more flattering of Eden. To say the mission failed 
because no agreement was reached disregards the serious restrictions that were 
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placed on Eden both before, and during, his visit, as even his authority to offer the 
RAF squadrons was withdrawn part-way through. It also ignores Eden's own aim, 
which was to achieve a Volga Charter, not an alliance or other formal agreement. 
Eden had a very limited scope, both on what could be offered and what could be 
accepted, so limited results were to be expected. That these limited results were 
achieved should highlight Eden's diplomatic skill and ability to negotiate from a 
position of weakness. Instead they are often taken to suggest the whole mission 
was in vain. Dutton's suggestion that “neither Eden’s assurance to Churchill that 
his mission had been a success nor his description of the talks to the press as full, 
frank and sincere reflected reality”67 is too critical, and suggests that only grand 
achievements are worthy of being termed successes – though as there was no 
grand achievement that came out of the visit by this scale it would be deemed a 
failure, even if the small achievements were recognised. The talks were often 
tense, heated arguments or filled with historic suspicion, though this was because 
they covered many topics; both parties spoke frankly to each other; and, on Eden's 
part at least, were carried out with sincerity. The communiqué pledged that the 
two countries would fight on together against Germany and collaborate during 
and after the war, and whilst not exactly ground-breaking, was a sign of 
collaboration closer to what Eden had envisioned than Stalin, as it was not a 
treaty, and did not mention the 1941 frontiers. Whilst the talks produced no 
agreement, they had served a different purpose, and that they were conducted, 
albeit by chance, alongside Churchill’s talks in Washington can be seen to 
represent the “importance Britain attached to Anglo-Soviet solidarity”.68 Churchill 
himself wrote to Eden that he was “where I want him”69 and later wrote that he 
should “not be disappointed if you are not able to bring home a joint public 
declaration . . . I am sure your visit has done the utmost good”.70 Other than Eden 
not being able to consult Churchill, it is unlikely that this coincidence had any 
effect in Moscow, though it is not beyond reason to think that, if nothing else, it 
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would show the Russians that the British were not ganging up with America and 
leaving them to fend for themselves. The press reports after the mission stated the 
importance of the talks in this regard, although The Daily Mail, The Telegraph and 
The News Chronicle all reported that the conversations were parallel too or a part of 
the conversations in Washington, which was of course not the case.71 Whilst the 
British press was, to some extent, restricted in some aspects of what it could 
publish regarding Anglo-Soviet relations, the Russian press was free to be as 
critical of the west as it wanted, but its coverage of the talks was equally positive. 
The extent of positive press coverage, both in Britain and in Russia, highlights 
another success, and that was the fact that Eden's visit, despite Harvey's fears, had 
not been forgotten about in the wake of Churchill's visit to Washington. 
Consequently the visit was seen as a stepping stone for better things, and the 
information gathered allowed the British to understand the Soviet position, both 
politically and militarily, as well as their aims and requirements. Knowing what 
the Russians wanted made it significantly easier to prepare for future talks, and 
gave the Foreign Office a target to work towards. The delegation went to Moscow 
with only sketchy ideas about any post-war aims, and came back with a fresh 
outlook, and what was to become the new policy of the Foreign Office, defining 
the British war and post-war aims outside of defeating Hitler. Cripps recalled that, 
whilst “I took rather too tragic a view of the failure to get an agreement” there was 
an upside, especially as far as he was concerned, that “the Cabinet will have to 
really get down to thinking about the post-war settlement”.72 It would appear that 
Cripps was, yet again, displaying a sense of foresight that probably should have 
been taken more seriously than it was. Individually these were small scale results, 
and thus easily overlooked. Equally, the small scale and lack of historical 
significance they receive suggests that Eden and his mission had, in fact, not really 
managed to achieve anything, and that perhaps it was a rather pointless 
endeavour. When combined, however, they helped to significantly improve 
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Anglo-Soviet relations, to define what the Foreign Office wanted to do, and give 
them a reality check on its imminent necessity. Though the achievement is still 
overlooked in this respect, as it doesn't fit easily within the Churchill narrative, in 
the examination of Eden's policy efforts it was significant, as it provided an 
important catalyst for the bold, imaginative, and at times highly controversial 
foreign policy that was to develop over the next two years.  
 
84 
6) Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
 
 
The Moscow Conference had highlighted the tensions between Soviet and 
British aims, along with the serious gaps in the British ideas, and this need to 
clarify their own war aims meant the Foreign Office was set on a new footing. The 
fact it almost hadn't taken place because of Churchill’s view that America’s entry 
into the war should be the top priority, however, was a sign of things to come. 
Before leaping headlong into 1942, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the other 
conference that occurred at this time, and examining its impact on foreign policy.  
 
Churchill heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 
December, whilst listening to the radio with Winant and Harriman, though the 
news didn’t initially register. He called Roosevelt for verification, and heard the 
most welcome comment that “We are all in the same boat now”.1 He thus set to 
work re-assembling the Members of Parliament, as well as drafting an official 
declaration of war to Japan. In ‘The Grand Alliance’ he notes that “no American will 
think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to 
me the greatest joy … at this very moment I knew the United States was in the 
war, up to the neck and in it to the death. So we had won after all!”2 As part of his 
impulsive response to the news he began planning to leave for America to hold 
another conference with Roosevelt. Despite the objections and efforts of Eden and 
the Cabinet he informed Roosevelt of his desire to meet to “review the whole war 
plan in the light of reality and new facts”.3 After haggling over safety concerns and 
the date of the conference, Churchill set off for Washington, and the Arcadia 
Conference.4 Eden was on his way to Moscow, but Churchill decided to allow 
Eden’s mission to continue, though there would have been time to turn him back 
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had the situation required it, feeling that “his mission was all the more important” 
given the new circumstances.5 
The details of the Arcadia Conference are covered elsewhere,6 but what 
matters here are its implications for British foreign policy. The most significant 
public result was the Declaration by the United Nations, issued on 1 January 1942, 
and signed by the 26 allied Nations ranged against Fascism and Hitlerism. Its 
clauses regarding no separate peace, co-operation between the signatories and full 
employment of resources, as well as continuing adherence to the Atlantic Charter 
ideals, bound the allied powers in a unity of purpose, as well as in ideals.7 Whilst 
there can be no doubting the significance of this document, the most crucial result 
from the conference was Churchill’s success in ensuring the United States did not 
confine themselves to pursuing a purely Pacific policy. Admittedly Hitler’s 
confusing decision to declare war on America on 11 December helped matters. 
Charmley suggests this not only saved Churchill from seeing Britain left high and 
dry while America exacted revenge on Japan, but also avoided embarrassing 
Roosevelt, who had announced that America must follow a Germany first 
strategy, and would have struggled to maintain this line without any aggression 
from Germany.8 Churchill’s success also came from his preparation during his 
voyage, drawing up three detailed memoranda outlining his views. Entitled ‘The 
Atlantic Front’, ‘The Pacific Front’ and ‘The Campaign of 1943’, they are all fully 
reproduced in ‘The Grand Alliance’, and cover pretty much any avenue the 
discussions could take. From a British perspective, the key was in ensuring a 
practical and helpful American focus on Europe, and Churchill’s Atlantic Front 
memorandum appears to have achieved this, noting the importance of the 
supplies and of the defeat of Germany to the overall war effort to defeat the Axis 
powers.9 Roosevelt concurred, later suggesting that there might be “unfortunate 
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repercussions”10 if they let down Russia. Unfortunately for the Foreign Office, this 
feeling did not extend to territorial change. Conscious of his host’s sensibilities, 
not to mention the creation of his desired ‘Grand Alliance’, the ground work for 
which would be undone if accepted, Churchill refused to put the issue of the 
Soviet frontiers to Roosevelt, informing Eden that it would be “inexpedient” to 
raise this issue even informally at this time.11  
The close link between Churchill and Roosevelt had ensured active American 
engagement in Europe, so as far as Churchill was concerned his policy was 
coming to fruition, but the cementing of ties led to further restrictions on the 
freedom of action of the Foreign Office, who found this neither practical nor 
helpful as they were forming a policy of their own which put British interests, 
particularly in Europe, above the military interests of the Churchill-Roosevelt 
alliance. Eden’s assessment that “I accepted the fact that the United States must in 
time become the dominant partner in Anglo-American councils … The balance of 
power between us brought its problems. How to handle our relations with Soviet 
Russia, the policy to be followed towards de Gaulle, and the future of the British 
Commonwealth presented varying facets almost daily … With our other major 
ally the path was rougher. Though Soviet Russia’s immediate interests in the war 
were the same as ours, in the peace they might conflict with what we and much of 
the world thought right. It was this contingency that I wished to guard against, if I 
could”12 was written with hindsight, but there is solid grounding to the words, 
and they reflected the struggle he faced for the remainder of the war. These 
themes were mirrored in a diary entry by Harvey which highlighted the 
impotency of the British position. “As between Russia on one side, who thinks she 
is doing all the fighting against the Germans, and America, who thinks she can 
dictate the peace on the other, poor H.M.G. are going to have a difficult time. We 
shall be in trouble with both. We must take a realistic view of Russia’s claims, but 
we must somehow avoid a collision with U.S.A. who mean so much for supplies 
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now and post-war reconstruction after”.13 Ever the Russophile, Harvey was clearly 
emphasising this particular area to illustrate British difficulty, but his concerns 
were not dissimilar to those of Eden and others. Even de Gaulle, who was as much 
a hindrance as a help for the allies, recognised the British problem, and noted that 
“From now on, the British will do nothing without Roosevelt’s agreement”14 This 
statement would ring true in the near future. Despite comments like these, this 
concern does not appear to translate into the secondary work. Only Thorpe 
suggests that British thinking at the time was wary of America, stating that 
“Eden’s attitude to America was equivocal: the common language should not 
delude the British into believing that the Americans also had common interest. He 
was wary of the price the Americans might eventually extract from Britain for 
their support”.15 Since returning as Foreign Secretary Eden had experienced the 
problem of differing American interests, and did not share Churchill’s sentiment 
of “comradeship in the common cause of great peoples who speak the same 
language, who kneel at the same altars and, to a very large extent, pursue the 
same ideals”.16 It is unfortunate that the three areas Eden highlighted, France, 
Russia and the future of the British Commonwealth, were the areas around which 
the Foreign Office policy was based, but also where their success was to be most 
restricted by the primacy given to the American alliance. A subject for a different 
project, perhaps, is whether the price Britain had to pay for American support, 
and as a result of American interest, was the dismantling of its Empire, and 
whether Eden chose the word ‘Commonwealth’ rather than ‘Empire’ consciously 
to reflect this.  
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‘Teapot Tempests’ 
 
This divergence of attitudes became problematic over the “teapot tempest”17 - 
the occupation of the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon on Christmas Eve 1941.18 
The Islands, situated off the Newfoundland coast, were French territory under 
Vichy control, and were of interest for their location and their powerful radio 
transmitter, which could be used for hostile spying or propaganda purposes. De 
Gaulle, with Foreign Office support, proposed rallying the Islands in October,19 
and by early December everything was in place. Approval was granted by 
Churchill, who authorised Halifax to consult the Americans.20 The Americans 
rejected this plan, as they were working on their own deal with the Islands’ 
Governor on the wider issue of neutralisation of French territory in the Western 
Hemisphere.21 Despite being ordered to cancel the mission, and agreeing to do 
so,22 de Gaulle ordered Admiral Muselier, the Commander-in-Chief of the Free 
French Naval forces, to occupy the Islands anyway, in response to a suggestion 
that Canadian technicians would take over control of the radio station, which he 
saw as foreign intervention in French affairs. The occupation resulted in a Vichy 
colony peacefully rallying to the Free French with a 90 percent majority vote in a 
plebiscite.23 This would have passed off smoothly as a minor allied victory had it 
not been for the Americans. On Christmas Day the “passionately anti de Gaulle”24 
Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, released an admonishing statement which 
claimed the “action taken by the so-called Free French … was an arbitrary action 
contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned [Hull’s italics]”.25 This statement 
shows the difference in policy, and how out of step Hull was with public opinion. 
The British didn’t see any problem with the event, and the American press led a 
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wave of criticism against the “treason”26 of the “so-called Secretary of State”.27 
Halifax telegraphed Eden that “There is no doubt that the State Department lost 
their temper at the outset and although the temperature is now lower their 
position … does not alter”.28 In a message to Churchill, Eden noted the difficulty of 
removing de Gaulle and the likely adverse effect on British public opinion were a 
settlement reached which appeared to “victimise a population for its loyalty to the 
Allied cause”.29 Whilst Roosevelt was initially happy, as he was often want to, to 
“sit back and watch the State Department getting into trouble”,30 with Hull 
threatening resignation and the tempest close to overflowing from the teapot he 
changed course, followed by Churchill, fearing damage to his new alliance. 
Having sent Eden a draft statement intended to defuse the situation,31 which Eden 
considered inadequate to safeguard Free French interests,32 Churchill sent further 
instructions. The new statement allowed the Islands to remain ‘French’, but de-
militarised them, and did not leave them directly under Free French control.33 The 
message also set Eden the daunting, and personally unwelcome, task of forcing de 
Gaulle’s acceptance. Churchill recognised that the State Department’s line was 
digging them a bigger hole in the face of American public opinion, and never 
stated that the Free French were in the wrong or acting against British interests, 
but felt that letting such a minor event obstruct the greater picture and his new 
alliance was “intolerable”.34 Despite protests that this would be a “bitter blow not 
only to General de Gaulle, but also to public opinion in this country”,35 Churchill 
was insistent, and Eden confronted de Gaulle. As expected, he refused the 
communiqué, and failed to understand why the British were following an 
American policy clearly aimed at “Establishing a protectorate over the Vichy 
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Government”.36 Despite Eden’s best efforts, de Gaulle was unwilling to 
compromise to save Hull from embarrassment, but eventually agreed to examine 
the communiqué with the FNC and provide a reply. At no point did Eden defend 
the Americans, nor suggest de Gaulle was in the wrong or responsible for 
reconciliatory action, implying he believed that there was nothing wrong with the 
situation as it stood. Eventually, a revised communiqué was approved by Eden 
and de Gaulle which allowed the Islands to remain French; under control of a pro-
Free French consultative council, with the Vichy administrator removed; with a 
reduction of the naval forces but not total disarmament; and receiving economic 
assistance.37 This did, however, have three secret clauses, which ensured a 
continuing military presence on the Islands, that the Free French Administrator 
would remain and that the consultative committee would be under control of the 
FNC, essentially making the main communiqué redundant.38 Churchill, upon 
receiving these terms, was “very angry” and felt Eden had “failed lamentably”,39 
though by the time he put the communiqué to Roosevelt he had softened, and felt 
the terms were “not too bad”.40 When de Gaulle subsequently met Churchill, 
however, he suffered a “torrent of indignation”41, which sparked a bitter argument 
over who represented France. Eventually de Gaulle conceded to consult the FNC 
about removing the secret clauses, which the Americans would not accept.42 All 
this was in vain, however, as the State Department were unaware of the 
compromise communiqué, and Hull, who had caused the chaos in the first place, 
was on holiday recovering from illness, so the issue remained unresolved.  
This incident sheds interesting light on the contrasting foreign policy views 
of the British and the Americans, and also on the continued tussle between 
Churchill and Eden for control of British policy. Initially, Churchill felt the issue 
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was unimportant, explaining to de Gaulle that he “had not originally himself been 
against a Free French occupation of the Islands”,43 a stance which had been shared 
by Eden. Unlike Eden, however, Churchill was more easily swayed by the 
Americans than his own colleagues, and told de Gaulle that “the moment 
President Roosevelt had raised strong objection it was merely foolish to hamper 
the great alliance through which the war would be won”.44 This statement clearly 
showed that Churchill was not only willing to ignore the advice of the War 
Cabinet and his Foreign Secretary, but also public opinion and his own personal 
opinion so as not to risk the American alliance, in whose basket all his eggs were 
placed. It is hard to see how any of this constitutes Eden ‘failing lamentably’, as 
defending British foreign policy interests would not count as failing when 
compared to his job description. The fact Churchill criticised Eden for standing by 
British policy in a situation advantageous to the British suggests that the bigger 
failing was Churchill’s, as he ignored existing policy commitments, and the advice 
of his War Cabinet, who had based their decisions on military advice and public 
opinion, in order to get Hull out of a hole of his own digging. Also concerning for 
Eden was, as de Gaulle criticised, that the British “attached so much importance to 
giving satisfaction to the United States”.45 Eden was wary of the consequences of 
trying to ensure American approval of British policy, especially in areas of 
particular British interest, and was uncomfortable with the amount of control over 
foreign policy held by Churchill. Whilst Rothwell argues Eden was prepared to 
support de Gaulle in part because America supported Vichy,46 it was a British war 
aim to restore France (represented in Britain’s eyes by the Free French Movement), 
and thus not unreasonable for the Foreign Secretary to support the party with 
whom agreements were held. Another concern, raised by David Reynolds, was 
that the Anglo-American alliance was not so much an alliance between countries, 
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but between Churchill and Roosevelt.47 Eden was apprehensive about allowing 
Roosevelt “to determine the foreign policy of the British Empire”,48 the likely 
outcome as he saw it of this style of Anglo-American alliance. Whilst difficult to 
say that there was a definite idea within the Foreign Office of an independent 
foreign policy, it seems clear from the attempts to back the Free French, even 
against America, that they saw the need for one. The coming months would see 
this policy develop, and the events outlined proved to be a microcosm of a 
broader attempt to define British policy outside of American influence.  
 
The ’teapot tempest’ was not the only source of friction with the French 
during early 1942. De Gaulle continued to be a thorn in the side for the British, 
especially in relation to the FNC.49 When Muselier returned to England and learnt 
of the difficulties caused by the affair, he became increasingly critical towards de 
Gaulle,50 and relations between the two men deteriorated. Muselier subsequently 
left the Committee, though retained his command of the Free French Naval forces. 
Eden, having been involved in the creation of the FNC, tried to smooth things 
over, though de Gaulle responded angrily to this un-necessary intervention in 
French internal affairs. The British insistence that Muselier should be reinstated 
increased his frustration, and the meeting led to an impasse, with Eden 
complaining that de Gaulle’s dictatorial nature was damaging to the British and 
the Free French, and de Gaulle criticising Eden for thinking that he harboured any 
greater ambitions than simply running the Free French Movement. 51 When the 
two met the following day Muselier had been removed as Commander-in-Chief 
by de Gaulle,52 leading Eden to inform him that the Cabinet wanted Muselier to 
remain in his post, and this was a matter far more important than French internal 
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politics.53 Once again, de Gaulle took offence, thinking this was an internal matter. 
As he felt the matter settled he turned a cold shoulder to Eden’s vague threats that 
“certain measures” might have to be taken against him.54 Another stalemate 
developed, though this was broken on 19 March 1942, as the British were forced to 
withdraw their support from Muselier when he called for the French Navy to go 
on strike.55  
Whilst again showing himself difficult to work with, de Gaulle’s position vis-
à-vis France meant he could, just, get away with these actions, so long as fortune 
continued to favour him. As with St. Pierre and Miquelon, de Gaulle was aided in 
his efforts by Eden, who was tasked with confronting the General; on this issue, 
however, he did not share the view of the Cabinet. In the meetings between the 
two, Eden was trying to avoid implementing the Cabinet decisions, and gave de 
Gaulle as much opportunity as possible consider the British request in its true 
light, rather than assuming it an act of interference and rejecting it out of hand.56 
He also indicated that whilst the Cabinet wanted immediate action from de Gaulle 
or they would revise their agreements, he “wished to avoid” this situation and 
pleaded with de Gaulle to prevent this happening.57 Eden was not alone in his 
reluctance to antagonise or over-rule de Gaulle. A memorandum received from 
Neville Lytton58 highlighted the position of de Gaulle relative to France, and notes 
in particular that he was the man who represented “all honour-loving French 
people” and was a “courageous ally to Great Britain”, yet also highlighted how 
badly the British seem to treat him compared to Pétain, suggesting this was an 
intolerable situation that needed to be halted.59 Harvey wrote that de Gaulle was 
“the only leader of the Free French” despite being “a most difficult man and 
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almost intolerable to work with … We cannot afford to get rid of him”.60 This was 
indicative of Foreign Office sentiment, as although de Gaulle was obstinate, 
argumentative, temperamental and intolerable, there was no alternative Free 
French leader, nor was the prospect of dealing solely with Vichy a palatable one. 
Thus once more Eden stood by his ally, when others would have become too 
frustrated and potentially cut the ties between Britain and the Free French 
Movement, as indicated by the warnings and threats Eden was meant to deliver to 
de Gaulle from the War Cabinet.  
 
Policy or principle? 
 
Whilst the Foreign Office was having one of its “periodical bust-ups”61 with 
de Gaulle and seeing its relations with the Free French deteriorating further, it was 
at least making progress in its relations with the Soviet Union. After his relatively 
successful visit to Moscow, difficult though some of the conversations with Stalin 
had been, with Eden now working on gaining Soviet frontier recognition as a step 
towards an Anglo-Soviet treaty there looked a great deal of promise. 
Unfortunately, appearances can be deceiving, as the Russians were soon to 
discover. While in Moscow, Eden gave the impression that this was all just a 
matter of formalities, and would quickly be resolved, but the reality was very 
different. His initial impetus was for a two pronged approach, putting the subject 
to Churchill and Winant in the hope that one or both would put the British case to 
Roosevelt, but his enthusiasm was diminished by Cadogan, who minuted that 
Churchill would “quite possibly refuse” to raise the issue in Washington, and thus 
felt it safer for Eden not to proceed on his own “without further discussion with 
the P.M.”.62 Eden took heed of the advice, asking the Department to send the 
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telegram to Churchill, but hold the note for Winant.63 No indication is given as to 
why he did this, so it can only be assumed that he either felt Cadogan had 
proposed the most sensible course of action, or that he also thought the initial 
approach to Churchill would likely fail. Having submitted his report of the 
mission to the War Cabinet, no recommendation of further action was made, 
despite Eden’s suggestion that “this question of frontiers would have to be 
considered by the War Cabinet”.64 His reluctance to proceed without approval 
from Churchill could suggest a lack of conviction to his task, but the fact he was 
willing to take immediate action to deal with the issue makes this seem unlikely, 
especially as he was taking his own initiative after receiving no recommendation 
from the War Cabinet, and he probably suspected this was a battle that would take 
more than one telegram to resolve, as indeed was the case.  
His telegram to Churchill was passionate and reasonable, detailing logical 
reasons for accepting the Soviet demands, noting where merit lay and not 
ignoring possible difficulties. He tried to present a workable solution that could 
just about be acceptable to all parties, including a means of working within the 
Atlantic Charter, and earnestly appealed for Churchill to discuss the issue in 
Washington.65 Churchill’s response, whilst accepting that some discussion was 
necessary, was unequivocal in its attitude to Eden’s request: “there must be no 
mistake about the opinion of any British Government of which I am the head; 
namely, that it adheres to those principles of freedom and democracy set forth in 
the Atlantic Charter”.66 This did not deter Eden, who began drafting a lengthy 
memorandum which he produced at the War Cabinet meeting on 5 February. This 
covered two main topics, how to build post-war co-operation with Russia and 
how to deal with the 1941 frontier question, and recommended the War Cabinet 
allow Halifax to lay out the British problem in Washington after considering what 
form this presentation should take. The memorandum set out what Eden saw as 
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the likely shape of post-war Europe, and suggested that co-operation with the 
Soviet Union was necessary as a counterweight to a German resurgence, and to 
minimise any threat from a potentially strong Russia taking advantage of a weak 
Europe. In effect co-operation was necessary to ensure a post-war balance of 
power in Europe, no matter how strong or weak any of the given powers may 
have been. It also noted the difficulty of bringing America and Russia together on 
the issue, but thought that where possible tri-partite decisions should be made.67  
As to the frontiers, this was more complicated, though Eden suggested that 
the Russian demands were “very reasonable” considering what they could have 
requested; that agreement could aid the British in achieving a balance of power in 
Europe (albeit one directed against Germany); that mollifying Russia on this issue 
could ease her passage into the conflict with Japan, thus helping the American war 
effort; and asserted that a lack of British acquiescence could not affect Russia's 
post-war frontiers one way or the other: “if she is in occupation of the territory 
involved at the end of the war, neither we nor America will turn her out”.68 He 
also set out the difficulties that would be faced, specifically with the Atlantic 
Charter although he suggests some ways to work round this, and of gaining 
agreement by Stalin of anything less than his demands. To complete the 
memorandum he included some quid pro quo’s which could be used as bargaining 
chips with Stalin, as well as alternate plans that could be more palatable to the 
United States should they be unwilling to recognise the frontiers. These included 
the Soviet acquisition of bases in the Baltic countries or Soviet control of foreign 
relations and defence of these states, with the suggested quid pro quo’s including 
Soviet acquiescence in British acquisition of bases in Europe, as well as Soviet 
agreement to various statements about collaboration, confederations and non-
interference in the affairs of other states.69  
When discussed by the War Cabinet, the proposal met with mixed opinions. 
Beaverbrook championed the cause, arguing effusively for the urgent necessity of 
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accepting the Soviet demands, subject to receiving American views, and stating 
that history gave many examples of times when the British had been less than 
efficient at acceding to Russian requests.70 Eden, more moderately, argued that the 
wider perspective of improving Anglo-Soviet relations outweighed the distaste 
some may have felt at the frontier recognition, and that it was in the broader 
interests of the whole war effort to put the case for accepting the demand for their 
recognition to the United States.71 Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, and 
Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, also weighed in, suggesting the 
principle of self-determination should not be too rigidly applied, that post-war 
agreement with Stalin was imperative, and that, assuming the war was won, 
Stalin’s forces would be occupying these areas anyway.72 Only Clement Attlee, 
The Lord Privy Seal, spoke against the plan, suggesting it could endanger the 
causes for which the British were fighting and could open the floodgates to more 
unpalatable Russian demands, a course he felt was “both wrong in itself and 
inexpedient”.73 Churchill reserved himself to stating that all these matters should 
be settled at the Peace Conference, but that for now the issue was how to put the 
matter to the United States, and that he preferred a balanced statement. This was 
to be the eventual result, with Eden tasked with drafting a telegram to Halifax 
containing the balanced statement, as well as the alternate plans. Given the 
suggested action at the end of Eden’s memorandum, this was almost the result he 
was looking for; the only point missing was, in realty, a clear indication to the 
Americans that on balance the Cabinet favoured accepting the Soviet demands. 
This result was not enough for Beaverbrook, who presented a paper at the 
following War Cabinet meeting detailing the urgent need to agree to Stalin’s 
demands, and thus put forward a strong case to the United States on these lines.74 
This was, however, overlooked, as the draft telegrams to Halifax were approved, 
and were dutifully despatched the following day.  
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Despite the initial objection and disapproval from Churchill, Eden’s 
persistence, combined with his balanced, logical and wide-reaching memorandum 
to the Cabinet, left little room for successful and coherent counter argument, so it 
is not surprising that he received enough Cabinet support to force the pace of the 
issue. Churchill had acknowledged that something should be said to Roosevelt, 
but did not want a proposal submitted to America that stated Britain favoured 
accepting the Soviet demands. Thus the result being a balanced statement appears 
a workable compromise, allowing the Cabinet to say they had discussed the issue 
whilst allowing Churchill to appear to stand by the Atlantic Charter. Eden 
suggests that this was a success, and showed that the Cabinet had “resolved our 
differences”,75 in reality, the result was actually quite disappointing. Of the sixteen 
present at the meeting76 only seven made contributions worthy of being minuted. 
Of these, only Attlee argued against the proposal; Churchill subtly suggested his 
opposition; Eden and Beaverbrook argued the case, supported by Morrison and 
Sinclair, with Bevin’s contribution only a question for clarity on Stalin’s demands. 
There is also a note that “several ministers … favoured giving the United States 
some indication of how our minds were moving”,77 in other words that the United 
States should be told Britain favoured accepting the proposals. The balance of 
opinion, and the range of support from both Conservatives and Labour alike, 
suggests the debate should have ended in something more than a draw.78 Though 
Churchill fails to mention this debate in his writings, in general the fact is picked 
up in the historiography that a good number of the War Cabinet supported Eden, 
though this is not always represented as a success, and as seen, support was one 
thing, being able to act was quite another. 
 
Obtaining agreement to put the problem before Roosevelt was a success, 
especially given Churchill’s earlier comments, and meant the task of resolving the 
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problem had moved on to its next step. The telegrams sent to Halifax gave no 
sense of Eden’s strong personal opinion, or that of the majority of Cabinet, but 
equally gave little indication of what the British required, prompting a vague 
reply from Halifax.79 After consulting Roosevelt and Welles, Halifax informed 
Eden that the President thought “we might both assure Stalin of our general 
purpose”,80 and Welles, whilst acknowledging the “necessity of recognising 
Stalin’s case for reassurance about security” preferred “building [the] new world 
on principle”.81 This response, whilst unhelpful, could have been used by Eden to 
convey that no real objections had been made, save for needing to consider the 
Atlantic Charter. Unfortunately, he was to receive news the next day that, after a 
joint discussion between Roosevelt and Welles, Roosevelt felt the suggestions 
could not be reconciled with the Atlantic Charter, “and that it was premature to 
attempt detailed treatment of the problem”.82 To add insult to Eden’s injury, 
Roosevelt also proposed that he should seek a direct resolution of the issue with 
Stalin. The Cabinet’s response was not promising. Churchill suggested that it was 
best to let Roosevelt proceed so as not to offend him, and the Cabinet offered no 
other proposals, simply postulating that it was Britain, not America, with whom 
Stalin wanted to deal.83 Eden’s proposal, which was accepted, was to present a 
memorandum to Winant that he could discuss with Roosevelt, raising concerns 
over this procedure, and pushing for tripartite discussions in London, though 
accepting they would have to let Roosevelt pursue his course if he chose to do so.84 
Whilst Winant did, unsuccessfully, put the British case to Roosevelt, Eden 
managed to convince Churchill to move to the next step. By taking advantage of 
Britain’s difficult political situation, its military misfortunes in the Far East, and 
highlighting the danger of Britain being left out of a Soviet-American bargain, 
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Eden persuaded Churchill to send a personal appeal to Roosevelt.85 Whilst this 
was also unsuccessful, it was an impressive feat that Eden had finally converted 
Churchill, and removed him as a barrier to acceptance of the Soviet demands. The 
difficulty for Eden was resolved when Roosevelt went ahead with his direct 
approach to Litvinov. The Americans were prepared to offer little more than 
words, and the approach was rebuffed by Stalin, who informed Roosevelt that 
they had “taken note of his communication”.86 The way was, therefore, clear for 
Eden to proceed without the need to worry about the Americans, as the Soviets 
had shown no interest in dealing through Roosevelt, and the Americans had 
agreed on the need for Soviet security, just not the method being employed.87 
Pressure from Maisky and increased support from the Government convinced 
Eden that the time was right to “risk ruffling the Anglo-American relationship in 
the interests of what he saw as compelling British interests”.88 Thus, on 27 March 
1942, he informed Maisky and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who had replace Cripps 
as Ambassador in Moscow, that Britain was prepared to enter negotiations with 
the Soviet Government, and conclude a treaty,89 and these negotiations will be 
examined in the next chapter. Eden’s championing of this cause will also be 
explored in greater detail, and in the wider context of the thesis concerning a 
broader foreign policy.   
 
Persona Grata? 
 
With Eden attempting to improve relations from London, there was also a 
change of personnel in Russia. After many threats to return home, based on the 
widening difference of his views to those of the Government, a difference not 
unknown to the Russians;90 and an increasing sense of frustration at what he felt a 
                                                 
85 Dutton, Eden, p. 192, Carlton, Eden, pp. 194-195, Barker, Churchill and Eden, p. 238. 
86 TNA, Avon papers, FO 954/25A, Eden to Clark Kerr, 23 March 1942. 
87 Ibid, Eden to Clark Kerr, 17 March 1942. 
88 Dutton, Eden, p. 193. 
89 TNA, Avon Papers, FO 954/25A, Eden to Clark Kerr, Report on conversation with Maisky, 27 
March 1942. 
90 Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, editors text, p. 233. 
101 
futile task even in the best of circumstances, Cripps was finally relieved of his post 
in Moscow. Having been ignored on several occasions by Molotov and Stalin, he 
was left out of the Beaverbrook negotiations, generally sidelined whilst Eden was 
in Moscow, and his standing was so low that Stalin made no effort to say goodbye 
or see him off.91 Despite thanking the Russians for their generous and friendly 
treatment in his public farewell, he had, in reality, lost his standing as persona 
grata, and was looking forward to returning home. He was replaced by seasoned 
diplomat Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who had served most recently and with great 
popular acclaim in China, so much so that he was elevated from KCMG to 
GCMG.92 Though technically a promotion, the role of Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union was one Clark Kerr found particularly isolated and dull, especially after his 
experience in China, where he had plenty to do and was not surrounded entirely 
by the “diplomatic circus”.93 He struggled to adapt to his new life of “isolation”,94 
cut off from the world entirely by comparison to his former experience, and 
initially found little to do. Despite this, and an unsuccessful appeal to Cripps for 
advice on dealing with the difficulties,95 Clark Kerr soon began to leave his mark 
on Anglo-Soviet relations. After a month in Russia, he was finally invited to 
Moscow to meet Stalin and Molotov, who had remained there in the face of the 
German assault, just as he himself had done in Chungking against the orders of 
His Majesties Government.96 He proved an instant hit with Stalin, forming a bond 
with him that Cripps could only have dreamt of, though as ever with Anglo-Soviet 
relations, luck played its part. Clark Kerr was being taken through the Kremlin 
when the air-raid warnings sounded, and clumsily accepted the invitation to join 
Stalin in the air-raid bunker. Thus his first meeting was not a procedural 
presentation of credentials, but a shared human experience of sheltering from a 
                                                 
91 Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, 27 December 1941 to 2 January 1942, pp. 230-231 and 8 January 1942, 
p. 235. 
92 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32422?docPos=1. 
93 Gillies, D. Radical Diplomat: The Life of Archibald Clark Kerr, Lord Inverchapel, 1882-1951, (London, 
1999), p. 125. 
94 TNA, Inverchapel Papers, FO 800/300, Letter from Clark Kerr to Eden, 27 April 1942. 
95 Ibid, Clark Kerr to Cripps, 26 April 1942 and Cripps’s reply on 12 June 1942, which contained no 
advice for Clark Kerr except to wait it out.  
96 Gillies, Radical Diplomat, p. 113. 
102 
German air-raid, and consequently a more genuine and non-political meeting of 
men rather than politicians or diplomats. The tone of the conversation attests to 
this, with Clark Kerr and Stalin amicably discussing pipe tobacco, sex and 
methods to keep one’s wives in line (a rather sensitive subject for Clark Kerr).97 
Whilst this was not necessarily Ambassadorial, the light hearted discussion meant 
Clark Kerr and Stalin developed a bond more akin to friends than colleagues. The 
same could not be said with Molotov, however, whom he referred to as 
“bootfaced”98 and with whom he felt there was little chance for “personal 
harmonies”.99 Vyshinsky fared better, on a personal level at least, as he was 
considered to be “agreeable and friendly”,100 though it was felt that, through him, 
“nothing fundamental can be done”.101 As a mark of the good personal relations 
cultivated he received of a gift of tobacco from Stalin, and was honoured by 
Vyshinsky holding a dinner party for the British Embassy staff, two events which 
were without precedent,102 and perhaps a sign that the Russians were more willing 
to deal with the new Ambassador.   
It is interesting that relatively little attention has been paid to the significance 
of this change. Perhaps it is felt Churchill’s comment that “when so much was 
being done by direct communication between me and Stalin … the functions of an 
Ambassador become increasingly separated from the scene of decisive business”103 
was an accurate reflection on the idleness of the post. Maybe the distance shown 
by the Russians themselves to Cripps was taken to suggest distain for the post 
itself. Whatever the explanation, which seems, unfortunately, hard to find, the lack 
of coverage suggests that the replacement of Cripps was not significant. Eden fails 
to mention Clark Kerr until July 1942, despite discussing the possibility of Cripps 
joining the Government in February.104 Likewise Cadogan first mentions him in 
July after receiving a telegram from the Ambassador urging a meeting between 
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Stalin and Churchill.105 Churchill makes a reference to the fact he was being 
appointed, though made no other comment on the matter,106 and Harvey mentions 
his appointment, but only after his first meeting with Molotov and Stalin.107 
Maisky makes no reference to him at all. The story continues in the secondary 
work. D.R. Thorpe makes a solitary and apparently incorrect reference to Clark 
Kerr, stating he was appointed due to his success quelling Stalin’s Second Front 
demand during Eden’s mission to Moscow, despite no reference in the documents 
or any other works of him being involved.108 Other examples include Dutton and 
Rothwell, whose works on Eden fail to reference the Ambassador; Carlton, who 
doesn’t mention him until 1944;109 and Charmley, who doesn’t reference him until 
Churchill’s meeting with Stalin in August 1942.110 Only Folly mentions the new 
Ambassador with any level of regularity, and considered his appointment to be an 
“inspired” choice by the British.111 It could be suggested that this lack of coverage 
was due to the difficulties faced in the post, or that Clark Kerr was a singularly 
uninspiring Ambassador and, therefore, not worthy of any discussion. What 
makes these two suggestions rather unfounded are, firstly, the number of 
references these same works make to Cripps;112 secondly, the widely 
acknowledged support Clark Kerr held in China; and thirdly, the number of 
unprecedented gestures made by the Soviets towards Clark Kerr. This suggests 
that, for some unknown reason, historians have largely decided to overlook the 
arrival of a man who was to play a key role in relations between two major 
countries during the war, and whilst an in-depth discussion on this as a historical 
phenomenon is beyond the remit of this thesis, it is important to mention to 
highlight, to an extent, the neglect shown to the idea of foreign policy and 
diplomatic relations during this period by 70 years of history.  
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On the face of things, 1942 brought with it a great deal of promise. 
Churchill’s hopes of an American entry into the war had been realised, Eden had 
finally met Stalin and begun the process of treaty negotiations, and although the 
French were still causing trouble, progress in two areas out of three wasn’t bad. 
Churchill’s American adventure managed to ensure a Europe first policy, as well 
as the signature of the United Nations Declaration, and he had high hopes that 
this would be the moment where the tide swung away from Germany. The 
positive appearance was, however, a mask for more difficulties under the surface. 
Relations with France were steadily declining, causing several threats of 
resignation, and showed no real prospect of improving in the near future. The 
only real consolation being that Eden was standing by de Gaulle in an effort to 
preserve the British position in the face of American contradictions and 
collaboration with Vichy. Relations with Russia were, for the first time, showing 
real signs of improvement. Whilst there was annoyance on the Russian side by 
British delays, the reassurances that discussions were being held, and that Eden’s 
promise was being upheld, generally allowed for good working relations whilst 
the British sought a suitable resolution, at first to everyone’s satisfaction, but 
finally concluding that it was their own policy that should take precedence over 
American idealism. The Russians also had a British Ambassador with whom they 
felt they could work, so as 1942 proceeded there looked a good chance that, 
having won over Churchill and largely nullified American concerns, Eden could 
make progress on a treaty with Stalin. On the French side, however, he faced the 
prospect of yet more difficulty with de Gaulle, and probably more arguments with 
Churchill for standing by this rather irritating ally, but then nobody said 
diplomacy was easy.  
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7) Two Steps Back, One Step Forward 
 
In retrospect, 1942 would be the year which saw the ‘end of the beginning’, 
but its early months were hard ones for the British, with defeats in the Far East and 
the Middle East doing nothing to boost either morale or prestige. Churchill faced 
up to mounting criticism in the House by calling for a vote of confidence, which 
was conduced in euphemistic language. Rather than saying what they meant, that 
they had no confidence in Churchill himself, his opponents concentrated on the 
anomaly of his being Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. It was suggested 
that someone of his stature, holding both these offices, could lead to something 
more akin to absolute rule within the War Cabinet than was desired.1 It was also 
argued that, due to the perceived failings of supply provision and distribution, 
changes were required to resolve this problem, the popular suggestion being for a 
Minister of Production,2 something that was already under consideration.3 After 
three days of discussion, the debate wound up and the Vote of Confidence 
proceeded, resulting in an overwhelming majority of four hundred and sixty four 
to one being returned. Had the debate been held a few weeks later when the full 
implications of the situation in the Far East were realised it could certainly have 
delivered a different verdict but, as it was, confidence was bestowed upon the 
Churchill Government to continue its “vigorous prosecution of the War”.4 
 
Whilst changes were under consideration, the debate highlighted their 
requirement, and Churchill proposed the inclusion of Cripps, who had received a 
“tumultuous reception”5 upon his return from Russia, and whose public profile 
continued to rise amidst public speeches and radio broadcasts. His inclusion in the 
War Cabinet was something that the public were also coming to expect, and 
Churchill, feeling him qualified for the role, offered him the post of Minister of 
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Supply, an offer that would also allow him to promote Beaverbrook to Minister of 
Production.6 As the post would be subservient to Beaverbrook’s, and would not 
offer a War Cabinet seat, Cripps declined, thinking he would not be able to 
perform the role successfully.7 Thus no change occurred, but the fall of Singapore, 
which Eden noted both “shocked and grieved the country”,8 brought the conduct 
of the war under renewed criticism, and thus changes had to be made.  
Eden was summoned to see Churchill on 16 February, and after several days 
of discussions a new War Cabinet was announced.9 Creating it, however, was not 
straightforward. Something Churchill fails to mention, which Eden notes in his 
diary, was that he was offered the Leadership of the House of Commons, but 
having delayed his response to think it over for a couple of hours, found the post 
had meanwhile been offered to Cripps, who wanted to accept it if Eden 
approved.10 Eden was unimpressed, and when he met Churchill he put forward 
the case for him being Leader of the House, particularly noting support from 
Beaverbrook, but Churchill dismissed this, stating that Eden was “a doer not a 
talker”.11 Churchill makes no reference to these discussions, instead suggesting he 
talked through his idea with Attlee, who approved of Cripps becoming Lord Privy 
Seal and Leader of the House in exchange for Attlee’s acquisition of the Dominions 
Office and the role of Deputy Prime Minister.12 The important change, aside from 
those outlined, was the resignation of Beaverbrook. To Churchill he cited ill 
health,13 to Eden the lack of support for Russia and the failure to deal with the 1941 
frontier question and, coupled to this, the promotion of Attlee (the reason, in his 
eyes, Russian policy never materialised).14 His resignation was a blow to Churchill, 
as he was a long time friend and political ally, and Churchill hoped to have him 
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back after a stint in America to return to health.15 It was also a blow for Eden, as 
whilst Beaverbrook could be frustrating, his support for the Russian cause made 
him a useful ally in Cabinet. It was Beaverbrook who had pushed for a re-
consideration of sending Eden to Moscow empty handed, and Beaverbrook who 
had led the charge in Cabinet and argued alongside Eden for a positive British 
decision on the frontier issue. His relationship with Churchill meant he was able to 
persuade him to change course, to the benefit of both Eden for his mission to 
Moscow, and his Department’s attempts to consider and construct a foreign policy, 
based around strong, friendly relations with the Soviet Union. His successor was 
Oliver Lyttelton. The reshuffle brought in new personalities, and although reduced 
in number, its political bias largely remained the same. Whilst Beaverbrook had 
gone, Cripps was in, so Eden would still have one strong ally when it came to 
pressing the Russian cause, and Lyttelton was a respected and loyal colleague who 
had recent experience dealing with foreign policy, giving a potential ally for Eden 
when discussing broader considerations, though as a right-wing Tory was unlikely 
to provide much assistance where Russia was concerned.  
 
The reshuffle was accompanied by rumours of a formal challenge to 
Churchill’s leadership. Whilst no challenger emerged, it is interesting to examine 
this because of the rumoured candidates. Maisky asked the question “Who can 
possibly replace Churchill if he resigns?” and followed immediately with the 
answer “Two names are widely circulated: Eden and Cripps”.16 As one of the 
prominent members of the Cabinet, and leader of one of the most important 
departments, it was natural that Eden’s name should be put forward, and his anti-
appeasement reputation and his popularity with the public would have made him 
seem a viable candidate. Cripps was unquestionably the man of the moment, 
though his support was more temporary than Churchill’s, he was outside party, so 
would be seen as a national rather than party appointment, and was an intelligent 
political thinker and good orator. Eden was unofficially regarded as Churchill’s 
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successor, and the debate over who was to be Leader of the House could have 
really been about who was being groomed to be the next Prime Minister.17 Eden 
recalls dining with Churchill and Brendan Bracken, the Minister of Information, 
and Winston suddenly stating “that if anything happened to him I should have to 
take over”.18 This nomination of Eden as heir was noted by Harvey, who suggested 
that Eden “is now in position we want him as recognised No. 2”.19 The fact that 
Eden was de facto Churchill’s heir could certainly be a reason why there was 
difficulty gaining agreement on the Cabinet, and why there was concern over 
Cripps gaining the Leadership of the House. The position of Churchill’s number 
two could also be why Eden did not put his head above the parapet and formerly 
challenge Churchill, thinking in the long run the Leadership of the party and the 
Government would be his if Churchill stepped down or suffered ill health. Cripps’ 
inclusion in the new Cabinet may have prevented his threat, as he would have 
appeared greedy if, after being offered Leader of the House, he held out for the 
Premiership, which had recently won a Vote of Confidence in Parliament. It is 
interesting that the two contenders have common features. Both were younger 
than Churchill and carried popular support; both felt improved relations with and 
support of Russia would be beneficial to the British war effort; both had argued for 
the acceptance of the Russian frontier demands, to improve relations and out of 
strategic realism; and both (although Eden only recently) were thinking about 
what lay ahead for Britain, and wanted to set the groundwork for a foreign policy 
that could carry Britain through the war and into the post-war world. It is pure 
conjecture to state that, from a foreign policy point of view, this indicated a more 
idealistic Britain and a desire to look beyond the present war effort, but it is 
interesting that both these ‘candidates’ shared these common perspectives, which 
were at odds with Churchill’s but aligned to the vision Roosevelt would develop, 
and the leadership of either could have produced a significantly different future 
for Britain than the one Churchill was to bring about. When examined from 
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hindsight a case could easily be made that this was simply an ideological shift, and 
one that was resigned to the fact that giving in to Stalin was easier than standing 
against him. Though Cripps was undoubtedly pro Soviet, the Foreign Office as a 
whole were not, despite favouring working with Russia, so Eden was unlikely to 
pursuing this course on ideological grounds. Equally, it would be hard to level a 
pro-soviet charge at Roosevelt, who was soon to propose similar policy lines as 
Cripps and Eden had been suggesting.  
 
In terms of policy towards the USSR, the British had decided that they were 
prepared to negotiate a treaty with Russia without American backing, though they 
were by no means excluding America. Alongside informing Maisky and Clark 
Kerr, another telegram was despatched to Halifax, asking him to make one final 
effort to get the President to understand the British position.20 Although this 
yielded no change of attitude, it did suggest that America was, reluctantly, 
prepared to acquiesce in the British decision to make a deal with Stalin, based on 
the acceptance of the 1941 frontiers.21 Having resigned his cabinet post, 
Beaverbrook had been sent to America to try and smooth out the Russian treaty 
question, under the guise of recovering from his asthma.22 Though this was the 
disclosed rationale for the visit, there were rumours of Beaverbrook scheming to 
take over the Washington Embassy, a position he had been offered and had 
accepted in September 1941, but the Americans failed to respond to the suggestion, 
so there could have been more to the mission than the select few who knew of its 
existence believed.23 Being a strong supporter of the Russian cause, and having 
successfully dealt with the supply issue in Moscow, he was certainly suitable for 
such a mission, and despite the difficult situation he was able to leverage some 
flexibility in the American attitude. Having seen Roosevelt, he informed Churchill 
that they had devised a suitable plan and that details would be received through 
                                                 
20 TNA, War Cabinet Papers, CAB 66/23/24, Eden to Halifax, 26 March 1942, produced as part of 
Eden’s Memorandum to the War Cabinet on Proposed Anglo-Soviet Treaty, 5 April 1942. 
21 Ibid, Halifax to Eden, 1 April 1942, produced as part of Eden’s Memorandum to the War Cabinet 
on Proposed Anglo-Soviet Treaty, 5 April 1942. 
22 TNA, Prime Ministers Papers, PREM 3/399/8, Churchill to Stalin, 20 March 1942. 
23 Roberts, Holy Fox, p. 290. 
110 
Halifax.24 This was news to the Foreign Office, with Cadogan commenting that 
they had received “another extraordinary telegram from the Beaver … it talks of a 
‘plan’ – apparently in connexion with the Stalin demands. We’ve had no ‘plan’”.25 
The ‘plan’, which followed from Halifax, was the insertion into the political treaty 
of a clause allowing for the emigration of people who wanted to leave the Baltic 
countries over which Russia would gain control.26 Despite any possible intrigues 
surrounding the post of Ambassador, Halifax informed the Foreign Office that 
“Max has been most helpful and we have worked together in complete harmony. 
The main question in which you have been interested here these last days would 
have been much more difficult but for his independent contribution. Tell Prime 
Minister”.27 The telegram was unusual as Halifax and Max did not get on, the 
latter was critical of the former's religion28 and was part of the intrigue to remove 
Halifax from the Foreign Office in late 1940,29 not to mention that Beaverbrook was 
not ‘independent’ on this issue, having a very particular “obsession”30 for the 
Russian issue. Given Halifax's good relations with the State Department and 
Roosevelt it is hard to see that the more difficult personality of Beaverbrook would 
make a positive difference, but a difference he made. Given his desire for a Second 
Front, perhaps he convinced the President that it was better to acquiesce to the 
agreement of the Russian frontiers than risk having to be part of an early Second 
Front in Europe, but we may never really know what led to Roosevelt’s change of 
stance. Clearly Churchill felt Beaverbrook had been the catalyst for this success as, 
in May 1942, he again offered him the position of Ambassador. Beaverbrook 
accepted, as now did Roosevelt, though the plan was never implemented, much to 
the relief of the Foreign Office. Cadogan’s reaction was “Ye Gods!!”,31 whilst 
Harvey described it as “dreadful” and “calamitous”.32 He also noted that Eden 
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feared Churchill’s plan was for Halifax to go to India, with Beaverbrook to replace 
him, and that Eden was not keen on this arrangement.33  
With the American position tentatively resolved, Eden constructed a plan for 
the proposed treaty, which he presented to the War Cabinet on 8 April. He 
proposed to use the treaty drafts discussed in Moscow as a starting point, and 
negotiate updated terms through Maisky, attempting to include the American 
suggestion for population emigration.34 This was agreed by the War Cabinet, as 
was the proposal to invite Molotov to visit London to conduct the signature of the 
agreement.35 With the procedure agreed, Eden consulted Maisky, who was 
receptive to the planned procedure and Eden’s requirement to make some 
amendments to the drafts.36 The drafts submitted by Eden to Maisky as the 
opening salvo were the ones that he had come close to signing in Moscow, but 
with several alterations.37 The new political draft was both longer and broader in 
scope. In addition to the Articles already contained in the draft treaty from 
Moscow (on the Atlantic Charter, acting by mutual agreement in the post-war 
world, and the prevention of future German aggression, all of which were subject 
to minor alterations of wording), a lengthy preamble was added; the Article 
covering European reconstruction was split, with an additional Article created 
covering the separate nature of the Polish frontier question; a new Article was 
added encompassing the American suggestion about population emigration; the 
Article from the military agreement which ruled out participation in alliances or 
coalitions directed against the other power was added, along with a lengthy 
Article detailing the ratification process.38 Given the significance of Poland to the 
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British they were keen to make sure this remained a separate issue, so it is not 
surprising that a clause was added to try and ensure this. The incorporation of the 
American clause shows how much the British still wanted to appease America, as 
the emigration of the population from his new territories would not have been 
something Stalin would have been keen to agree to. With these clauses Britain was 
trying to safeguard her own position on the one hand, whilst safeguarding 
American public opinion on the other. The military draft remained essentially the 
same, save for one Article being moved to the political treaty, and minor additions 
recognising the United Nations declaration and an agreement not to negotiate a 
separate peace with any allies of Hitler.39 Nothing controversial here, as Russia had 
subscribed to the United Nations declaration, and had already agreed in principle 
to the no separate peace clause. Eden noted that Maisky “did not take any strong 
objection to any of the modifications we suggested, nor even our new clause”.40  
Unfortunately, this lack of objection was not to last as Maisky returned with 
what Eden called a “catechism” on the drafts, though the record of the 
conversation sent to Clark Kerr suggests it was not too bad, and that Eden was 
even able to get a pleasing response to his suggestion that everything possible 
should be done to help the Poles. 41 Whilst continued negotiations made little 
progress, positive news was received that, after initially declining the invitation, 
Molotov would travel to London in the near future to resolve the “fresh 
divergencies of opinion” raised by the new drafts, and “dispose of all the matters 
which stand in the way of the signing of the agreements”.42 During April it was 
discovered that Roosevelt had invited Molotov to Washington to discuss “a very 
important military proposal”,43 and suggested that Molotov, who had accepted, 
would visit Washington first, and then continue on to the United Kingdom.44 
Could this have been the real plan that Beaverbrook and Roosevelt had concocted? 
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Roosevelt sought Churchill’s opinion but Churchill was spared a confrontation 
with Roosevelt by Stalin, who confirmed that Molotov would come to London 
first, then go on to Washington.45 With this settled, although no date yet agreed, 
Maisky presented Eden the Soviet drafts.  
The military draft was the same as the British draft, though dropped the 
reference to the United Nations on the grounds that the treaty would go further, 
and thus the reference was unnecessary, which Eden accepted.46 It was the terms of 
the political draft that were likely to cause trouble, but while there were difficulties 
they appear, from studying the drafts, not to have been too severe, despite the 
impression given in Llewellyn Woodward’s official history.47 Although the Soviet 
draft contained only a simple reference to the Atlantic Charter, and omitted the 
suggestion of working in mutual agreement “in concert with the other states 
concerned”, neither change was opposed by Eden.48 The Articles preventing future 
German aggression; ruling out participation in alliances or coalitions directed 
against the other powers; ensuring post-war economic assistance and ratification 
were all untouched.49 So far, five of the eight articles had been agreed with relative 
ease, and there is evidence to suggest that the difficulty in getting agreement on 
the other, more controversial, Articles was not sufficient to prevent progress. The 
Soviets wanted their original reconstruction Article, and to omit the reference to 
the Polish question, preferring to deal with the issue by an exchange of notes,50 and 
by “mutual agreement between the two countries’ friendly allied relations”.51 
Whilst this was not objectionable to the British in one sense, it did exclude them 
from determining the future of Poland, something which would become an issue 
in a later meeting with Maisky. The wording changes meant the clause now 
related to the restoration of Soviet frontiers, and also to Soviet interests in 
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territories violated by Hitler’s aggression.52 Maisky admitted this meant a further 
undertaking for Britain, and Eden commented that he would have to discuss this 
issue, but did not openly reject the change.53 This just left the American clause, but 
this was, predictably, rejected by the Soviets. Maisky argued that, as far as Russia 
was concerned, the issue was already resolved, especially in regard to the Baltic 
States, as plebiscites had already been held.54 He could also have argued that, as 
this was a treaty between Britain and Russia, there was no requirement for a non-
signatory power to have any of its needs represented. Eden informed Maisky that 
this was “disappointing”, and that it was “important … to take account of 
American opinion”, despite the fact the Americans were not in support of the 
negotiations.55 He did not, however, say it was imperative that such a clause were 
to be included, just that it was desirable, again not entirely closing the door on the 
Soviet proposal. The discussion then turned to the duration of the treaty, which the 
Russians were happy to leave up to the British to determine, and the insertion of a 
secret protocol. This caused some controversy, as it called for British recognition of 
Russian pacts of mutual assistance with Finland and Roumania, which guaranteed 
the independence of these States, in exchange offering Russian recognition of 
similar British pacts with Belgium and Holland.56 Eden noted that this was a new 
proposal, though again did not reject the idea out of hand, giving further hope that 
an agreement could be forthcoming. The War Cabinet were unhappy with the 
Soviet drafts, however, and advised Eden to “draw up a reasoned reply” which 
should “not state, in terms, that we were not prepared to make any further 
concession; but it should set out in detail the reasons why we felt unable to make 
concessions beyond the position set out in the draft Treaty prepared by the Foreign 
Secretary”.57 Whilst Eden was open to negotiation and concession to the Soviet 
Union, the Cabinet were not, and so Eden was left in the awkward position of 
arguing the Cabinet line, despite not personally objecting to the Russian 
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suggestions. With the War Cabinet’s attitude being stiffer than his own, Eden 
continued to argue unsuccessfully with Maisky throughout May, and it was not 
until the arrival of Molotov that any progress was made.  
During the negotiations Cadogan, who was not exactly in favour of the 
Russian treaty in the form being discussed, suggested that there should be “some 
alternative form of Treaty - mutual guarantee, or something”58 that could be put to 
the Russians to save haggling over the same points in the existing treaty, a draft of 
which was circulated to the War Cabinet on 22 May, though not discussed.59 This 
treaty was quite clever, as it avoided anything the British or the Russians were 
unhappy with in the other drafts, yet retained all the points where there had been 
little or no disagreement: its Preamble covered working with the United Nations 
and within the Atlantic Charter framework, preventing future German aggression 
and mutual assistance if one of the signatories were to be attacked by a third 
power; Part One of the treaty encompassed the main points from the military 
draft, with both powers pledging military assistance and support against the Axis 
powers, as well as the intention not to sign a separate peace; Part Two covered the 
points of agreement from the political draft, with the parties agreeing to provide 
each other post-war economic assistance, to collaborate in the post-war 
reconstruction of Europe, to follow the principles of no territorial aggrandisement 
and non intervention in the internal affairs of others, and that neither party would 
join an alliance or coalition directed against the other.60 Additionally, Part Two 
added articles covering the parties desire to associate with other like-minded Sates 
and adopt common proposals to ensure the preservation of peace and the 
prevention of renewed German aggression, agreement to work together if either 
party became involved in another conflict, and the duration for the treaty, which 
was set at twenty years.61  
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Molotov arrived in Britain on 20 May, and took up residence at Chequers, the 
country house available to Prime Ministers, which Maisky noted was a sign of 
utmost respect, as only the highest of visitors stayed there.62 There are many 
summaries of the negotiations between the British delegation headed by Eden and 
the Russian delegation headed by Molotov, so there seems little point offering a 
further one,63 especially as the disagreements were similar to those seen between 
Eden and Maisky. As with the discussions with Maisky, the military draft saw 
minimal amendments and swift agreement, but the political draft was where the 
difficulty lay. The important point to look at here is Eden. He was not opposed to 
many of the Soviet proposals for changes, but had to stand by the Cabinet’s 
decision not to concede any further ground. This dichotomy continued while 
negotiating with Molotov. When discussing the American clause on transfer of 
population, Eden states that it was the position of His Majesty’s Government to 
have such a clause, but then states that he was not bound to any particular form of 
words,64 suggesting that he was happy for the article to be as vaguely defined as 
the Soviets wished, so long as it was there. When discussing Poland, a similar 
picture can be seen, as on the one hand Eden is noting that the position of His 
Majesty’s Government with respect to its agreements with Poland must be 
safeguarded as part of the treaty, whilst also stating that he was not opposed to the 
issue being dealt with outside of the treaty. He also suggested that he would be 
happy to see the proposed compensation of Poland by giving it territory from East 
Prussia ,65 something that had not been discussed by the War Cabinet. Having 
failed to gain agreement on a treaty in Moscow, failed to come to terms with 
Maisky over the drafts, and now failing to reach agreement with Molotov, Eden 
attempted to rescue the negotiations that, since his return from Moscow, he had 
been trying to get the British into a position to hold, and successfully conclude, by 
putting forward his alternative Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Not having been 
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discussed by the War Cabinet, he had no authority to do this, making it another 
example of his differing attitude and desire to reach an agreement. This new 
proposal was received sceptically by Molotov, though after explanations from 
Eden he conceded that the new draft could be considered, and that he would 
transmit it to Moscow.66 Eden agreed to this, and impressed upon Molotov the 
advantages of the new treaty, namely that it would circumnavigate the deadlock 
that was being experienced, would be something that could be agreed to without 
upsetting any other party and would put relations between the two powers on an 
“abiding footing”.67 Having initially only given it sceptical consideration, Eden’s 
insistence that the difficulties over the political draft would cease to exist meant 
the Russian delegation gradually took more note of the Mutual Assistance Treaty, 
and his argument that it could be “signed now and no one in the world could have 
the slightest grounds for objection. It would be a buttress of the future peace of 
Europe and would not exclude discussion between us as allies, not only of the 
problems presented by Finland and Roumania, but of the future map of Europe 
and the economic problems of the post-war period. The treaty which he had 
offered would afford a strong foundation on which lasting friendship between the 
two countries could be built”,68 seems to have converted Molotov, as a draft was 
agreed the following day.69 With Molotov awaiting instructions from his 
Government as to whether he could sign this new treaty, Eden informed the War 
Cabinet, and it took little to persuade them of the merits of this alternative 
proposal, which was “greatly to be preferred” to the previous drafts, and they 
encouraged its signature.70 Later that evening, Molotov informed Eden of his 
authority to sign the Treaty, and this was duly concluded the next day.71  
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Celebration 
 
In “ceremonial circumstances … amidst a vast concourse of photographers 
and film cameramen”72 the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed.73 Its signature 
was highly significant for several reasons. Not only had Eden brought a successful 
close to negotiations that essentially began in November 1941 with Stalin’s 
telegram about future relations and the shape of the post-war world, but he had 
done so in such a manner that Britain, Russia and America were all happy with the 
result. The alternative treaty contained no controversial reference to frontiers, 
population movements or Poland, yet the Russians felt it was “of very great 
value”,74 and “of great importance in promoting friendly relations”75 between the 
two powers. Given the American disapproval discussed previously, it is 
unsurprising they were relieved about the outcome, and Winant appears to have 
been instrumental in making the Russian delegation realise the difficulty of the 
American position had treaties been signed on the lines of the original drafts,76 for 
which Eden noted in his diary that he was “much relieved”.77 From the British 
viewpoint, congratulations were offered all around. Churchill noted that this was 
“a great relief to me and a far better solution than I had dared to hope”78 and, 
according to Eden, stated that this was “much the biggest thing I [Eden] had 
done”.79 The records of the War Cabinet meeting on 26 May note that “The Prime 
Minister said that the War Cabinet were greatly indebted to the Foreign Secretary 
for his skilful handling of the negotiations, and for the very satisfactory result 
which had been achieved”.80 Harvey noted that he and Eden dined out at the Ritz 
in celebration, with Eden feeling “immensely relieved and satisfied, feels a good 
                                                 
72 Maisky, Memoirs, p. 267. 
73 The Anglo-Soviet Treaty for an Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed 26 May 1942.  
74 Maisky, Memoirs, p. 267. 
75 Stalin to Churchill, 28 May 1942 in Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 304. 
76 Churchill to Winant, 4 June 1942, quoted in Gilbert, Road to Victory, p. 111. 
77 Eden’s diary 24 May 1942, in Eden, Reckoning, p. 329, Winant met Molotov during the evening, 
and it was after this meeting that he decided to look properly at Eden’s alternate treaty.   
78 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate. p. 300. 
79 Eden’s diary 24 May 1942, in Eden, Reckoning, p. 329. 
80 TNA, War Cabinet Papers, CAB/65/30/15, War Cabinet Conclusions, 26 May 1942, Confidential 
Annex on U.S.S.R. 
119 
job of work done, his biggest day yet”.81 Cadogan offers a more sober assessment, 
suggesting this was “A very satisfactory ending to a long and tiresome and 
embarrassing exchange. Everyone pleased”.82  
This reaction suggests Eden was right to push the British Government to 
make concessions to Russia after his visit to Moscow. Admittedly, the new Treaty 
made these concessions unnecessary, but Eden would not have known that in 
early 1942. His championing of the Russian cause was ultimately pointless, but it is 
important to reflect on the reasoning behind this. Eden was concerned by 
Churchill’s vision of a grand Anglo-American special relationship, believing that 
this in no way guaranteed common goals, principles or policy ideas. Success in 
negotiation with Russia opened up other avenues for British foreign policy. Not 
only did it offer a fall-back should the American Alliance prove unworkable or too 
restrictive, but it also meant that policy based on broad collaboration looked like a 
realistic option to pursue. He pushed the Russian cause to such an extent that he 
was able, after a few months of tough discussions, to win Churchill over so that he 
was no longer an obstacle to agreeing to the Russian frontier demands. Though the 
American position helped Eden with the Treaty as signed, it can be seen 
throughout the negotiations that, whilst wanting to upset America as little as 
possible, Eden was prepared to push on in Britain’s interest and come to terms 
with the Russians on something that would have ultimately gone down badly in 
the United States. The fact Eden ignored Churchill’s initial disregard for the issue, 
and continued to work on the problem also suggests another reason for him 
pressing this cause. This, simply, was that he was acting as Foreign Secretary, and 
in that capacity was pursuing what he, and his Department on the whole, felt was 
the right policy to pursue at the time. As Rab Butler put it, “our interests at the 
present moment lead us to come to an agreement with the Soviets that they may 
attain their 1941 frontier”.83 Aside from Cadogan, who is well noted as being 
against this impetus by Eden,84 the Department were by and large in favour of 
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making concessions to Russia, so it was only natural that the Foreign Secretary 
should be following this policy line.  
We can see that this was clearly linked to Eden’s wider views on the nature of 
British foreign policy. In the memorandum he put to the War Cabinet, discussed in 
the previous chapter, Eden had two clear thoughts. Firstly that the British wanted 
a balance of power in Europe, directed against Germany, both during and after the 
war, and that secondly, Britain was still to be conceptualised as a Great Power.85 
These two statements suggest that, in one sense, the Department had not lost its 
traditional outlook, as these terms were very much the traditional way of looking 
at the British position. As Rothwell put it, there was a “basic assumption that 
Britain was a Great Power with legitimate interests in the future of eastern 
Europe”,86 and though it may appear contradictory, it could be argued that Eden 
wanted to negotiate an agreement on the Soviet frontier demands as he felt this 
was Britain’s best chance of exerting this influence, perhaps doubting Britain’s 
capacity to do so after the war87, and the treaty, “by providing for mutual 
consultation, would allow Britain at least to claim a voice in the affairs of these 
countries”.88 Eden thought it would be sensible to settle for what was offered when 
the USSR was hard-pressed as, once her armies were west of the Oder River, she 
would be in a position to keep what she had seized.89 Britain was not in a strong 
position at this point, however, with the reverses in North Africa, and the fall of 
Singapore, so whilst agreement with the Soviet Union became necessary to ensure 
the Russians didn’t give up and sign a separate peace, it was also required to 
convince Russia that Britain wasn’t going to do likewise. Dutton and Carlton 
clearly note the connection between the military situation and the Russian 
agreement. Dutton states that the disasters in the Far East helped swing the 
argument in Eden’s favour, and that the agreement on Soviet frontiers was to be 
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coupled with a deal for Russian action against Japan.90 Carlton, meanwhile, 
suggested that British weakness could lead to a potential Soviet-American bargain, 
or a separate German-Soviet peace, and that Eden presented Churchill with these 
two options as outcomes should Britain fail to secure agreement with Russia.91 The 
military situation also concerned Churchill, who stated to Roosevelt that “the 
increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied 
when Germany attacked her”.92 The final point as to why Eden championed this 
cause can be seen in the terms of the treaties. Whilst in favour of accepting the 
Soviet frontier demands, the Foreign Office were turning their attention to the 
future of Europe, and this is where the balance of power thinking came in. The 
argument used repeatedly by Eden was that, assuming Germany was defeated, 
Britain and Russia would be the major European powers, and thus it would be 
they, along with America, who would be tasked with the reconstruction of Europe, 
and maintaining the peace.93 On this basis, co-operation with the Russians was 
essential to preserve not only the British position, but also the position of Europe, 
and to ensure its reconstruction. This can be seen in the terms of the Treaty, with 
Eden arguing for clauses embodying mutual assistance, collaboration in 
organising the peace and association with likeminded states94 all aimed at bringing 
long term collaboration and ensuring Britain would have some voice in the 
organisation of Europe during and after the War.  
 
Eden was not so much championing the Russian cause for its own sake, so 
much as linking it to traditional balance of power ideas; if we add to it his support 
for de Gaulle, we see it for what it was – a kind of revised and revived Triple 
Entente. He was acting, as his predecessors had, on the assumption that there was 
an independent foreign policy to be had, and although the needs of allies had to be 
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taken into account, in the end British interests were paramount. His new treaty 
was a step away from dependence on America in the sense that it gave some 
reassurance of future collaboration with Russia, which could have been useful 
were the Americans to withdraw from Europe after the war, as they had done in 
1919. This episode also offers a glimpse of Eden’s skill, as he was initially pushing 
a cause that lacked support outside his Department, but by exploiting the weak 
British military situation, as well as strategically arguing his case, he was able to 
convince the War Cabinet and later Churchill that his policy was correct. That the 
final Treaty meant this work was without result could make it seem like it had 
been in vain, but it is unlikely that any Treaty would have been agreed had the 
British not moved beyond their December 1941 thinking by the time Molotov 
arrived in London. Eden’s hard work meant the British were in a position to sign a 
far stronger Treaty than they actually did, and it was only the Russian insistence 
over Poland that prevented them achieving what they had originally wanted. The 
Mutual Assistance Treaty was a success, but it is interesting how close the British 
came to signing away large chunks of Eastern Europe in an effort to prove their 
sincerity to Stalin. This quest to prove sincerity could again be attributed to British 
weakness, and that they felt the need to prove themselves as loyal allies who were 
going to be beneficial to the Soviet Union. The extensive history of poor relations 
between the two powers, and the well documented suspicion held towards the 
West by the Soviet Union would actually suggest the British were learning from 
experience, and realised they had to actively show they were breaking from the 
distance and hostility of past relations and were genuinely interested in co-
operation. Looking back, given the historical developments, this would not be seen 
as a positive, but looking at the period and the efforts to develop and build plans 
for the future, co-operation with a power believed to be necessary for both victory 
and sustained peace looks a lot more like common sense than weakness.  
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8) Towards a Foreign Policy 
 
Eden and the Foreign Office were beginning to think in terms of future 
strategy and policy, and the signature of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty had gained them 
a foundation upon which this could be built. That is not to say relations became 
easier after the Treaty, but it provided a more positive footing, which was to prove 
beneficial when facing the strain on relations during the latter part of 1942. With 
the Russian pillar established, the Department should have been able to focus on 
the continuing predicament of supporting de Gaulle, despite his ego and 
challenging temperament, and attempting to improve relations with the Free 
French Movement. Unfortunately, military campaigns and American politics were 
both to have their influence here, with some potentially disastrous consequences. 
This chapter will investigate the political and military struggle for France that was 
ensuing in British policy overall, and between Churchill and Eden in particular, 
and examine the strains in Anglo-Soviet relations that led to an all or nothing visit 
by Churchill to try and prevent the collapse of the new alliance. 
 
Having almost severed ties with de Gaulle after a series of ‘teapot tempests’, 
the last thing the Foreign Office wanted was another confrontation. Unfortunately, 
the increasing strength of Japan in the Far East, coupled with British dependency 
on naval convoys, meant their attention turned towards the Vichy colony of 
Madagascar, which they feared might be targeted by Japan as a potential naval 
base.1 The British invasion of Madagascar, [codename Ironclad], in preparation 
since late 1941, intended the quick capture of key points on the island, giving 
Britain access to its resources, and preventing the Japanese taking the island, in 
particular Diego Suarez.2 Despite proposing such an operation after Pearl 
Harbour,3 and Churchill’s initial enthusiasm for it,4 de Gaulle was excluded from 
the planning, and Free French forces did not participate, as the British felt it 
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“undesirable that Frenchmen should fight against Frenchmen”.5 The operation 
went ahead on 5 May, and by 8 May Diego Suarez had been taken after 
encountering slight resistance.6 It is worth noting that this occurred without the 
initial backing of the United States, who were negotiating a trade agreement with 
Vichy African colonies whilst British planning for the operation was underway.7 
Despite being excluded, de Gaulle met Eden to discuss the events, although waited 
a week before doing so, and accepted the British justification and its associated 
assurance from Eden that the Free French should play a role in the administration 
of Madagascar.8   
Sadly events were to delay this process, as the British contemplated halting 
the military operation and reaching a modus vivendi with the pro-Vichy 
Governor, which aroused de Gaulle’s suspicions of British designs on the French 
Empire. A communiqué from the United States noting that the island would be 
“restored to France [i.e. the Vichy Government] if its occupation were no longer 
essential to the common cause of the United Nations” increased his concern, and 
led him to believe that the whole raison d’etre of the Movement was being 
undermined.9 Having been excluded from the operation, and potentially having to 
swallow a British deal with Vichy, it is easy to see why de Gaulle felt he wasn’t 
being treated as an ally, and it is often credited to Eden that the issue did not cause 
a break between the two parties.10 That said, given his previous conduct, aside 
from delaying meeting Eden, de Gaulle deserves credit for acting with some of the 
decorum and civility expected of someone leading an allied movement. This good 
behaviour may explain why the British issued a communiqué, citing the purpose 
of the operation, and acknowledging that the “French National Committee should 
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play its due part in the administration of the liberated French territory”.11 Whilst a 
break was avoided, tensions remained high. 
Amazingly, de Gaulle’s good behaviour continued, despite Eden failing to get 
his travel ban lifted. The justification that “events might arise at any moment, 
either political or military, in respect of which we might wish to consult him”,12 
was not a strong, nor the real reason for him to remain, which was that Churchill 
harboured bad feelings towards de Gaulle, and believed that he would return to 
his Anglophobic rhetoric once abroad.13 Whilst outwardly polite and accepting of 
these decisions, in private he was angry, and suggested to Catroux that he would 
contemplate breaking with the British and Americans should they again display 
such a lack of confidence in the Free French.14 It was not until 13 June that the 
contents of this message were discovered, and Eden requested a meeting with him 
demanding an explanation. The meeting went well, with the two having a 
reasonable discussion about de Gaulle’s message, and Anglo-Free French relations 
more generally, with Eden endeavouring to reassure de Gaulle that his suspicions 
were unjustified.15 De Gaulle responded that his concerns mainly centred on the 
American attitude to the Movement and, interestingly, Eden did not disagree with 
any of the points raised by de Gaulle, but simply suggested that he was going 
about the relationship in the wrong manner.16 Eden was, despite some frustrations, 
still on de Gaulle’s side, especially in recognising that the American attitude was a 
significant problem, and the meeting concluded with de Gaulle agreeing to send a 
clarifying message to Catroux. It cannot yet be argued that Eden was sympathetic 
to de Gaulle because of a clear British foreign policy vision, but the developing 
vision of some form of renewed triple entente, combined with a balance of power 
intended to restrict Germany, certainly meant that tolerating de Gaulle was a 
necessity whilst there was no alternative opposition to Vichy.  
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Unbeknown to de Gaulle, Eden had been attempting to improve the position 
of the Free French in America, something that should have been helped by the 
United States withdrawing its Ambassador to Vichy, and consequently re-thinking 
its relations with France. Only Woodward’s official history discusses this process, 
though the documents used to support his discussion have proved impossible to 
find in the archives, so it is unclear how accurate his portrayal of the process is.17 A 
series of telegrams between Halifax and Eden, as well as meetings between Halifax 
and Welles in Washington, resulted in a formula being reached which provided 
limited American recognition for the Free French Movement. This memorandum 
was given to de Gaulle on 29 June, and contained several phrases which would 
undoubtedly please him: recognition that Free France was undertaking active 
military measures against a common enemy; recognition of the role of de Gaulle 
and the FNC in keeping alive the spirit of France; realisation that the Movement 
was the symbol of French resistance and provision of assistance to the military and 
naval forces of Free France.18 Eden noted that de Gaulle was “clearly gratified” by 
the memorandum and accepted it with considerable satisfaction on 9 July.19 It 
seems strange this is overlooked, as de Gaulle’s criticisms of the United States are 
often picked up, and the Americans had essentially performed a volte-face in their 
policy, having previously felt the Movement unimportant, with a leader Roosevelt 
saw as “tiresome and dangerous”.20 For de Gaulle this must have been seen as a 
step forward, not to mention a major ego boost, with the memorandum referring 
to the man who already felt himself “in the role of Joan of Arc”21 as ‘the spirit of 
France’. Unfortunately, as Eden and de Gaulle were soon to discover, American 
recognition did little to change their practical approach to France. 
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From a foreign policy viewpoint this was an important development, as 
relations with France were a key area where the Foreign Office faced restrictions 
imposed by American policy. With the United States recognising de Gaulle, the 
door was open to try to strengthen the Movement as a whole, something 
considered key to the aim of collaboration with France in the post-war world, and 
work on their own policy ideas without having to consider Vichy or American 
reactions. Laval’s return to power in the Vichy suggested there was little point 
attempting to pursue diplomatic relations, as “He has staked everything on a 
German victory, and will do all he can to bring it about”,22 an attitude reinforced 
by the American decision to cease formal relations with Vichy soon after. This step, 
and recognition of de Gaulle, should have removed the obstacles for Eden, but a 
new one had appeared - Churchill. Eden soon faced more than just a battle to 
increase support for de Gaulle, as the conflict escalated into one about the whole 
nature of Britain’s French policy. Played out through the medium of War Cabinet 
memoranda and correspondence, this tactical duel was to highlight some serious 
differences in views within the British Government. Eden’s memoranda outlined 
the increasing evidence of support for de Gaulle, particularly as the recognised 
head of the French resistance and as the likely leader of France after its liberation.23 
Churchill saw this as an “oblique attack on Roosevelt”,24 however, and presented 
his own memorandum praising the Vichy quislings.25  
Certain phrases from Churchill’s paper highlight the strategic division. The 
first was Churchill’s assertion that Vichy was “the only Government which may 
perhaps give us what we wanted from France, namely, the Toulon Fleet and the 
entry into the French North African provinces. One has therefore to consider what, 
if any, are the chances of this. They do not seem to me entirely negligible”.26 This 
statement indicates that Churchill was willing to sacrifice politics in order to gain 
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military advantages, however remote they may have been, but also suggests an 
ignorance regarding the attitude of a Government which had, as recently as May, 
ordered its troops to defend Madagascar by force against the British forces. With 
Vichy unwilling to hand over an island whose main value was a naval harbour, 
and American diplomacy unable to alter their attitude, it is hard to see how 
Churchill thought they might hand over their diplomatic ace card of the French 
fleet, not to mention also allowing allied forces entry into North Africa. Churchill’s 
next concerning statement was that “from my own personal observation of what 
has happened, I do not feel that the Vichy Government have done anything more 
than was absolutely necessary” to avoid the installation of a German Gauleiter.27 
Churchill’s comment implies that Vichy were the victims of the situation, and his 
observation that “they have borne Oran, Dakar, Syria, Madagascar, the British 
blockade and British air raids with the least possible show of anger”28 almost 
suggests their attitude should be admired, and they should not be criticised. Such 
an attitude was not conducive with British policy, since Britain had maintained 
contacts with Vichy only at American insistence and had ended these when Leahy 
was withdrawn, and had focussed on de Gaulle and the Free French Movement as 
the preferred representatives of the French Resistance and the democratic post-war 
France. According to Churchill it was a “French conviction that they must not 
sever the future of France from the United States”,29 further evidencing his lack of 
grasp on the tactical situation, as Vichy had, realistically, outplayed the United 
States to gain supplies, without ceding anything in return. That Churchill 
associated the future of France with the United States and Vichy was worrying for 
Eden, as de Gaulle did not fit that vision, but led the French group whom Britain 
were fighting alongside, and had the potential to restore France to a useful 
strategic position after the war. Churchill’s closing statement suggested that “I 
look forward to a time in the war … when the great change of heart which has 
taken place in the French masses and the apparent certainty of an Allied victory 
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will produce a sudden, decisive change in the action of the Vichy Government”.30 
This is concerning for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests Churchill thought the 
‘masses’ were favourable to the Vichy regime; and secondly, he was willing to 
work with Vichy provided they switched sides before the end of the war. Though 
a good portion of France was under German control and there had been no mass 
exodus to the Free French, this did not mean the masses were tolerant of, if not 
pro-Vichy, and the evidence presented by Eden supported this. Likewise a 
statement that Axis collaborators would be considered as partners if they switched 
sides could have presented issues for the British Government, both with de Gaulle 
and the Governments in Exile.  
Eden responded by submitting a draft memorandum to Churchill, 
highlighting the flaws of Vichy, the efforts they had undertaken to hinder the 
allied cause, and dismissing Churchill’s thin hopes of a volte-face.31 Churchill took 
this personally, and replied that he had been “a friend of France for thirty-five 
years” and had a “certain instinct” about them.32 He felt it too easy to make a case 
against Vichy, who faced “unnatural conditions”, and wanted to remind the 
Cabinet that Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staffs shared his views, and would thus 
speak out against Eden if he brought the memorandum to Cabinet.33 Despite 
attempting to soften the blow by suggesting that what really separated the two 
men was the emphasis of the argument,34 it was the policy itself that caused the 
divide. Eden agreed, however, and submitted a more balanced memorandum to 
the Cabinet. He summed up his paper by noting that “the picture is thus 
exceedingly confused, and the wisest policy, as I see it, for us is to continue our 
efforts to bring as much as possible of France and the French Empire back into the 
war at our side; to support all the forces of French resistance, wherever they may 
be, and whatever their allegiance, without binding ourselves exclusively to any; to 
continue to support General de Gaulle; and at the same time to encourage him to 
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strengthen his organisation by the enlistment of such representative Frenchmen as 
he can persuade to come over and join him. By following this policy we should at 
the same time be best serving the war effort and making provision for our post-
war relationship with France”.35 This conclusion throws up some interesting 
problems. The biggest one, given Eden’s support of de Gaulle, was his 
acknowledgement of Churchill’s view that any party that could bring part of 
France back into the war would be welcomed, and that allegiance did not matter. 
This is particularly surprising given the criticisms he had levelled at Vichy, and 
that he felt the best manner of getting the French Empire back into the war was 
under the Free French Movement. That he suggests Britain should not be bound to 
any party is also strange, as the British were already bound to the Free French, 
having recognised them as the resistance movement and, in the Foreign Office at 
least, it was tacitly acknowledged that they would likely play a leading role in 
post-war France. Barker notes that this was a series of “tactical moves in a duel 
between the two men” which “raised fundamental questions which were to be 
hotly disputed from Torch [in late 1942] until the liberation of France”.36  
His determination to argue the Gaullist case against Churchill’s Vichy hopes 
shows Eden wasn’t willing to sacrifice all British policy to military strategy, and 
could be viewed as a desire to see the two combined so that British strategy would 
advantage both the British war effort and the French party with which Eden 
envisaged future relations being conducted. This pattern can be seen throughout 
the tactical duel, where Churchill leapt to the defence of American policy with an 
almost glowing review of Vichy and their ability to help the allies militarily in the 
future, whilst Eden stood by British declared war policy and supported the Free 
French, using evidence and examples to highlight what he saw as errors in 
Churchill’s judgement. With Churchill’s statements lacking logic, it is no surprise 
Eden struck back to defend his corner, and it is clear that Eden was not going to 
suffer quietly whilst Churchill tried to stomp all over his foreign policy. In arguing 
for de Gaulle, Eden was once again acting as a British Foreign Secretary, thinking 
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about what was in Britain’s policy interests and trying to defend it. Eventually 
Eden backed down, presenting a balanced overview of the situation to the Cabinet, 
though still highlighting the importance of de Gaulle and the concerns over Vichy. 
Whilst Churchill had won in one sense, that Eden’s campaign against Vichy never 
fully reached the Cabinet, the end result was still favourable to Eden, as by 
backing down he had saved the face of both men, but his arguments had 
resonated, and the attitude of the Cabinet had shifted towards de Gaulle. 
Unfortunately, the main issue of directing foreign policy towards France had been 
swept under the table in an effort to maintain Government unity, and it was not 
long until it would flare up once more.  
 
The compact with the devil 
 
The onset of Operation Torch returned to the fore de Gaulle’s suspicions of 
the British carving up the French Empire, and the sacrificing of his Movement’s 
objects and position for military gains. With the British having to undertake 
further military action to secure control of Madagascar, they hoped that the 
administration could be handed over to the Free French so they could prepare for 
this upcoming operation.37 Unfortunately, de Gaulle had finally been allowed to 
travel, and was busy breaking the assurances given to Eden that he would 
behave.38 Such action was causing the British to reconsider their stance about 
Fighting French39 administration, and Eden had to be creative in resolving the 
situation. On 10 September he informed René Pleven and Maurice Dejean, the FNC 
Commissioners in London for Finance and Foreign Affairs respectively, that the 
British were to undertake further military action in Madagascar, and that de 
Gaulle’s attitude meant the British were, presently, unwilling to offer the Fighting 
French the role of administrating the territory.40 This news shocked the two men, 
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but despite their protests, Eden held firm, suggesting that if de Gaulle returned 
immediately to London conversations could be resumed in order to proceed with 
the original plan. This would remove the problem of de Gaulle causing trouble 
abroad, and also minimise the disruption they would face if the Fighting French 
did not assume this responsibility. Eventually, they agreed to this proposal, and de 
Gaulle returned to London, to a somewhat hostile reception.  
He was summoned to meet Churchill and Eden on 30 September, and was 
probably quite shocked to find that, for once, the two were taking the same line. 
Both were disappointed by his attitude in Syria, and his suggestion of British 
attempts to gain a preponderant position in the Middle East at France’s expense, 
but both expressed their views differently. Churchill was more vocal and annoyed 
by the General’s actions, whilst Eden was quieter and less hostile. Churchill’s 
comments centred on the position and attitude of de Gaulle, and he repeated 
several times that “the great difficulty lay in working with General de Gaulle”.41 
Eden, on the other hand, was less personal, talking about the position of the 
movement or British attitude more generally, and whilst not blaming de Gaulle for 
the difficulties in relations, suggested several times that the British had more 
trouble with the Fighting French than any other ally.42 Whether by chance or by 
planning, they adopted an almost carrot and stick approach, with Churchill talking 
about opportunities or friendships that had been lost by de Gaulle’s action,43 and 
Eden discussing future potential relations if they could resolve the sources of 
tension. Both sides recognised that there were solutions to the problems, though as 
they differed over what the problems were, agreement was never reached as to 
solutions.44 Only on the subject of the representation of France was there a 
difference between Churchill and Eden. Churchill openly stated that de Gaulle 
only represented one part of France. Though acknowledging this was “a very 
honourable part of France” which “represented the combatant sentiments and the 
main body of opinion”, he noted that “there were other parts and aspects of France 
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which might become more prominent”. 45 On this topic Eden remained quiet, 
suggesting he did not share Churchill’s view. De Gaulle, for his part, made no 
threats of resignation or of breaking with the British, and was prepared to accept 
the consequences of his action. Unfortunately, he was unwilling to do anything 
about rectifying the situation, and stuck to his guns over what he saw as “the 
diminution of the position of France”.46 The differences between Eden and 
Churchill are subtle, but important. Churchill was generally looking back or being 
critical, whereas Eden was being positive and looking to the future. De Gaulle was 
sensitive, so Eden perhaps realised that to dwell on the past would not help, and 
that de Gaulle needed support if the positive change needed was to materialise. 
Churchill’s insistence on bringing up Vichy shows his unwillingness to stray from 
American policy, and whilst suggesting he was more open-minded about strategic 
possibilities, these were unlikely and narrow military advantages. Eden’s political 
aim would have offered more military advantages for Britain, as well as ensuring 
it maintained control of its foreign policy.   
Whilst the meeting was tense, the record of the conversation suggests 
Cadogan’s description of it being a “pitched battle”47 was somewhat embellished. 
Likewise Barker’s contention that Churchill vehemently rejected de Gaulle’s claim 
to be France48 is overstated. The often repeated suggestion from de Gaulle’s 
memoirs that Churchill was “bitter and highly emotional” and that Eden lost his 
temper both lack accuracy when compared to the record of the conversation.49 
Eden comes across as moderate and emotionally detached from the subject, and 
Churchill, famed for his emotional zeal, appears to have been quite balanced and 
restrained. Harvey’s statement that Churchill was “frank but patient”50 was more 
accurate than the traits attributed by de Gaulle, though given the content of the 
meeting, it is unsurprising he remembered it in an unfavourable light. 
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The already strained relations were almost destroyed by future events. 
Despite the British victory in Madagascar, the allied invasion of North Africa 
[codename Torch] was now on the horizon, the details having been settled during 
Churchill’s most recent visit to Washington in June, further staff talks in London in 
July, and correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt over the summer.51 The 
Operation, intended to gain control of French North Africa, went ahead on 8 
November. By 12 November serious resistance had ceased, and the allied troops 
made good progress towards Tunisia, only thwarted by German reinforcements, 
whose arrival was not opposed by Vichy forces.52 By December the British and 
Americans had taken military control of a large portion of North Africa, but efforts 
to ensure the political and administrative stability of these areas was not a 
straightforward process. 
At Roosevelt’s insistence, de Gaulle was to be kept in the dark, as he felt his 
inclusion would have an “adverse effect … on our promising efforts to attach a 
large part of the French African forces to our expedition”,53 despite the desire of 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, to include 
de Gaulle in the planning of operations in Europe,54 and Churchill’s suggestion 
that he should be informed prior to the operation.55 Due to Roosevelt’s attitude, 
Churchill abandoned this line, accepting the Presidents “silly decision”56 as 
Cadogan put it. Given his reaction to Ironclad, de Gaulle “surprisingly, took the 
right line”57 when he lunched with Eden and Churchill and was officially told of 
the operation. Churchill’s explanation of the nature of the operation, the American 
insistence on keeping de Gaulle in the dark, and the possible installation of 
General Henri Giraud as commander in North Africa were accepted, and de 
Gaulle made positive statements about the need to unify the French resistance.58 
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He also spoke favourably of Giraud, saying he was “without reproach”, and 
suggested he would be willing to work under him provided he carried “the mass 
of the French people”.59 As a sweetener, de Gaulle was encouraged by Churchill to 
announce the appointment of General Paul Legentilhomme as High Commissioner 
in Madagascar, an end towards which de Gaulle and Eden had been working for 
some time. In light of de Gaulle’s positive reaction, Churchill informed Roosevelt 
of the need to “unify in every possible way all Frenchmen who regard Germany as 
the foe … you will I am sure realize that his Majesty’s Government are under quite 
definite and solemn obligations to De Gaulle and his movement. We must see that 
they have a fair deal … you and I ought to avoid at all costs the creation of rival 
French Émigré Governments each favoured by one of us”.60 Though wanting to 
avoid rivalry between French groups, Roosevelt was unmoved on de Gaulle: “it is 
still my considered opinion that any association by him with the TORCH 
operation at this time would add serious difficulties to our efforts in that area”.61 
So whilst the need to unify French resistance was agreed, this meant little as 
Roosevelt did not want one of the groups to be represented, and almost resulted in 
the scenario Churchill set out coming to pass. For the time being, Eden had 
Churchill’s support in calling for a recognition of de Gaulle’s position vis-à-vis the 
British Government. This union was short-lived, however, as military concerns 
overtook their political counterparts, though the two would quickly intertwine, 
resulting in six weeks of diplomatic crisis.   
Luck was an important factor for Eden, but with Torch, it initially went 
against him. Darlan, largely by coincidence, was in Algiers at the time of the Allied 
landings in North Africa.62 This was not a factor that had been part of the allied 
plans, which assumed Giraud would take power, thereby unifying French 
resistance and winning the loyalty of the Vichy territories, and Churchill’s account 
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of the initial 24 hours of the operation,63 coupled with other accounts,64 suggest the 
Darlan factor caused significant chaos. The defenders didn’t know whose orders 
they should follow, and the allies didn’t know how to ensure the political stability 
of the region. With Giraud receiving little support, and recognising his inability to 
over-rule the Vichy Commander-in-Chief,65 he and General Mark Clark66 advised 
Eisenhower that the best way to neutralise resistance was a deal with Darlan, and 
negotiations began. As a result, a ceasefire was called, in the name of Pétain; 
German troops occupied the hitherto unoccupied parts of France; and an 
agreement was reached between Clark, Darlan and Giraud which made Darlan 
High Commissioner, Giraud head of the land and air forces, and required them to 
do what they could to get North Africa behind the war effort.67  
Whilst this safeguarded the military aspects of the operation, this outcome 
had major political consequences. Eisenhower justified the deal with Darlan on 
practical military grounds, noting that the ceasefire saved allied lives and that only 
Darlan could have had such an order obeyed. Churchill accepted this, informing 
Eisenhower that he approved “anything for the battle”.68 The deal was sensible if 
looked at from a military standpoint, as it had been at the time, given there was no 
political consultation taken regarding it. Unfortunately, whilst Generals may not 
have worried about politics, politicians worried about the Generals, and political 
and public opposition quickly arose. The Foreign Office reaction is interesting, as 
they initially accepted the deal to ensure a ceasefire, but as reports came in of 
agreement about the administration of North Africa, attitudes quickly stiffened. 
Eden’s memoirs suggest he didn’t object to the agreement with Darlan to save 
lives, but on receiving news of the deal between Giraud and Darlan he noted that 
he “didn’t like it a bit, and said so” to Churchill, with whom he was staying at 
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Chequers.69 Likewise, Harvey made no negative mention of the ceasefire deal, but 
when he learnt of the Giraud–Darlan deal he noted that “we are horrified” by this, 
and that “all here in the F.O. are alive to the danger” of Darlan.70 He was also quick 
to liken it to appeasement, a topic sure to fire up Eden.71 Cadogan seemed pleased 
that an armistice had been quickly reached, even with Darlan, though this quickly 
changed as he was to refer to the political deal as the “compact with the devil”, 
and was quick to press on Eden the political dangers of the situation, feeling he 
was not sufficiently horrified by it.72 This reaction continued outside the Foreign 
Office. Correspondence with Clark Kerr, and a meeting between Eden and Maisky 
backed up the warning from Gladwyn Jebb, the Head of the Economic and 
Reconstruction Department of the Foreign Office, that the Soviets would be 
disturbed by this turn of policy, which could be interpreted as being a future 
“Anglo-American-European quisling combination directed against the Soviet 
Union”.73 Attlee and Bracken also raised objection, fearing damage to the moral 
aspect of the war effort, and the potential storm of public opinion this could 
produce if Britain were seen to have abandoned the spirit of France,74 and some 
sources also note a hostile response of the British press to the deal.75 De Gaulle, as 
expected, quickly reached a negative conclusion, feeling any deal with Darlan was 
despicable, and launched into a bitter tirade against American policy when he saw 
Sir Charles Peake, the British representative to the FNC, on 15 November.76 In an 
effort to quell de Gaulle’s anger, Churchill and Eden saw him the following day, 
and were informed that he “would not be party to any arrangement, however 
temporary … with a traitor”, and despite Churchill’s assurance that his “position 
was unassailable, that he need not be alarmed at the course events were taking”, 
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he was not placated.77 He issued a communiqué, stating that the Fighting French 
had nothing to do with the negotiations in North Africa,78 and his anger had not 
subsided when he saw Eden two days later.79 The widespread political opposition 
prompted Churchill to inform Roosevelt of the “very deep currents of feeling” 
stirred by it, commenting that the more he reflected, “the more convinced I become 
that it can only be a temporary expedient”.80 It was not just the British having 
misgivings about the deal. The State Department were never happy with it,81 and 
Roosevelt, despite being unwilling to undermine Eisenhower, had also 
experienced ‘deep currents’, and notified Churchill of a press statement where he 
discussed the “temporary arrangement” (he used the word temporary, or similar, 
nine times in the statement), and its implementation as a militarily expedient to 
save lives.82 This was just the reaction to the news of the agreement. As the terms 
were discovered, tensions increased, especially between Eden and Churchill. 
Roosevelt’s statement had eased Churchill’s concerns,83 as he proved unwilling to 
concede to further protest. When the terms were received, Eden faced a battle with 
Churchill, who wanted to accept them as they had already gained Roosevelt’s 
approval. Churchill’s determination not to upset the military operation with what 
he viewed a minor political issue proved too strong for Eden to combat single-
handedly, despite serious efforts to do so via phone calls and telegrams,84 and even 
in Cabinet on 21 November, but Eden received no support, so Churchill’s view 
was accepted.85 Eden did not give up, however, and wrote to Churchill arguing 
that the allies were being outmanoeuvred by Darlan’s skill; that the agreement ran 
counter to Roosevelt’s public statement of 17 November; that they were losing the 
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moral high ground regarding French resistance in particular, but resistance against 
the axis in general; were giving hope to the quislings of Europe; and finally that 
there needed to be consultation with America to give effect to Roosevelt’s 
statement.86 Churchill didn’t react, though ultimately took Eden’s advice after 
Darlan declared that he was acting in the name of Pétain, so Churchill approved a 
telegram to Halifax calling for political consultation, and the sending of political 
advisors to Eisenhower. This was eventually agreed, with Harold Macmillan being 
appointed Minister Resident in Algiers in December 1942.87  
 
These episodes demonstrate the difficulty that Eden faced in relations with de 
Gaulle and Fighting France during this period. Despite events and military 
operations which, in theory, should have acted to strengthen the Fighting French, a 
combination of circumstances often led to more difficulties being created than 
solved. They also serve to highlight the trouble with trying to plan, and conduct, a 
foreign policy which had one set of aims, against a military campaign which, for 
external or non political factors, had different ones. That Eden and Churchill, to a 
large extent, personify this dichotomy goes some way to disprove any suggestions 
that Eden was a yes-man in Cabinet or that he was unwilling to stand up to 
Churchill, and likewise shows that Churchill as a whole was more concerned 
about the military rather than the foreign policy aspects of the war. This was 
especially true where France was concerned, as listening to Eden would have often 
meant taking a different course to Roosevelt. As Thomas highlights, the deal also 
brought to the fore the contradictions in American policy, as they undermined de 
Gaulle and refused to support his movement because of his dictatorial leadership 
and political cunning, , yet were happy to jump on board with Darlan, the apex of 
and authoritarian and unreformed Vichy administration.88 This was to become 
more of a factor as foreign policy planning turned towards longer term strategy, in 
particular thinking about the post-war shape of Europe. Heading into 1943 the 
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position was particularly difficult, with a Vichy regime in North Africa behind the 
allied military advances, de Gaulle having been excluded from both the military 
and political side of the operation, and Eden and Churchill sharing differing views 
as to the desirability of both of these facts. Eden’s luck was to change, however, as 
the situation was suddenly simplified by Darlan’s assassination. He was succeeded 
by Giraud,89 and Charmley suggests this was proof that Father Christmas had not 
missed Churchill in 1942,90 but it seems more likely that this Christmas present was 
intended for Eden, especially given the eloquence of Churchill’s obituary to Darlan 
in ‘The Hinge of Fate’.91 
 
No Second Front in 1942 
 
Despite securing the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Eden’s celebrations were short 
lived, as the British were faced with difficulties sending supplies to Russia, and 
ever increasing Russian demands for a Second Front. Whilst Churchill and Eden 
were fighting their memoranda battle over France, Molotov returned to Britain 
after his visit to Washington, and brought with him the unwelcome news that 
Roosevelt had agreed to a communiqué stating that “in the course of conversations 
full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a 
Second Front in Europe in 1942”.92 This was a major blow for the British, who had 
not been consulted, and did not feel they could agree as it implied a definite 
promise of a Second Front that year, something they did not believe possible.93 
Though the British and Americans were still examining possible joint operations in 
Europe in 1942, it was understood that such an operation should only go ahead if, 
when the time came, it proved to be a practical possibility with worthwhile results. 
This point Churchill made explicitly in conversation and in writing with Molotov 
during his brief stop in London. The British had been forced into a corner by 
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Roosevelt, who had claimed to Molotov that “it was important to open a Second 
Front in 1942” and that he was ready to risk the sacrifice of “100 to 120 thousand 
men in the first instance even though that might lead to another Dunkirk”.94 
Churchill, for once disagreeing with Roosevelt, informed Molotov that “he was 
certainly not prepared to contemplate such a sacrifice” if the prospect was ultimate 
disaster, and put the point quite plainly to Molotov that, whilst operations were 
being considered, their implementation would depend on the situation at the time, 
so he could not and should not be taken as promising they would go ahead.95 This 
was backed up by an Aide-Mémoire, drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff, which stated 
that “We can therefore give no promise in the matter (Italics in original)” regarding the 
opening of a Second Front in 1942.96 From the available evidence, Molotov did not 
object to this statement, so it can be assumed that the explanations of the document 
and the British position had been accepted. The Aide-Mémoire thus safeguarded 
the British position; the publication of the communiqué signalled the intent to act 
as soon as possible; the inclusion of the ‘full understanding’ phrase reflected the 
truth that Second Front discussions were underway, and protected the appearance 
of allied unity. This potential problem had, therefore, been neutralised before it 
developed, and Churchill noted that Molotov “sailed off into the air … apparently 
well satisfied with the results of his mission”.97 Unfortunately, once back in 
Moscow the Aide-Mémoire appears to have been quickly forgotten, and the British 
in particular were to fall victim to Russian reproaches.  
 
Before examining the implications of the Second Front situation, it is 
important to mention one other item of interest from the Washington talks, 
particularly from the point of view of this thesis. That is the revelation from 
Molotov that, while in Washington, he exchanged ideas with Roosevelt on the 
                                                 
94 TNA, Avon Papers, FO 954/25B, Record of Meeting with Soviet Delegation, 9 June 1942. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Churchill’s Aide-Mémoire to Molotov on the Second Front, quoted in Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 
p. 305. 
97 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 305. 
142 
shape of the post-war world.98 Foreign Office attention was turning to this subject, 
so this information, albeit limited and idealistic rather than policy based, 
reinforced the need to look to the future in order to keep in step with their allies. 
Whilst not entirely thought out, Roosevelt presented a vision, which Molotov 
suggested that the Soviet Union fully endorsed, of a great power international 
police system, whereby the USA, USSR, Great Britain, and possibly China, would 
act to enforce the peace, with the aggressor powers being disarmed.99 Roosevelt 
didn’t mention this in his messages to Churchill, and thus the ground had not been 
prepared for Molotov to take up this issue.100 He was, unsurprisingly, met with the 
typical Churchillian reaction that “the important thing was to win the victory first 
rather than, before it was won, to dispute how the advantages were ultimately to 
be shared”.101 This event appears to have been completely overlooked in the 
historiography, either missed due to the focus on the Second Front, or simply 
ignored as unimportant. Whilst it may not seem that important, the fact there was 
a conversation at this time about the idea of what happens next, so to speak, shows 
several interesting things. Firstly, that Churchill’s steadfast attitude that the war 
must be won before the spoils could be shared was not only out of step with his 
Foreign Office, but also that of his friend and ally Roosevelt, upon whom he felt 
the alliance and hence the military success rested and, according to Molotov, the 
Soviet Union. Despite Roosevelt’s attitude, Churchill was unwilling to discuss the 
issue with Molotov, and one wonders what he must have felt at being brushed 
aside on this topic. Secondly, that the Foreign Office were right to be thinking 
about the shape of the post-war world, as not only had they now secured the 
‘Grand Alliance’ which Churchill had prophesised, and which would lead to 
ultimate victory, but their counterparts and allies were beginning to think about 
the peace requirements after the impending victory. Thirdly, that the thinking 
shown in the last chapter of some form of renewed alliance scheme to maintain 
peace, whilst perhaps slightly less advanced than the ideas outlined by Roosevelt, 
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was on the right track, and thus a worthwhile policy initiative for the Foreign 
Office to pursue, and in the following chapter the pursuit of that initiative will be 
examined. Though Molotov raised this topic, it did not lead to a constructive 
debate about post-war ideas, but it was a signal that the Foreign Office, more so 
than Churchill, were heading in the right direction. Unfortunately, the re-ignition 
of the Second Front issue upon Molotov’s return to Moscow meant that, for the 
time being, their work on this was kept largely in the background.  
 
Despite agreement in London, Molotov seems to have forgotten about his 
talks with Churchill and Eden, and the Aide-Mémoire, as in an interview with 
Clark Kerr he informed the Ambassador that he stood by the ‘firm commitment’ 
given in the communiqué to the creation of a Second Front later in the year.102 
Perhaps he thought Clark Kerr would be unaware of the Aide-Mémoire or the 
contents of his conversations in London, and that by standing by the communiqué 
he could get the Ambassador to support the Soviet demands. As it was, Clark Kerr 
had been sent an overview of the conversations in London and a full copy of the 
Aide-Mémoire, so knew perfectly well the true state of affairs.103 Such was the 
concern at Clark Kerr’s report of this conversation that the issue was discussed by 
the War Cabinet, with Eden being asked to instruct him to correct Molotov’s 
position.104 The Foreign Office were particularly anxious about the damage that 
could be caused to the new alliance should a failure to open a Second Front be 
incorrectly interpreted by the Soviets as a breach of a definite promise, and could 
effect other issues of the war that would later be regretted by Britain, Russia and 
the United States.105 Clark Kerr saw Molotov, but reported that, whilst he had 
acknowledged the existence and contents of the Aide-Mémoire, he was unwilling 
to act to dampen down the public expectations of an imminent Second Front 
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which were being unfairly raised by the Soviet Government.106 The lack of Soviet 
effort to rectify the British concerns made Clark Kerr suspicious, and he wrote 
home that “Molotov professes to have passed on faithfully to the Soviet 
Government all that was said to him in London … it now looks as if he had to 
some extent failed to interpret to Stalin the mind of the PM”.107 Donald Gillies 
attributes this situation to Molotov being afraid of informing Stalin that his visit 
had not actually yielded a firm promise of a Second Front, as he had initially led 
his chief to believe.108 This could have been the case, though regular mentions in 
the Harvey and Cadogan diaries of the Russian military situation could offer 
another explanation, that the Russians were, in fact, desperate for help, and could 
do nothing else except cling to the hope that a Second Front would be forthcoming 
to relieve their situation.109  
As Maisky claims to have predicted when reading the Aide-Mémoire, there 
was little likelihood of a Second Front being opened in 1942.110 Churchill was 
against making a sacrifice just for the show, and was heavily engaged in the plans 
for Torch. He was considering going to Washington before Molotov’s return to 
London, as Hopkins had hinted that there were “certain matters of high policy 
which you must come to grips with the President on and he is hopeful that you 
can make a quick trip”.111 Confusion surrounding the Second Front convinced 
Churchill of this requirement, especially as he was unconvinced of the viability of 
such an operation that year. Maisky claims this was a deliberate attempt to 
sabotage the Second Front plans,112 though obviously it is hard to sabotage 
something which, as far as the British were concerned, never existed. Churchill left 
for Washington within a week of the Second Front communiqué being published, 
and although the aim was ensuring the US did not withdraw from its Germany 
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first strategy,113 both Maisky and Clark Kerr saw this as closer Anglo-American 
collaboration, which would further raise the suspicions of the Russians.114 The 
discussions in Washington saw Churchill championing Operation Torch, though 
in his own memoirs he reproduced a note on future strategy, the third point of 
which discussed Torch, the first two points discussed cross-channel operations in 
1942.115 The coincidence of this meeting with the fall of Tobruk could have 
provided Churchill with the emotional passion which often stimulated his best 
oratorical performances, thus allowing him to skilfully put the case for the North 
Africa campaign, much to Maisky’s annoyance, who felt Roosevelt was rather 
brow beaten by Churchill into doubting the cross-channel invasion plan.116 
Although this conference did not secure the go ahead for Torch and the 
abandonment of plans for a cross-channel invasion of Europe [codename 
Sledgehammer], it was a step in that direction, completed by Churchill’s lengthy 
telegram to Roosevelt in early July setting out explicitly that “no responsible 
British General, Admiral or Air Marshall is prepared to recommend 
SLEDGEHAMMER as a practicable operation in 1942” and attempted to address 
Roosevelt’s concerns about the situation on the Russian front with Churchill 
suggesting that “I am sure myself that GYMNAST is by far the best chance for 
effective relief to the Russian front in 1942”.117 This, coupled with further military 
conversations in London, largely settled that any Second Front in 1942 would not 
be aimed against German forces in Europe, which was an unrealistic proposal in 
the circumstances, but against Vichy French, Italian and German forces in Africa. 
For Churchill, it was a victory for British military strategy and its emphasis on 
imperial defence, for Eden, it was to extend the period of difficult relations caused 
by the lack of a Second Front.  
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As if it wasn’t bad enough that there was little prospect of a Second Front, at 
least as the Russians conceived of one, in 1942, it also looked like the other method 
of support to Russia from the allies, supply convoys, was under serious threat. The 
Admiralty felt the northern convoys were “becoming a regular millstone round 
our necks”118 and had considered reducing the supplies sent to Russia for some 
time, but with the increasing dangers being faced, and high losses sustained, they 
wrote to Churchill requesting to halt future convoys altogether.119 This was 
considered by the War Cabinet, and Churchill opposed it, believing “it was our 
duty to fight these convoys through, whatever the cost”.120 It was decided to let the 
convoy scheduled for that evening depart, and inform Stalin that if the convoy 
suffered severe losses, the following convoys may well be held up.121 This convoy, 
PQ16, suffered minor losses so, for the time being, the convoys remained active. 
The convoy and shipping situation caused the allies great difficulty, and had been 
discussed several times in the conversations between Roosevelt and Molotov in 
Washington.122 The issue caused tension, as Molotov requested supply convoys 
continue undiminished, whilst also demanding the creation of a Second Front. 
Roosevelt had to point out that “ships could not be in two places at once”, and that 
the Russians “could not eat their cake and have it too”.123 Molotov was 
unimpressed, and retorted that “the second front would be stronger if the first 
front still stood fast”.124 Whilst stating that he would put the suggestion to Stalin of 
reducing Russia’s demands under Lend-Lease, he still did not grasp the difficulty 
of the shipping problem, though his implication that the Russian front would 
suffer without the shipping may have worried Roosevelt, who later wrote to 
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Churchill that he viewed the Russian front with “great concern”.125 For the 
moment, the successful arrival of PQ16 meant that the convoy issue temporarily 
abated. The following convoy, however, was to cause a sharp re-evaluation.  
The ill-fated PQ17 convoy suffered some of the heaviest losses of any Russian 
convoy. The 34 Merchant ships and a sizeable escort came under fierce aerial and 
surface attack as it rounded the northern tip of Norway. The escort was 
withdrawn, the merchant ships were ordered to scatter and, unprotected, were 
picked off by German submarines and aircraft with only 11 eventually reaching 
Russian ports. 130,000 tonnes of war materials, tanks, planes and other supplies 
were lost.126 Churchill aptly described this as “one of the most melancholy naval 
episodes in the whole war”.127 The consequences were significant. Eden saw 
Maisky on 9 July, as the fate of the convoy was still unknown, and again on 14 July 
when a clearer picture had formed. At both meetings he faced demands for action 
from an anxious Maisky, whether it be a Second Front, or an operation in Norway, 
and had to advise that under such severe circumstances there may not be another 
convoy, as “to send convoys out and have nearly all the ships sunk was of no help 
to the Russians”.128 Having been previously over-ruled, the Admiralty returned to 
the charge, and this time the War Cabinet agreed, despite reservations from 
Churchill.129 Fortunately for Eden, the task of informing Stalin fell to Churchill, 
who sent a long, firm and eloquent telegram to Stalin130 setting out the background 
of the convoys, the dangers faced in sending them, as well as the risk to the future 
Second Front if they continued with such high attrition.131 As expected, the 
response was rather bad tempered. Stalin felt the British were refusing full stop to 
send further convoys, and that they were reneging on their commitment for the 
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creation of a Second Front in 1942.132 Neither accusation carried much weight 
factually, but given the success of the most recent German military advances in the 
Caucuses, Stalin’s severe concern and displeasure were not entirely a surprise, a 
thought with which Eden concurred.133 Maisky felt the message rather mild, but 
noted that it had the desired effect on Churchill, though depressing and offending 
Churchill seems an odd objective to hope for in communication with the leader of 
an allied Government.134 Though the interview between Churchill and Maisky was 
“stormy”,135 it seems Churchill quickly calmed down, as the two agreed that no 
response was necessary. Churchill had a change of heart, however, and sought 
council about a potential reply to Stalin from Roosevelt,136 whose friendly tones 
probably soothed any remaining anger, and reassured Churchill that Stalin’s 
position was one that neither of them could understand, principally because their 
countries had not been invaded.137 Churchill’s response, sent the following day, 
had interesting political consequences, and will be examined later.    
 
The combination of the Second Front issue and the supply crisis lead to a 
particularly stormy period in Anglo-Soviet relations, perhaps more notable given 
the recent Treaty, yet there appears little coverage in the historiography. Aside 
from memoirs and diaries, there are few works which cover the period,138 with 
most of the secondary works either noting the existence of an argument over the 
Second Front but not examining it,139 or making it seem like nothing happened 
between the signing of the Treaty and Churchill’s visit to Moscow,140 discussed in 
the following section. A combination of the views of Clark Kerr and Maisky put 
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the situation best. Clark Kerr wrote that “What the USSR wants is some tangible 
evidence that we realise that the time will come when great and costly efforts will 
have to be made … As I see it they are not yet convinced that we understand this, 
or that we are yet taking the war seriously. They set up their own enormous losses 
against our (by comparison) trifling losses in men and material since the close of 
1939”.141 Maisky noted that “Churchill said to me more than once: ‘The enemy 
should always be deceived. The general public may sometimes be deceived for its 
own good, but an ally should never be deceived.’ The negotiations about a Second 
Front in 1942 serve as a splendid illustration of how the bourgeois statesmen, not 
in words but in deeds, conceived of their obligations to their ally”.142 Both views 
illustrate the Russian position, as they felt genuinely let down by the lack of a 
Second Front, and one cannot dispute that they had suffered more severe losses 
than the British, although the British were incurring losses fighting the Germans in 
North Africa. Both views highlight the significance attached to the Second Front by 
the Russians, but diminish the risks and sacrifices associated with the convoys, yet 
it was only after the decision to halt the convoys that Stalin sent his rough message 
to Churchill. Given it was obvious to most people, except the Russians, that there 
was no British commitment to a Second Front in 1942, such a message could have 
been sent any time after Molotov returned to Moscow, but it was only the 
coincidence of circumstance threatening both of Russia’s requirements from her 
allies, action and supplies, that the pressure was applied. Indeed when Eden and 
Maisky discussed Stalin’s message, the first item raised was convoys, the last was 
the Second Front, suggesting either the convoys were more important, or more 
immediately concerning to the Soviet Union.143 Both were important issues, and 
their combination offered a serious challenge to the morale of the Soviet Union, 
and to Anglo-Soviet relations. As such, on the suggestion of Clark Kerr and urged 
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on by Cadogan,144 Churchill, already planning to visit Cairo to try and rectify the 
military situation in North Africa, proposed to visit Stalin to discuss these issues, 
and give him a first hand account of the British position.  
 
Carrying a large lump of ice to the North Pole 
 
Churchill was no stranger to gallivanting around the globe, so the muted 
response to his suggestion was unsurprising. That the announcement came at a 
Cabinet called at 1am probably did little to enliven the reactions of those in 
attendance. Eden, however, was surprised by the decision, and assumed the 
limited response was because others were too; only discovering later that this was 
not the case. Despite being the heir, Eden was no Machiavelli, and was worried 
about the risks of the journey, and the effect of such a trip on Churchill’s health.145 
With Attlee and Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, agreeing to Churchill’s visit, 
Eden would have faced a solitary battle to prevent it were it not for a telegram 
received by Cadogan from Clark Kerr, which proposed that Churchill should 
endeavour to meet Stalin if possible, and that such a meeting would have a great 
effect on Russian morale and improve Anglo-Soviet relations.146 With Roosevelt’s 
council, and Eden’s change of heart, Churchill informed Stalin that the British were 
making preliminary arrangements for another large convoy effort in September, 
and that he would be willing to come to Russia, if invited, to meet him and to 
“survey the war together and take decisions hand-in-hand”.147 Stalin warmly 
accepted, inviting Churchill to Moscow at his convenience.148 After a week in 
Cairo, during which Churchill solved the British Command situation, at least to his 
liking, by replacing Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander and promoting 
General Bernard Montgomery to Command of the Eighth Army, Churchill and his 
                                                 
144 TNA, Prime Ministers Papers, PREM 3/76A/1 Clark Kerr to Cadogan, 28 July 1942, and Dilks, 
Cadogan Diary, 30 July 1942, p. 464. 
145 Eden, Reckoning, p. 338. 
146 TNA, Prime Ministers Papers, PREM 3/76A/1 Clark Kerr to Cadogan, 28 July 1942, and Dilks, 
Cadogan Diary, 30 July 1942, p. 464. 
147 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 409. 
148 Ibid, p. 410. 
151 
staff began the journey to Moscow.149 At least that was the plan, as shortly after 
take-off from the overnight stop in Tehran the plane carrying Cadogan, Wavell 
and General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was forced to 
turn back with engine trouble. Thus Churchill reached Moscow accompanied only 
by Harriman, and had to rely on Clark Kerr until his other aides arrived. Not that 
this was a bad thing. Clark Kerr was an experienced diplomat and had established 
a good relationship with Stalin, so was a useful person to impart wisdom on such 
matters. That said, Cadogan had accompanied Eden to Moscow in December 1941, 
and Wavell could speak Russian, so Churchill was missing some experienced and 
able company. Just as Eden suffered doubts on his way to Moscow, Churchill was 
not certain his visit would produce any positive results, describing it to Roosevelt 
as a “raw job”,150 and more evocatively in his memoirs as “like carrying a large 
lump of ice to the North Pole”.151 There was even a poem or song, composed by 
Wavell, the verses of which set out the difficulties faced, and each ended with the 
line “No Second Front in 1942”.152 Churchill was undeterred, however, and after 
some customary introductory speeches at the airfield, he was whisked away to the 
Dacha where he would stay during the conference. Churchill was impressed with 
this residence and, after taking a bath, was ready to leap straight into the daunting 
task at hand, and set off with his small party to meet Stalin at the Kremlin.  
 
The details of the talks are covered quite sufficiently in the historiography,153 
and as this visit was not strictly about foreign policy, it seems fruitless to repeat 
them. What matters here is the importance of the visit as a means of improving 
Anglo-Soviet relations, the role of those around Churchill, and the implications for 
British foreign policy. This visit was an important political step. Churchill was by 
                                                 
149 General Gott was originally selected, but was killed when his plane was shot down en-route to 
Cairo on 7 August 1942, two days after Churchill had flown this route. The change occurred just 
two weeks after the first Battle of Alamein, which began to turn the tide against Rommel. 
150 Churchill to Roosevelt, C-126A, 4 August 1942, quoted in Kimball, Alliance emerging, p. 553.  
151 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 428. 
152 Dilks, Cadogan Diary, editors text, p. 474, Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 428.  
153 For example, Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 426-452, Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 616-
622, Dilks, Cadogan Diary, editors text, pp. 470-474, Gilbert, Road to Victory, pp. 171-208, Woodward, 
British Foreign Policy, Vol. II, pp. 266-272. 
152 
no means favourable to the Russians, perhaps indicated by the fact he had not yet 
met Stalin, despite Britain and Russia having been allied and directly fighting 
Germany since June 1941; whereas the Americans had only officially entered the 
war in December 1941, but he held regular meetings with Roosevelt.  
The first meeting carried almost the entire weight of the visit on its shoulders, 
as Churchill not only had to meet Stalin and build a relationship, but do so when 
imparting the news that there would be no Second Front, as least as the Russians 
envisioned one, in 1942. Giving people the worst news they could expect is rarely a 
good way to try and make friends, but it seems that the meeting, which was long 
and at times heated, was in fact a success. Clark Kerr’s record suggests that 
Churchill’s frankness and his delivery of the bad news was masterful, and that he 
managed to raise Stalin’s hopes and lower his disappointment with a prolonged 
explanation of Torch.154 Perhaps Stalin found Churchill’s drawing of a crocodile 
amusing, but more likely he saw in the spirit of Churchill’s oration the strength 
and determination of the man who stood before him, determined to meet the same 
end goal as Stalin, the destruction of Hitler. Churchill recalls how, during his 
explanation of Torch, Stalin, who was “glum” and “restless”,155 became “intensely 
interested”156 and engaged in the discussion and, ultimately, Churchill was 
impressed with his “swift and complete mastery of a problem hitherto novel to 
him”.157 Clark Kerr’s report corroborated this, noting that Stalin had moved from 
“keen disappointment and irritation to equally keen relief and interest”.158 It is 
hard to know for certain, but given the disappointment Stalin displayed on 
receiving the bad news from Churchill, it was probably relief as much as military 
strategy that led him to pronounce his support for Torch. The meeting ended 
amicably, with Churchill writing to the Cabinet that “all ended cordially, and I 
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expect I shall establish a solid and sincere relationship with this man”.159 As 
Churchill was soon to discover, however, no amount of relief or tactical grasp 
would hold off Stalin’s disappointment.  
The second day of the conversations did not go well when considered as an 
effort to improve relations between the two Powers. Churchill was in a querulous 
mood despite the positive end to the talks the previous night, and Clark Kerr 
found his attitude and his comments irritating.160 That Churchill was to meet 
Molotov in this mood was concerning for the Ambassador, but he soon found 
another gripe to occupy his mind, the conduct of his late arriving colleagues. Upon 
their arrival he noted his disappointment at their rudeness and bad manners 
towards the greeting party, and particularly criticised Wavell given he could 
converse in Russian, though did note his pleasure at seeing the “well balanced, 
humorous” Cadogan again.161 Clark Kerr was spared an unpleasant evening 
having been dropped from Churchill’s party, and given the tension of the meeting 
he may not have felt too badly about this on reflection, though vented in his diary 
“What a bloody day!”162 Churchill’s meeting with Molotov was unfriendly, partly 
because Molotov reverted to discussions about the Second Front, and party 
because comments from Molotov that “Mr Churchill should understand our 
feelings and our desire that something should be done to relieve the situation on 
our front”163 aggravated Churchill’s bad mood.  
At the meeting with Stalin that evening the Aide-Mémoire handed to 
Churchill showed that Stalin had not accepted Torch as quickly as he had 
supposed. Essentially, Stalin understood there to be no Second Front in 1942, and 
that the British were refusing to carry out their obligation as agreed when Molotov 
visited London, despite favourable conditions for such an operation.164 The 
disappointment and accusations levelled in the Aide-Mémoire continued in the 
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discussion, with Churchill suffering several barbs and slights of Britain and its 
military effort. On the whole Churchill maintained his poise, a credit given his 
often emotional nature, though the repeated criticism left its mark, and eventually 
he expressed his annoyance to Stalin, breaking into such a spirited speech about 
his troubles, his long journey and how he had not received the hand of friendship 
he had expected to find, that the interpreters were so spellbound they abandoned 
their task. Fortunately, Stalin was equally taken aback, and noted his admiration 
for the spirit with which Churchill spoke.165 This broke the ice, as Stalin opened up 
and became more engaged in the conversation, discussing the sharing of 
inventions, Torch and his plans for defending the Caucuses, though Harriman 
noted that despite this the conversation never became friendly.166 The meeting 
ended with Churchill being invited to dine with Stalin the following evening, 
which he accepted “in the public interest”,167 suggesting both men wanted to keep 
up the pretence that the visit was going well.  
Back at the Dacha, however, there was serious discussion about the 
“performance”168 of Stalin, as apparently nobody had expected such a change of 
attitude to occur, despite Harriman and Cadogan commenting that the tactics 
mirrored those used on their previous missions to Moscow.169 The explanation the 
group arrived at, that the Council of Commissars had taken the news worse than 
Stalin, said much “for their ingenuity and ignorance of the Soviet system and little 
for their common sense”,170 though it was an explanation Churchill would often 
resort too when relations soured between himself and Stalin.171 Despite his 
annoyance at the change of attitude, Churchill was persuaded by Cadogan, and 
later Clark Kerr, to attend the dinner, and with the aid of Cadogan and Brooke he 
set to work on a response to Stalin’s Aide-Mémoire. The British reply stated that 
Torch was the best possible Second Front, countered the broken promise claims 
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made by Stalin, and reaffirmed Britain’s resolve to aid its ally.172 Cadogan 
delivered this to Molotov, and informed him that Churchill was “puzzled and 
much disheartened”173 by Stalin’s change of attitude. Molotov helpfully replied 
that he had not noticed any such change.174 Maisky correctly assumed from 
London that the proceedings and the exchange of communications meant the 
atmosphere was not “particularly cheerful”, which was putting it mildly, and even 
the big, formal dinner that evening struggled to raise the temperature.175 Though it 
began well, with Churchill and Stalin conversing in a friendly manner, the barrage 
of toasts irritated Churchill,176 and after the customary photographs he left without 
indulging in the film screening that followed such dinners. Stalin, perhaps in an 
effort to make amends for his roughness the night before, followed him to the 
door, something which was “without precedent”.177 Clark Kerr was again 
unimpressed with the British representatives, particularly Wavell, for their lack of 
courtesy during the evening, but notes that Stalin went out of his way in an 
attempt to be friendly.178 Day three had done little to improve the situation, or the 
relations between Churchill and Stalin, and Churchill set his mind on going home 
without seeing Stalin again.179 Though Cadogan managed to delay this overnight, 
the next morning Churchill’s attitude was unchanged. He had, however, relented 
to Cadogan’s pressure over the Soviet draft communiqué, which he initially 
claimed would be “calamitous”.180 With Churchill in no mood for any more 
meetings with Stalin, and no agreement on the wording of the communiqué, the 
future of the visit, and Anglo-Soviet relations, hung dangerously in the balance.  
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Clark Kerr’s finest hour 
 
Clark Kerr’s lack of coverage in the historiography thus far could be taken to 
suggest he was not the most effective Ambassador, and indeed his treatment by 
Churchill during his time in Moscow could imply the Prime Minister was 
disapproving of his Ambassador. Clark Kerr notes on many occasions that 
Churchill was rude to him, and that he bore the brunt of Churchill’s tempers.181 
Admittedly he didn’t help matters by discussing his desire for the American 
Embassy with Harriman, though that did illicit from Churchill the pronouncement 
that Clark Kerr’s current post was the “most important job in the world”.182 If the 
Russians were listening in, as it was assumed they were, this was a good statement 
of intent from Churchill regarding the seriousness of his mission. Despite the best 
efforts of Cadogan and Charles Wilson, Churchill’s Doctor, Churchill was already 
packing, intending to leave Stalin to fight his own battles,183 it was all or nothing 
for Clark Kerr, who, fed up of Churchill behaving like a “spoilt child”, decided to 
speak to him with “gloves off”.184 Spurred on by Wilson, Clark Kerr asked 
Churchill to join him in the garden. The resulting talk between the two men was a 
masterful exercise in persuasion, and the full record of it makes very interesting 
reading.185 He flattered Churchill, saying he was a great man, with great talents, 
whilst simultaneously making him responsible for all the failures of the visit, 
simply because his judgement had been clouded by a cold memorandum, and his 
pride hurt when insulted by a peasant, but suggested that, if he set his mind to it 
and used his charms and his talents, he could still bring Stalin round if he could 
swallow his pride and meet him once more.186 This Churchill decided to do, and 
with the aid of a new interpreter, set off to see Stalin one last time.187 The final 
meeting, like Eden’s visit before it, was considered to be the best, and was 
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thoroughly enjoyed by Churchill due to the quantity of food and drink and the 
intimate discussion he finally conducted with Stalin. Though not starting well, as 
Churchill rose to leave Stalin invited him to his apartment for drinks. During this 
more private conversation the two, later joined by Molotov and then Cadogan, 
surveyed the war, discussed convoys, exchanged “much chaff and banter” and 
agreed on the wording of the communiqué.188 Clark Kerr recalled being awoken in 
the early hours by the Prime Minister, in a “triumphant mood”, and that “the glee 
of the P.M. was a pleasure to see”.189  
Gillies suggests that the talk between Clark Kerr and Churchill was the “most 
important diplomatic coup” of Clark Kerr’s career, and that without this the 
“whole course of the Second Word War could have been fundamentally altered”.190 
It was certainly a master stroke from the Ambassador, convincing Churchill where 
the experienced Cadogan and the wise Wilson could not, and it is likely that the 
course of events could have been different had Churchill left without seeing Stalin 
again. That Clark Kerr produced this was also impressive, given his respect of and 
faith in Churchill had suffered during the visit,191 and he was not keen on having 
to “shake a great leader of men out of whimsicalities”.192 Churchill makes no 
references to the arguments with Clark Kerr or Cadogan discussed here, 
suggesting their influence was minimal, and Martin Gilbert’s work, drawing 
mainly on Churchill’s account, makes similar omissions. However, Cadogan noted 
that it was only after the talk with Clark Kerr that Churchill decided not to return 
home early, and Churchill sent a personal message to the Ambassador after his 
visit to say “Thank you so much for all you did for me during the Moscow visit. 
You were a constant help and wise adviser”.193 This clearly suggests Clark Kerr did 
something important, though Churchill again omits this from his writings. Given 
the events, their frank discussion is the most likely candidate. It is also clear that 
this visit was an important step in the course of the war. Churchill had, despite the 
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difficulties, managed to establish a personal relationship with Stalin, one which he 
felt would be beneficial as the war progressed.194 Both Clark Kerr and Cadogan felt 
that a genuine personal relationship had been established,195 a view later 
confirmed by Molotov, who noted that Stalin had been impressed by Churchill’s 
“spirit and by his dynamic qualities”.196 By the “sheer force of his personality”197 
Churchill had managed to break down the boundaries between the two great men 
despite bearing such bad news; and enabled the British to get away with Torch 
despite the displeasure it caused the Russians; and on that score Churchill was 
probably correct in reporting to the Cabinet that only he could have pulled this 
off,198 though he neglected to mention the help he received along the way. The 
important implication for foreign policy was that little came out of this visit, 
though the knowledge that the Russians were confident of holding off any German 
advances and were not contemplating a separate peace was good news for the 
alliance, and the possibility of maintaining it into the future. A slightly spurious 
point, but one worth mentioning, is that in accepting Torch, the Russians were 
agreeing to a delay to the cross-channel invasion of Europe, something likely to aid 
their cause over the 1941 frontiers, as the way the negotiations developed meant 
there was no chance for lengthy discussion of topics such as this. From the Foreign 
Office point of view, this could have been a particularly difficult topic to leave 
Churchill to discuss, given his feelings on this issue, and so they were probably 
quite glad it didn’t come up.  
 
All this shows quite clearly the difficult nature of dealing with the Soviet 
Union. Despite the high point of the Anglo-Soviet treaty, where there appeared so 
much promise, relations were soon deteriorating due to the lack of a Second Front 
and the halting of the supply convoys. Even with the best efforts to convince the 
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Russians that no Second Front had been promised, the Soviet attitude remained 
unaltered, and eventually relations became so strained that the Prime Minister 
himself visited Moscow to try and resolve the situation. Like Eden’s visit, this 
started well, was pretty sour in the middle, and warmed up again towards the 
end; giving further credence to the argument made by Barker about Stalin’s 
negotiating style. Whilst the tactics were the same, this time Stalin was 
unsuccessful on his key point, getting a cross-channel invasion, though in agreeing 
to Torch he was at least getting some form of Second Front. Perhaps Churchill’s 
emotional nature saved him here, as mostly he felt too insulted to consider 
accepting Stalin’s demands, and that it took serious persuasion from his 
Ambassador even to meet Stalin at the end shows how stubborn Churchill could 
be. These tactics may have worked on Eden, who was more sympathetic to the 
Soviet cause generally, but failed to work on Churchill, and could be argued to 
have backfired given the passionate defence Churchill gave of British policy. 
Eventually, a tactic more to Churchill’s taste, food, drink and intimate 
conversation, swung the visit towards a success in terms of preserving Anglo-
Soviet relations, but the communiqué provided little of substance except that they 
would keep fighting to destroy Hitlerism and, like the one issued after the Eden 
visit, displayed the conversations in a better light than had been the case.199 One 
real positive for the Soviet Union was achieved though, as in September supply 
convoys were resumed, using new tactics and with new agreements about the 
increased provision of air cover, something which was agreed piecemeal over the 
course of Churchill’s visit. Thus, for the time being, the two main sources of 
trouble subsided, and as Churchill had returned without championing the Second 
Front, or having damaged the alliance by snubbing Stalin, the Foreign Office was 
quite happy with the lack of other results, as this meant there was no new 
direction, limitation, or political chaos imposed on them, as often occurred after a 
Churchill visit, and allowed them to continue their post-war planning work, which 
shall be examined in the following chapters.  
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9) Shaping the Future of the World 
 
1942 had been a challenging year for the Foreign Office in their attempt to 
conduct their role in the British war effort. Whilst the difficulties and events 
outlined have merit in their own right, it is important to see them in the wider 
concept of foreign policy. Not only were there a series of crises to deal with whilst 
conducting the country’s diplomatic relations, they were slowly trying to create an 
actual foreign policy, and were particularly attempting to capitalise on the 
growing realisation that a long-term foreign policy strategy was required. They 
had an idea about the need for some form of plan for the future, and a sense of this 
can be seen with the arguments for the Anglo-Soviet treaty. This chapter will 
examine how the Foreign Office moved from having a loose idea about some form 
of plan, to actively attempting to pursue and define this idea, and establishing how 
it would manifest itself as an actual policy initiative. As will be seen, this was to 
lead to some incredibly detailed work, and some particularly frustrating battles. 
 
The arguments over the Russian treaty and the Second Front dilemma not 
only hindered the progress in relations between two powers which should 
naturally have occurred after signing an alliance, but also affected the British 
perception, or at least that in the Foreign Office, of America. Having excluded the 
British from the Second Front promise, America was also having a serious impact 
on their attempts to deal with France, and particularly de Gaulle and the Fighting 
French. This all served to increase the determination of the Foreign Office to 
ensure that Britain was, as far as possible, trying to follow its own policy course, 
rather than washing along with the current of other initiatives, something which, it 
seems, they had been unable to do thus far. Three events during 1942 were to see 
the Foreign Office stepping up its efforts in this particular area, the first was the 
signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty; the second was the formal nomination of Eden 
as the heir apparent in the Government; the third was the creation of the Economic 
and Reconstruction Department.  
 
161 
Whilst briefly covered when examining the cabinet reshuffle in early 1942, the 
issue of succession was to re-surface in light of Churchill’s visit to Washington in 
June, and could almost be seen as opening the door to Eden’s policy efforts. Given 
the danger of such trips, a rare event occurred prior to this visit. As Churchill 
recounts, “It is not customary for a Prime Minister to advise the Sovereign 
officially upon his successor unless he is asked to do so”.1 Yet, on 16 June, 
Churchill did just that, naming Anthony Eden as the person to be entrusted with 
forming a new Government in the event of Churchill’s death, on account of his 
being the “the outstanding Minister” in the National Government, and the man 
“with the resolution, experience and capacity which these grievous times 
require”.2 Whilst previously named in conversation as Churchill’s heir, Eden’s 
place was now made more official, and at this time he began having regular 
lunches with the King, an agreeable addition to his schedule, not least because the 
two often ended up discussing post-war problems.3 Though there is no obvious 
evidence that this formal nomination of Eden was the trigger for what was to 
follow in terms of a longer term foreign policy, the regular conversations with the 
King, as well as the knowledge that he was considered the future of the 
Conservative party, may have given Eden the self-confidence required to focus 
more on this issue, and consider it important enough that he was willing to 
challenge Churchill over it, as shall be seen later. Barker notes that self-assurance 
was the key for Eden, and that this, coupled with the backing of the historically 
strong, wise and experienced Foreign Office ensured he could act on his own 
accord and not simply fold to Churchill’s demands.4 Dutton suggests that this 
formal nomination made Eden more inclined to align with Churchill,5 though this 
seems an incorrect judgement as far as policy was concerned, as Eden was still 
inclined to act against Churchill. Though little appears to be made of this in the 
secondary work, particularly works focusing on Eden, it seems that the timing, 
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more than the event, of this historically rare occurrence is the thing that should be 
considered. Eden had just secured the Anglo-Soviet treaty, a key component of 
which was the twenty-year mutual assistance clause, so it would be logical for him 
to be considering how this was to be implemented, especially as he had come to 
the opinion that working with the Russians was going to be crucial for Britain both 
during and after the war. Given he was also arguing with Churchill at this time 
over relations with France, being nominated as successor and being able to discuss 
ideas about the post-war world with the King could certainly have signalled to 
Eden that the time was right for a more determined effort to be made in this 
foreign policy direction.  
The timing could also be considered important, as in August Eden sent 
Richard Law, his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, to Washington. Having 
been nominated as the successor and then having a close aide make such a visit 
could make it appear, if one was looking for conspiracy, that Eden was setting up 
his personnel in preparation for a Governmental change. Fortunately, conspiracy 
would be hard to prove, as this visit had been planned in May 1942, with Eden 
discussing the initiative with both Churchill and Halifax. It is worth considering 
this visit for a moment, as it shows Eden attempting to engage the Americans in 
discussion over future plans, something which, given the suggestions made 
throughout this thesis of annoyance over American interference, may seem 
somewhat strange. What is important to note, and something which shall be 
followed up later in this chapter, is that the American influence that had frustrated 
the Foreign Office was mainly in areas considered traditional British interests, or 
key British interests for the war effort: attempted interference in Anglo-Soviet 
treaty negotiations, interference in Anglo-French relations and attempts to alter 
Britain’s imperial policy, particularly with regard to India - though there is no 
room to discuss this topic here - all spring to mind; but in this instance Eden was 
trying to form a concerted and workable post-war plan, and had the sense and 
League of Nations experience to realise that America needed to be party to this. 
Thus it made sense to involve the Americans at an early stage, and the Law visit 
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was a good step in that direction. To secure support for it, however, Eden had to 
showcase his political skill.  
To Churchill, he wrote that this visit was to “get in touch informally with 
those in the State Department and elsewhere who are working on the political side 
of post-war problems in Anglo-American co-operation”; that conversations would 
be aimed at removing suspicion of Britain in lower levels of the State Department; 
and that the experience would be useful for future economic talks.6 To Halifax, 
however, he wrote that he had been “anxious for some time” that Law, “working 
on post-war problems on my behalf … should visit the United States to get in 
touch with those in Washington similarly engaged”, and that this would be 
extremely helpful in dealing with this important theme in Anglo-American 
relations.7 The differences are subtle, but it appears that Eden was attempting to 
play down the importance he attached to this visit when discussing it with 
Churchill, wary perhaps of the latter’s dislike of the topic at hand. The suggestion 
of meeting lower level officials and removing suspicions are not found in the 
telegram to Halifax, and whilst Eden talked about general conversations, the 
informal clause was also dropped. Both Churchill and Halifax agreed to the visit, 
though Halifax noted the Americans hoped procedural conversations would be 
conducted, which could also include other countries.8 Currently, this proposal was 
too formal for Eden, who hoped to test the water with the Americans, rather than 
leap right in to formal discussions so the visit was postponed,9 though it went 
ahead a few months later. Law reported successful conversations with Hull and 
Welles; that he was making good progress with the State Department; but found 
the Americans had “more definite ideas on post-war problems and on the 
necessity for a joint Anglo-American approach to them”.10 The American position 
seems to have advanced little beyond Roosevelt’s suggestions to Molotov, 
however, as Law reported that their main plan was for a World organisation, 
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headed by the four Great Powers within the United Nations framework, backed 
up by American, British and Russian military power.11 It was also felt that 
Germany should be disarmed and possibly broken up into a loose confederation, 
to be monitored by an international police force.12 It is interesting that, looking 
back, these were similar to demands made by French Prime Minister, Georges 
Clemenceau after the First World War, suggesting that America was beginning to 
understand the need for their involvement in Europe, an idea rejected after 
Versailles and which ultimately killed the chances of success of maintaining that 
peace. Thanks to the information provided by Molotov, and that gained by Law, 
the Foreign Office were in a position to start to work on a general plan, based on 
their own ideas, and those of the United States. 
 
With Eden’s succession in place, and consultation with the Americans over 
post-war co-operation underway, it now seems prudent to turn to the third event, 
and the one which arguably had the most impact in terms of foreign policy. There 
was already a general Ministerial Committee, operating under Sir William Jowitt, 
whose remit was to study reconstruction problems, but the Foreign Office wanted 
more control over this issue. It was already receiving detailed plans and 
suggestions for post-war policy from many different sources, both politicians and 
general correspondents, and there are several files full of these in The National 
Archives,13 so it seems natural that a portion of their resources would be directed 
to deal with this. In June, it was decided to create a new department to investigate 
a range of post-war questions such as relief measures and armistice terms.14 This 
was the Economic and Reconstruction Department, led by Jebb. Though initially 
tasked to investigate a series of specific post-war issues, Jebb, seeing an 
opportunity to exercise his considerable intellect, was soon attempting to make the 
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new department his own, against the intentions of Cadogan, who had aided him in 
securing the Foreign Office position. Cadogan quickly found a circular on his desk 
from Jebb which appeared “to throw all future foreign policy into the new 
Department”, and remarked that he could now see why Jebb was so happy with 
his appointment.15 According to Sean Greenwood, Cadogan attempted to curb this 
‘empire building’, but was unsuccessful; save the fact the Department retained its 
name. In effect, Jebb was able, in his new role, to do exactly what he had set out to 
do in his circular, and it was his department that was to be the catalyst for the 
formation of firm post-war foreign policy plans.16  
The initial paper from the Department, on Relief Machinery, did cover the 
“trifling issue”17 of establishing post war relief machinery, but then delved into the 
broader political spectrum. Jebb recalled that this plan was heavily influenced by 
what was thought to be the American mindset, and that this “coloured my 
subsequent thinking”.18 The paper examined what was seen to be an American-led 
re-working of the League of Nations concept, and looked at what Britain’s 
responses should be. As part of this examination, alternative solutions were looked 
at, but neither the British Empire and Commonwealth idea, whereby the British 
would pursue an independent policy, backed by their Empire; the European Bloc 
idea, where Britain would lead a Western European bloc as a counterpoise to the 
United States and the Soviet Union; nor the League of Nations idea, which aimed 
for a reconstitution of the League, only in Washington; were considered practical 
or desirable. The ideal course was considered to be a policy based on collaboration 
between the four Great Powers, who would each maintain a degree of 
independence within their own sphere, but with a necessity of Britain having 
American support. Whilst it considered that this might herald the start of the 
“American century”, this was seen as necessary to ensure a lasting peace 
settlement, as British power had been essential to keep the (relative) peace between 
1815 and the First World War, and avoid a Europe united against Britain, 
                                                 
15 Dilks, Cadogan Diary, 18 June 1942, p. 458. 
16 Greenwood, Titan, pp. 150-151. 
17 Ibid, p. 151. 
18 Jebb, G. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, (London, 1972), pp. 111-112. 
166 
particularly under German leadership.19 It was thus concluded that the American 
concept was sound, though it needed to be polished and made practicable by 
Britain’s more advanced “political sense”.20 Another advantage of this plan was 
that, with American and Soviet aid, Britain would maintain its status as a Great 
Power, even if realistically this was no longer quite so true.21 Jebb considered that 
“For a first effort I do not think, in the light of hindsight, that this was too bad”,22 
and given the evolution this paper was to experience, his first effort proved to be 
significantly more valuable to the cause of British foreign policy than he imagined. 
That said, the irony must obviously be noted here. The Foreign Office, given its 
concern about American influence, had wanted to try and establish its own policy. 
Yet what apparently happened was that American views, instead of being 
considered so British plans could allow for Anglo-American collaboration, were 
used in this paper by Jebb and his Department as a blueprint. Whilst the paper 
does discuss alternatives, these are dismissed as impractical or undesirable, and its 
main thrust was the dominance of America, and the imposition of some global 
system headed by Washington. There is thus significant irony in that, in 
attempting not to be dragged along behind American policy, the Foreign Office, 
through the Four Powers concept, was to champion that policy as its own.23   
 
The Four Power Plan 
 
It is the second paper from the Economic and Reconstruction Department, or 
more accurately, the revision of the ‘Relief Machinery’ paper, which is probably 
the most well known of the works on post war planning. This was ‘The Four 
Power Plan’. At approximately eleven thousand words,24 this was no half-hearted 
effort, and, after multiple revisions, covered pretty much everything anyone who 
had seen it had felt was important. It was drafted in response to comments 
                                                 
19 Ibid, p. 112. 
20 Ibid, p. 114.  
21 Greenwood, Titan, p. 152. 
22 Jebb, Memoirs, p. 114. 
23 Greenwood, Titan, p. 169. 
24 Jebb, Memoirs, p. 116. 
167 
received on the ‘Relief Machinery’ paper, and was a considerably expanded and 
more detailed document than its predecessor. Most notably, despite maintaining 
its American focus, there was significantly more discussion of the role of Russia, 
possibly due to input from Sir Frank Roberts, Diplomat in the Northern 
Department of the Foreign Office, and Sir Christopher Warner, Head of the 
Northern Department of the Foreign Office. The likelihood of American 
involvement was also re-examined after suggestions from Sir Neville Butler, Head 
of the American Department of the Foreign Office, that the Americans desire for 
widespread obligations may not be as strong as originally suggested,25 and from 
William Strang, Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary of State, who noted that 
“there is no sign of this conception [of a Four Power Plan]”26 in the remarks made 
by Hull or Welles whilst Law was in Washington. Law consequently wrote several 
minutes on the drafts to reassure American doubters that the proposal would 
“appeal to the Americans very much” and was in line with their ideas, despite 
Welles not mentioning it in discussion.27 There was also considerable discussion 
over the post-war fate of Germany, and during August Jebb, Strang and Sargent in 
particular exchanged a series of minutes and memoranda on the subject.28 Given 
the causes of the war, and the peace imposed following the previous war, 
Germany was obviously a key factor in any such plan for the post war world, and 
it is unsurprising that there were strong opinions on it, and that the new plan thus 
paid considerably more attention to the topic than its predecessor. 
 
Given this evolution, by the time the ‘Four Power Plan’ reached Eden for 
Cabinet distribution, it was truly a Foreign Office document, and indeed Jebb 
noted the need for it to be seen as foreign policy, rather than as a reconstruction 
plan, to avoid control of the issue being taken outside the Department.29 However, 
having created the plan, the challenge was now to get it to Cabinet. This would 
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involve negotiating the obstacle of the Prime Minister, whose attention was 
currently held by the final preparations for Torch. As early as 26 September 1942, 
Jebb argued that the Cabinet needed to see the paper, and should be asked to give 
a general approval of the policy line suggested. In this, Jebb was in agreement with 
Sargent, and Cadogan noted that he had consequently discussed the matter with 
Eden, who suggested that, as a first step, he should send a minute to the Prime 
Minister, summarising the paper.30 Cadogan agreed that Churchill was unlikely to 
read the full paper, and as such a summary was prepared for Eden, who liked the 
paper, thinking it “a good piece of work”.31 The summary was composed by Jebb, 
and covered the key points of the paper, and an overview of its general policy 
suggestions, but looking back he felt it unconvincing, “shorn of all the closely 
reasoned argument and colourful phrases.32 Eden gave Churchill the summary on 
16 October, hoping that the visiting Jan Smuts, the South African Prime Minister 
who was close friends with Churchill but who approved of Eden’s foreign policy 
work, would be able to lessen the Prime Minister’s concern and reluctance to 
discuss the issue. The summary was never discussed, but Churchill sent a minute 
to Eden on the subject on 18 October. This was the now famous ‘jugged hare’ 
argument. Churchill believed it was more important to focus on defeating Hitler 
and then to aid America in its struggle with Japan, thinking this would provide “a 
very good background for collaboration about the settlement of Europe”; that 
“Any conclusions drawn now are sure to have little relation to what will happen”; 
that these issues should be left “mainly to those on whose hands time hangs 
heavy”; and that “we shall not overlook Mrs. Glass’s Cookery Book recipe for 
Jugged Hare – “First catch your hare””.33 This was not what Eden was hoping for, 
though was probably what he should have expected given Churchill’s reluctance 
to consider post war issues. Harvey considered this “foolish” and noted Eden was 
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“much annoyed at this further example of the P.M.’s blockading of postwar 
questions and [he] means to send a firm reply”.34 Eden’s reply was not as firm as 
Harvey hoped, stating he was “most disappointed”35 with Churchill’s reply. That 
said, Eden put a brief but forceful case defending his department’s work, and this 
section of his message is worth quoting in full. “I had hoped that you would not 
regard this Four Power Plan as a vague project for an indefinite future. My desire 
is to have the basis of a foreign policy now, which policy, if the basis is sound to-
day, should carry us over into the peace. It is from every point of view bad 
business to have to live from hand to mouth where we can avoid it, and the only 
consequence of so doing is that the United States makes a policy and we follow, 
which I do not regard as a satisfactory role for the British Empire”.36 He went on to 
give an example of when this type of forward planning was to Britain’s advantage 
in negotiations with the United States over territorial rights in China, and finished 
by reiterating his desire not for detailed discussion, but for a general approval of 
policy, and noted that this was a “very modest request from your Foreign 
Secretary”.37  
This is probably where we see Eden’s whole foreign policy ethos stated most 
plainly. That he was prepared to take on Churchill over this issue dispels any 
suggestion of being subservient or too spellbound by succession to act 
independently of the great man, and, from all appearances, was acting as a strong 
Foreign Secretary, not being afraid of standing up for the work of his department. 
There appears no attempt to cover up his insecurities regarding America, as he 
made it clear that Britain should not take a course of action just because that was 
what the United States was doing, neither did he hide his belief that Britain and its 
Empire should maintain a strong position post war, which he believed would be 
particularly hard to achieve if Britain was having its whole foreign policy course 
laid out by another power. He was clearly putting the interests of Britain and its 
Empire first, and noting that, whilst peace has not yet been achieved, it was 
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important to look to the future now so that Britain could have a satisfactory role, 
and one must wonder if that isn’t the whole point of the role of the British Foreign 
Secretary. Churchill was having none of this, and replied that whilst Eden was free 
to circulate papers – something that may not actually have been the case – he was 
inclined to believe that changes were happening, and would happen, that would 
render any decisions made as premature.38 Thus, an impasse was reached, which 
was only broken when a similar topic was discussed by the War Cabinet. On 3 
November they discussed a Memorandum from Eden, proposing instructions to 
Halifax regarding a plan for Post-War Atlantic Bases, details of which had been 
received from Trygve Lie, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and were 
said to be in line with the thoughts of the Netherlands and Belgium. This entailed 
the sharing of bases by Britain and the United States along the Atlantic Coast of 
Europe to help ensure security and stability after the war.39 A similar idea was 
suggested by Stalin to Eden in Moscow,40 so this Norwegian plan would likely 
have, or receive, Soviet backing, though Eden did not make this argument to the 
Cabinet. The instructions asked Halifax to discuss the political aspects of such a 
deal with the American Government, noting that he could express British support 
for the political aspect of the plans, but that they were unsure of the military 
advantages and sought to avoid commitment at this stage.41 The War Cabinet, 
however, thought this went too far and felt that “certain general conclusions as to 
the broad lines on which we hoped to see international security re-established after 
the war” needed agreement before such a plan could be advocated.42 According to 
Harvey, this resulted in a row, with Eden apparently stating that he had “been 
trying to circulate his general plan for weeks but the trouble was that the P.M. 
disagreed with it”.43 This resulted in a general demand from the Cabinet to view 
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the paper, a summary of which Eden submitted on 8 November. The Cabinet 
Conclusions do not confirm the suggestion made by Harvey,44 although it is clear 
from the exchanges between Eden and Churchill that Eden had been pushing to 
have his plan seen by the Cabinet. Despite the request of the War Cabinet, he 
would have to push for a few more weeks until his paper was finally heard, with 
various minutes by Churchill on prospective Cabinet agendas stating “please not” 
and “I cannot deal with these matters now”.45 Eventually, after receiving papers on 
the topic from Eden, Amery and Cripps, Churchill yielded, and on 27 November 
the War Cabinet received all three papers.  
With the battle to bring the plan to Cabinet won, it is appropriate to examine 
the document itself, to see exactly what course the Foreign Office were proposing 
to pursue, and how they intended to do so. As the paper’s structure and central 
themes remained largely unchanged throughout the many drafts, this work shall 
study the final version, before it received the input from Cripps and Amery, 
though their papers shall be discussed later. It should be noted that this version 
was significantly longer and more detailed than the version seen by the War 
Cabinet, which was only a summary, though it is intended to draw on that at 
certain points to see how Jebb condensed the key ideas, and also to see if they 
actually reflected the true nature of the plan.  As the plan was long and very 
detailed, the focus will be on its key foreign policy ideas, and the basis of the 
reasoning behind them, rather than every single detail. 
 
The plan set out by examining American proposals regarding the 
organisation of the post war world, and it was these that the Foreign Office used as 
their test paper essentially to set out the British position. The American ideas 
outlined by the paper focused on the United Nations as a world-wide 
organisation, which would have at its helm what were considered the four Great 
Powers: the USA, the USSR, the United Kingdom and China; underneath which 
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would be a greater assembly of the other powers who were members of the 
organisation, possibly including ex-enemy powers, and those which had been 
neutral during the war.46 This would potentially be coupled with regional councils 
headed by one of the powers; an internationalisation of communication, transport 
and colonial resources; and was to be backed by the immense scale of American 
sea and air power, supported by British air and sea power, and the Russian army 
in a form of International police force.47 The question posed by the paper was 
simple. What was the British attitude to this American conception, and did it fit 
with Britain’s home and world interests? 
The first, and most important, foreign policy assumption made by the paper, 
as a preface to the examination of the likely positions and foreign policies of each 
power, was as follows, and it is important to think about it for a moment: “The 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will all, 
after the war, realise their world-wide interests and responsibilities and be both able and 
willing to enter into the world-wide commitments in order to prevent any other nation 
from again troubling the peace [Italics in original]”.48 From this a few clear post-war 
requirements emerge. Firstly, the need for international co-operation from what 
the British considered would be the post-war Great Powers, the British did not 
consider China even a potential Great Power at this point; secondly, the necessity 
of these powers acknowledging that they had a world role to play, something that 
may have been difficult for the USA and controversial for the Soviet Union; 
thirdly, that this idea would only work if all were able and willing to participate in 
this process, something the League of Nations experience should have taught 
those involved. It is important to recognise that the rest of the paper was based on 
the fulfilment of this assumption. Whether or not it was a reasonable assumption 
to make given the differing circumstances of each power is a difficult question to 
answer, though one the following sections of the plan looked to address. At this 
point, the continuation of international co-operation can not really be seen as a bad 
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idea given this was felt to be the precursor to victory in the war, something 
obviously required to allow for any post-war plans to be put into effect. Also, the 
fact that the three powers were co-operating, albeit through circumstance, and 
often reluctantly, shows that it was not unreasonable to propose that this co-
operation should continue.   
Having set out the assumption that the great powers would need to work 
together, the paper then went on to examine what were felt to be Britain’s crucial 
foreign policy interests in the post-war period, and how they could be reconciled 
with any world organisation. The paper determined that Britain had five foreign 
policy objectives:  
1) The development or restorations of our export trade, our overseas 
investments and our merchant marine, and other “invisible exports,” with 
the object of maintaining our imports, without which the population of these 
islands could not support themselves at their present standard of living;  
2) The building up of an international system designed to restrict the power 
of Germany and Japan (but principally Germany) as the chief dangers to our 
national independence, livelihood and prosperity;  
3) The retention by us of strong forces which, even if not sufficient to protect 
us without allies against all possible aggressor States, will be strong enough 
to inspire respect in our former enemies and confidence in our existing allies, 
so as to enable us eventually to make an adequate contribution to any 
international system of collective security capable of preventing the outbreak 
of further totalitarian wars;  
4) The consequent maintenance of the power and influence, both political and 
economic, of Great Britain in all those parts of the world where up till now 
she has exercised such influence and where it has represented, and still 
represents, a civilising and educative force;  
5) More generally, the pursuit of policies designed to promote world peace 
and world trade by means of international co-operation, provided always 
that such policies do not result in our being placed at the mercy of any 
foreign power or combination of Powers.49  
 
These foreign policy statements were unsurprising from a country that had a 
long history of being a Great Power, and certainly fitted Eden’s assumption “that 
the aim of British policy must be, first, that we should continue to exercise the 
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functions and to bear the responsibilities of a world Power”.50 In some respects, 
this was not very forward thinking. The idea that British security was most 
threatened by Germany suggests Britain’s fear came from past experience, and 
preventing a reoccurrence of past problems, and while a logical position to take, 
showed no awareness of potential threats that might arise. Likewise, the 
conception that Britain must maintain its empire and its international influence 
shows a historic, almost romantic, vision of Britain as a world power, and failed to 
take into account the political, economic and military realities of Britain’s position 
in the world. But as several works assert, this was not a conception with which 
many would disagree.51 
The paper proceeded to discuss the commitments Britain had already made 
in an effort to achieve its objectives, as discussed previously. It is interesting that 
the paper saw the Atlantic Charter and the Anglo-Soviet Treaty as part of the 
process of achieving these foreign policy objectives. Given these objectives had not 
been set down at the time the commitments were made, it would be illogical to say 
that they were made as part of the development of this particular foreign policy 
idea, but the fact they were considered part of the wider process offers evidence 
that Britain, or perhaps the Foreign Office, saw the need for close working 
relationships with the other major powers as crucial for being able to deal with the 
post-war problems.  
Little discussion is needed from a foreign policy point of view of the next 
section of the paper that weighed up the likely strengths and weaknesses of 
Britain’s post-war position, though there are a couple of points worth noting. 
Firstly, the suggestion was that Britain would have a world role simply because of 
its existing commitments,52 though its ability to carry it out would depend on its 
exact circumstances come the end of the war. Secondly there was a tacit 
acknowledgement that Britain was no longer the global financial or military 
powerhouse and, in practice, would struggle to stand up against the might of 
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either America or the Soviet Union, though this appears to have been considered 
insufficient reason for Britain to abandon the idea of playing a world role, 
particularly if it was able to maintain key parts of its empire and its trade.53 These 
ideas suggest a failure to grasp Britain’s true decline as a world power, as they 
seem to be based in the hope and expectation that Britain could continue to fulfil a 
world role because it had to, rather than having the capability to do so. This 
section was largely glossed over in the summary paper to the War Cabinet, which 
appeared to assume Britain would be a world power and would play a role, but 
which recognised that Britain would not be able to fulfil this assumed role 
unaided, but would need to be part of a larger organisation.54  
What is most interesting is the final section of the examination of Britain as 
part of the Four Power system. This revolved around the question of whether or 
not Britain was willing to accept the responsibilities of a world power after the 
war. It was predicted, or assumed depending on whether the full or summary 
paper is read, that Britain would be required to fulfil a world role, and would 
probably be in a position to do so, though perhaps with a little help from its allies. 
There is plenty of evidence in this paper alone to suggest that Britain maintained 
its sense of importance, and could thus be expected to retain its titular status of 
Great Power. The ‘Four Power Plan’, however, sheds light on a trend of 
‘liberalism’ which was considered to be defeatist in outlook, suggesting that 
Britain’s time had passed, and that it was time to hand over the torch to the 
younger powers, notably America and Russia.55 Whilst no evidence of the origin of 
this is set out, it appears a serious concern, as the paper goes on to assert that 
“unless we can find some rallying cry which will inspire such doubters with the 
belief in the necessity of our fulfilling our word-wide mission it is possible that, 
whether we like it or not, we may sink to the level of a second-class Power”, the 
result of which would be “an agonising collapse, from which we should emerge as 
a European Soviet State, or the penurious outpost of an American Pluto-
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democracy or a German Gau, as forces might dictate”.56 This is an incredibly 
evocative statement of the perils Britain could face were it not a world power, and 
was not without justification. The sheer political or military might of Russia, 
America or a revived Germany, could well impose itself in some way on Britain 
depending on how the war proceeded, and how the peace shaped itself, and none 
of the possible outcomes were felt to be acceptable or welcome for Britain or its 
Empire. This point should be born in mind given the divergent nature of the 
Churchill and Foreign Office foreign policies that have already been seen, and will 
continue to be seen in the rest of this work, especially with regard to America. The 
examination of Britain’s role concluded by noting that Britain, unlike the United 
States or the Soviet Union, did not have the luxury of lapsing back into 
isolationism, and insisted that it must, therefore, remain a world power, though 
rather paradoxically suggested that this could only happen if Britain had strong 
allies, but equally that Britain couldn’t have strong allies without being a world 
power.57 This suggested Britain might in fact be in a lose-lose situation come the 
end of the war. This admission suggests good foresight from the Department, 
however, to ensure this matter was considered before Britain had actually been 
eclipsed in the war effort by Russia and America. At the time, Britain had not been 
eclipsed, and it was thus felt that the first assumption could be viewed correct in 
Britain’s case. 
 
Having set out the British foreign policy objectives that were to be 
considered, and outlined Britain’s likely position and role within the ‘Four Power 
Plan’, the paper then examined the likely position of the other powers that were to 
be involved, and it is worth looking at a couple of key ideas about each power to 
understand Foreign Office thinking. With regard to the United States, there was 
particular concern in Britain that the betrayal of the American retreat to isolation 
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would be repeated,58 and indeed most of the section on America was dedicated to 
the potential problems around their non-involvement in Europe. Given the 
precedent after the First World War, coupled with Republican gains in the 
Congressional mid-terms in 1942, there was significant concern over this issue, and 
a point made in the summary, though not in the full paper, was that Eden’s 
League of Nations experience showed that it was crucial to have the key powers 
involved in any large systems designed to maintain international order.59 The 
paper considered that those who had discussed policy, such as Welles and Hull, 
were encouraging as their ideas were all wedded in some way to American 
international involvement, but there was concern over the more general public 
attitude. It was hoped that the universal nature of the war would emphasise the 
point to the American people that America could no longer escape the rest of the 
world, and would have to play a role as it would be impossible to escape a future 
conflict. The full plan does not state these ideas outright, but suggests the 
desirability, in attempting to create a world organisation, to have a willing 
America acting in concert with the other Powers, rather than on its own, which it 
could do given its significant resources.60 Aside from this concern about American 
isolationism, the plan also examined the power of America, and recognised the fact 
that, come the end of the war, America would most likely be the dominant world 
power, with “incomparable” military strength, and forces active all over the 
world.61 Unlike the possible weakness of Britain’s post-war position, it seems 
thought had gone into the growth of American power, and perhaps the plan had 
been conceived to be along similar lines to current American thinking to ensure 
that this power could be harnessed for what Britain felt were the right 
international goals after the war, rather than some isolationist American 
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imperialism.62 These fears aside, it was considered that the sheer power and 
influence of America were coupled with sufficient positive signs that the first 
assumption could be applied to post-war America.  
The position regarding the Soviet Union was more complicated, as the Soviet 
Union had put forward some post-war ideas, but was at the same time less 
understood and more secretive than the United States. The treaty with Britain had 
helped in this regard, and the plan noted it was a good step in engaging with 
Russia in Europe in a political rather than military manner. The fact Stalin had 
made some statements about potential Soviet goals had helped shape the plan, as 
it was already known that, somehow, the frontier issue would have to be dealt 
with, that the Soviet Union was principally interested in its own security, and 
particularly the restraining of Germany.63 The plan was thus designed to include 
the Soviet Union in the post-war world order, as Stalin had suggested would be 
desirable; ensure it was put on a level footing with the other great powers, 
hopefully removing some of their traditional suspicion of the Anglo-Saxon 
powers; and show how it was beneficial to their search for security if they were 
involved in the long term pacification of Europe.64 Given the earlier reference to 
the younger powers, this could be a suggestion that, akin to a stubborn child, the 
Soviet Union needing to be coaxed by its elder to play fairly with the other powers, 
and could be a rather patronising thing to suggest about the power that had, up-to 
this point, ensured a successful continuation of the war against Germany almost 
on its own. The idea of the Soviet benefit to participation, especially the geographic 
significance of participation, concerned much of the remaining Soviet section. The 
restriction of German power was also one of Britain’s key objectives, and anyone 
familiar with Europe will realise the geographic importance of co-operation 
between these two powers to deal with this issue. The Plan was felt to offer the 
Soviet Union a win-win situation. It would be involved with the other main 
powers in the pursuit of this aim, and at the same time its involvement would also 
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prevent its fear of Anglo-Saxon hegemony being imposed on Europe.65 From 
Britain’s viewpoint, Soviet involvement might also limit efforts to sovietise the 
eastern European countries, or at least prevent them being played off against the 
democratic powers in order to disrupt the post-war reconstruction.66 The plan also 
offered Russia the advantage of American assistance in dealing with Japan, and 
British and possibly American assistance in the Middle East, both of which were 
areas of strong concern for Russia given its geographic location, and its current 
war effort. It was thus felt that Russia, provided she believed Britain and America 
were being fair and open with her, would eventually be willing to partake in the 
Four Power system to manage the post-war world. This was a conclusion, drawn 
not out of naivety, but out of a set of assumptions developed through debate and 
observation over the previous year, which suggested the importance of involving 
the Soviet Union, and the relatively strong possibility of co-operation with Britain 
that was felt to exist at that time.67 
Finally the position of China was considered, though mainly because the 
Americans felt it would be a world power come the end of the war, rather than 
because the British felt it an integral part in preserving the peace.68 In fact, the 
British saw very little to commend China as a potential world power, feeling its 
interests were not sufficiently global, its economic potential too underdeveloped, 
and its unity maintained only by military necessity – though these were also 
largely true of the Soviet Union, though it was seen as far more relevant to the 
overall war effort to the peace in Europe than China.69 These factors combined 
meant that the only claims China had to being a great power were the “long and 
stubborn resistance to Japan” and “the Americans want her to be included”.70 It 
was thus concluded that the assumption could not be applied in the case of China, 
but due to her limited value, this was not sufficient reason to abandon the plan, 
which largely hinged on the other three powers.  
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With the conclusions drawn above, the second foreign policy assumption of 
the plan was put forward, and that was that “the real, if not the declared, object of the 
Concert of the four Powers will be to hold down Germany and Japan for as long a period as 
possible and will not be based on the alternative theory that both these Powers should be 
readmitted to the ranks of Great Powers [Italics in original]”.71 It is interesting to see 
how basic this objective is, and how, in a paper about future policy, one of the key 
themes is based on the past. Holding down Germany was a key demand of the 
French after the First World War, and the principle of the Triple Entente, and it is 
interesting to see how little peace considerations had moved beyond the ideas of 
the First World War and 1919. Whilst this was a different scheme to the League of 
Nations, and it was acknowledged in advance that it would need the participation 
of the great powers to make it workable, it still followed a similar policy line, 
suggesting those responsible for the drafting of this document were very conscious 
to avoid a repeat of the inter-war years. It was considered that this assumption 
might be more controversial than the first, but that it was the crux of the whole 
plan, and that if it were not considered its key objective then the whole plan would 
fall.72 This seemed a reasonable position to take given the whole point of planning 
for the post-war was to establish how to deal with the aggressor powers, and how 
to maintain peace. With this assumption in place as the goal, it is necessary to 
consider how the plan might in practice be applied, though this section in reality 
mainly dealt with the various problems of applying the plan, rather than 
examining how it might work. The remainder of the plan was largely an exercise 
in self reflection, and while not all of these reflections are relevant to this study, 
there are a few points which are worth examining.  
The first consideration in the application of the plan regarded the position of 
France. The British had the restoration of France as a war aim, and were keen to 
see the position of France restored, especially given the possibility that the 
Americans could be unwilling to use their military force to help tie down 
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Germany. If France was re-established, the British would have another power to 
work with, and would not have to place as heavy a reliance on Russia for the 
maintenance of peace. It was, therefore, considered that, if France was restored 
with some measure of greatness, the Four Powers would have to examine the 
desirability of her being associated with the Great Powers in the government of the 
world.73 Obviously this was a risky strategy, as the plan had not been accepted 
before there was a proposal to expand it to five powers, and relations between 
America and France were not exactly harmonious, nor were they likely to be if 
Eden’s championing of de Gaulle continued. It was felt, on balance, that the claims 
France could present would be sufficiently strong were she present and active in 
the victory that the Russians and the Americans would have difficulty in refusing. 
No reference is made to China – perhaps a thinly veiled attempt to supplant them 
with a more ‘worthy’ great power – though more likely an acknowledgement of 
China’s considered lack of interest in Europe.  
The second consideration was the concept of regionalism, and there is a 
lengthy examination of this process, which boiled down to the conclusion that 
regionalism had two levels, Global and European. On a Global level, all powers 
(except China) were considered to be interested in maintaining the peace 
everywhere so there would be no limited liability, though there would be initial 
liability for the power most closely associated with the region to be the initial 
source of the peace-keeping effort should trouble break out.74 On a European level 
it was considered that regional schemes, such as the creation of a Western bloc, or 
Eastern European Confederations, should be considered as welcome, and should 
be supported by the Four Powers, though they should not be forced into existence, 
and their existence would not alter the responsibilities of the Four Powers.75 This 
area of the plan was left open, as it was dependant on the as yet unknown geo-
political landscape of post-war Europe.  
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The question of armaments, however, was one where some definite 
statements could be made. The main thrust of this section was its condemnation of 
the impractical nature of Roosevelt’s idea of only the Four Great Powers having 
arms. It was considered impossible that France, for example, could be made to 
disarm after the war when its arms would have been involved in victory, and 
when it could potentially be accepted as a great power. It was also considered that, 
were the Americans unwilling to maintain significant forces in Europe, the burden 
of responsibility for Western European defence would, if everyone else were 
disarmed, fall to Britain, who would be unwilling to hold this responsibility alone, 
and would thus require assistance from others.76  
The final consideration of this section concerned the status of the colonies. 
Britain, having a global Empire, had a particular vested interest in this, and had set 
out by maintaining that the Empire was one of its key foreign policy objectives. 
The American view, in contrast, was that empires should be treated as 
‘trusteeships’ of the United Nations, and colonies should be moved towards 
independence.77 As a compromise, the plan suggested that in the special 
circumstances of the Far East, Britain would be open to maintaining its rights to 
administer former British possessions, but treating them as trusteeships 
answerable to an international body of other interested powers.78 This was not to 
be used as a precedent for other British colonies, though it was suggested that they 
could already be thought of as Trusteeships, with Britain, the parent state, 
responsible for administering and developing them, which was beneficial to the 
whole United Nations. The extent of this compromise becomes quickly apparent: 
“such principles, if applied, would in fact alter the present position very little”,79 
suggesting that Britain felt they would be able to get away with both pursuing 
their own foreign policy goals, whilst in the meantime giving a minor gesture to 
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the United States to secure its participation in the larger project of worldwide 
defence.  
This section links neatly with the following section, which put forward the 
doubts that could already be viewed about the Four Power Plan, some of which 
have been discussed. This section is essentially a series of critiquing questions, 
such as whether the Americans were united enough to make this scheme more 
workable than the League of Nations; whether the rest of the world would see the 
Four Great Powers as tyrants keeping the lesser states in straight-waistcoats, and 
whether the Dominions or India would go along with such a plan.80 These are, on 
examination of the plan, reasonable questions to ask. The American position, as 
seen, was of considerable concern. The position of the lesser states was often over-
looked through the plan, so the question is pertinent, as states such as France or 
Turkey might have felt they deserved a voice, rather than hoping for 
representation by one of the great powers. The Dominions is an interesting 
question, as maintaining the Empire was a key objective for Britain, and was in 
part considered a necessity for their world power status, and thus their inclusion 
in their own plan. It was, however, considered that, India aside, the majority of the 
Dominions would agree to have decisions taken on their behalf so long as they 
were consulted, and those decisions related to the aim of keeping down Germany 
and Japan.81 The final doubt expressed in the plan was the ability of Britain to fulfil 
the balancing act that was required between the irresolution of America and the 
suspicion of the Soviet Union, to ensure sufficient identity of outlook to make the 
plan workable.82 
The depth of thought that went into the plan is further displayed by the next 
section, which examined the alternative policies. Here it considered what Britain 
would do if any of their worst scenarios were to occur. Firstly, it considered the 
implications of American isolationism. In this event, Britain would have to look to 
the Soviet Union for political and military alliances in order to preserve the peace 
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in Europe, as its Empire would not be sufficiently powerful to carry out this task. It 
was also felt that Soviet influence in Europe would become so strong in this 
situation that Britain’s relationship with the United States would suffer, and 
Britain would have to move towards more socialist economic practices in order to 
keep in step with its only major ally and compete at any level with the United 
States.83 This, it should be noted, was not considered to be as bad as if Britain 
“were to surrender our freedom of action to an imperialistic and ill-disposed 
United States of America”, though that is not to say this is something anyone, save 
perhaps Cripps, wanted to occur.84  
The second scenario involved a Russian rejection of co-operation. It was felt 
that after the war Russia would be in a position of self-sufficiency, and could 
potentially abandon co-operation with the western allies. In such a situation, 
Russian foreign policy could pose a significant threat to British interests in the 
Middle East and Europe, and would make it particularly difficult to hold down 
Germany, whose strength could become a significant factor in any anti-Soviet bloc 
formed to combat the spread of communism.85 It was also suggested that, in this 
situation, America would probably retreat from Europe, leaving Britain with little 
option but to abandon the policy of holding down Germany and make a series of 
agreements with other powers try and maintain any standing in Europe.86  
The final scenario was the worst of all, where neither the United States nor 
the Soviet Union accepted the Four Power Plan or were willing to play a role in the 
subjugation of Germany. This was considered a “highly dangerous situation” as 
Britain would be unable to rely on Poland or France for support, and would have 
to collaborate with Germany and Italy in an attempt to appeal to their better 
natures and convince them to swap their swords for ploughshares.87 The expected 
result of this was another world war. In a critique of appeasement, the Plan 
highlighted how history showed that Britain and France could not hope to 
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subjugate Germany alone, and the “humiliating years” prior to the war would be 
repeated unless Britain could be certain of the attitude of the United States and the 
Soviet Union.88  
 
With all this in mind the paper reached the following conclusions: That the 
Four Power Plan was something which the British should support, if not indeed 
advance; that the British should lead the Americans, without appearing to do so, 
and take their good ideas and “forge them into practical tools on the anvil of our 
experience”; that any agreements made with America should be in treaty form, 
making it as difficult as possible for the Americans to back out later; and finally, 
with more of the irony suggested earlier, that “it would be the height of unwisdom 
to commit ourselves forthwith and definitely to any precise American scheme” – 
apparently forgetting that the Plan they had concocted was based on the ideas put 
forward by Roosevelt.89 It was thus suggested that the British should adopt the 
‘Four Power Plan’ as general policy and should encourage both the United States 
and the Soviet Union to do the same. Jebb added a bit of Machiavelli, however, 
suggesting that during conversations with each power, Britain should drop hints 
that they were prepared to make an exclusive agreement with the other if 
demands became too stiff, suggesting that if Britain played its cards right it could 
be responsible for making a real world balance of power.90 The paper ended with 
the following words, both vision and warning combined: “Only by taking up the 
vague ideas now floating about the world and expressing them boldly and even 
recklessly in our own terms can we hope to play the role which is proper to us. And 
irrespective of what we say, only by making up our minds as to what it is that we 
really want can we hope to be the master and not the victim of events. Ducunt 
volentem fata nolentem trahunt (Fates lead the willing and drag the unwilling) 
[Italics in original]”.91 Although discussed in a manner of greater self-importance 
and superiority than its military and political strength deserved, British thinking 
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was still that of a world power, and a former world leader, and given Britain’s 
long history at the top of the hierarchy it is perhaps unsurprising, if slipping out of 
touch with reality. As it turned out, the Cabinet made up its mind to adopt The 
Four Power Plan as general policy, and it became Eden's task to try and implement 
its ideas, and encourage its adoption amongst the other Great Powers.  
 
When the ‘Four Power Plan’ eventually reached the Cabinet, both Leo Amery, 
and Stafford Cripps, had submitted memoranda on the subject. Amery argued in 
his paper that the most serious danger to peace lay in Europe, and that to nullify 
this danger the solution must also come from Europe, and be confined to Europe, 
unlike the idealistic worldwide attempt at peace with the League of Nations 
concept after the previous war.92 He also thought Britain would be too busy to act 
as the policeman of Europe, that the United States were starting to show signs of 
withdrawing from Europe, that China was not interested in playing such a role 
and that Russian interest would be based more on extension of power than 
keeping the peace.93 His proposed solution was for the federation of smaller states 
into ones which could stand up to Germany, along with the creation of a loosely 
organised Europe, using as an example the British Commonwealth, which would 
allow powers to develop in an inter-related manner with regard to currency, 
culture and infrastructure. Despite setting out that “The first and essential 
condition of any European polity, stable within and peaceful in its relation to the 
outside world, is that it should not be dominated by one of its component units”, 
he argued that Germany should be invited into this European Commonwealth as 
an outlet for its goods and to share in a combined living space, and noted that 
there was a likelihood through this that Germany could eventually dominate this 
union. 94 He suggested that it was either this, or a revived and re-militarised 
Germany, which would unite the continent against outside interference, making 
his initial statement about the condition of non-domination rather pointless, and 
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his whole argument rather flawed. It is easy to see why Jebb and Dr. Hugh Dalton, 
Minister of Economic Warfare, referred to it as “The No-Power Plan” and the 
“German Victory-through-Defeat Plan”.95 It is clear that the paper was a direct 
attack against the whole conception of the Four Power Plan, suggesting that the 
Four Powers concept was not strong enough to work for the main purpose of what 
was being discussed, methods to ensure peace, and that the powers would in fact 
have no interest in doing so due to the other domestic and international issues they 
would be faced with. The idea that Europe should be largely left alone suggests a 
lack of understanding of the issues being considered by the Four Power Plan, 
which was aimed at ensuring Germany could never become the master of Europe. 
The plan was felt to add little to the debate or ideas for post-war planning. Eden 
felt it worthy of little comment, noting simply that “this is sad”.96 Woodward failed 
to mention it in his Official History,97 and Jebb only discussed the plan enough to 
explain the extent of his indignation at it, and it seems his disappointment at the 
effort from Amery, whose opposition he initially thought would be formidable.98 It 
is, however, interesting to note that Amery was not far off in his vision. Firstly, 
Europe is now a federal system with integrated infrastructures, a single currency 
and common market, and it has, as he predicted, come to see Germany as the 
dominant power. Secondly, his argument that Russian interest in Europe would be 
for power rather than peace could be seen as justified in light of events during the 
Cold War, and even today with Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine. 
The paper from Cripps, however, attracted significantly more coverage, and 
was not considered to be such a bad proposal. The fact that, unlike Amery, Cripps 
opened with the line “I agree with the view expressed by the Foreign Secretary” 
probably helped his case, as did the fact that his own conception, unlike that of 
Amery, relied to an extent on the Four Powers working together in some way for 
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the good of the peace process.99 Like Amery, Cripps felt the immediate post-war 
danger lay in Europe, but in contrast to his colleague believed the best way to deal 
with this was active involvement in the pacification of Europe by the United 
States, Russia and Britain, particularly in the pursuit of ensuring Germany would 
be economically restrained.100 His work shared other similarities with the Foreign 
Office paper, acknowledging the role America would be required to play in a 
successful peace settlement, and being wary of allowing America to take a 
complete lead, suggesting that it would be undesirable for Britain to end up in a 
situation of following the other powers instead of leading them.101  
It was over ideas as to how this was to be done that Cripps diverged from the 
‘Four Power Plan’, however, and he put forward his vision of a system of 
international rule based on local and world councils. His proposal was for five 
smaller councils, a Council of Europe, a Pan-American Union, a Far-East Council, 
the British Commonwealth, and the U.S.S.R., all of which would have 
responsibility in their own sphere, and would all be represented on a Supreme 
World Council.102 Only the Council of Europe was actually defined, and it had 
responsibility for pacifying and policing Europe; reconstruction functions; 
boundary changes; dealing with general social, economic and political issues; and 
overseeing the internationalisation of Europe, particularly with regard to 
transport. It is unclear exactly what some of those roles entailed, and Cripps noted 
that these were rough proposals, and that the exact tasks would be defined 
depending on the nature of the peace settlement. Having seen only the summary 
plan at this point, Cripps did not know that the full plan contained a discussion 
about regionalism, with reference to regional councils and a possible Assembly of 
United Nations.103 The plan was received far more positively than that from 
Amery, with the War Cabinet giving their general approval to it, alongside Eden’s 
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plan, and suggesting the Foreign Secretary work to merge the two together.104 
Woodward’s Official History felt this was worthy of comment, considering it an 
“important note”,105 and Jebb, who was concerned at the “dangerous” nature of an 
assault by Cripps, was relieved to find its views were “greatly preferable to those 
of Leo Amery”.106 That did not, however, stop him dismissing it as “naïve” in his 
memoirs,107 nor, according to Greenwood, as “’waffly’, ‘silly’ and ‘absurd’”.108 The 
documents in the archives show a different picture, and highlight the importance 
of examining the official documents. Jebb wrote a minute in response to the Cripps 
paper, highlighting the similarities and differences to the Four Power Plan, and 
stated at the start that the paper was “certainly encouraging – almost surprisingly 
so”.109 Eden too was encouraged by the work, commenting to Cadogan that this 
was “better than usual” and suggesting he ask the department to examine the 
proposal.110 As a result of the more favourable nature of this paper, not to mention 
the admission received from Cripps that he would not have submitted his points 
had he seen the full paper,111 it was not an onerous task for the Foreign Office to 
merge these two papers, and the results shall be seen in the next chapter.   
     
Visionary or Protagonist? 
 
Having examined the substance of the plan, it is worth taking a moment to 
bring in the historiography on what is undoubtedly one of the key aspects of this 
thesis, and foreign policy planning during the war to see how time and historians 
have treated this paper, and also its champion. Charmley’s work on the Special 
Relationship is one of the few which look in detail at the ‘Four Power Plan’, and 
suggests that the plan showed a great deal of vision from Eden, something for 
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which, in the shadow of Churchill, he receives less credit for than he perhaps 
deserved.112 Charmley uses two key examples to illustrate his point. Firstly, the 
passage from the summary paper that: “We have to maintain our position as an 
Empire and a Commonwealth. If we fail to do so we cannot exist as a world 
Power. And we have to accept our full share of responsibility for the future of 
Europe. If we fail to do that we shall have fought this war to no purpose, and the 
mastery of Europe which we have refused to Germany by force of arms will pass 
to her by natural succession as soon as the control of our arms is removed”.113 He 
thus suggests that Eden, not Churchill, saw most clearly the shape of Britain’s 
future with regard to Europe, and looking at where we now stand it would be 
hard to argue, that this prediction did not come to pass.  
Secondly, the suggestion in the plan itself that: “unless we [Britain] can find 
some rallying cry which will inspire such doubters with the belief in the necessity 
of our fulfilling our word-wide mission it is possible that, whether we like it or not, 
we may sink to the level of a second-class Power with all that implies. It is a 
process which might be painless and possibly even profitable in the short run, but 
it is quite probable that, if it took place, we should sooner or later experience an 
agonising collapse, from which we should emerge as a European Soviet State, or 
the penurious outpost of an American Pluto-democracy or a German Gau, as forces 
might dictate”.114 It might be argued today, as indeed Charmley argues in 
‘Churchill’s Grand Alliance’ that the second of these outcomes did in fact come true, 
and that Britain today, shorn of its Empire, on the periphery of Europe, and bound 
by its ‘special relationship’, is little more than an outpost of the United States. 
Whilst this might have been the least unpleasant result, it was one that, by 
circumstances and events, became fully apparent when Eden was Prime Minister – 
yet another ironic foreign policy twist, though an unfortunate one given Eden’s 
vision to see this coming, and attempts to avert it during his time as Foreign 
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Secretary.115 Whilst Charmley’s assessment certainly stands up well when 
examining the contents of the plan, in examining the formation of the plan itself, it 
falls down, for reasons that shall be seen in a moment.  
Few other works examine the importance of the Four Power Plan, perhaps 
feeling its wishful thinking was not relevant to Eden, or the course of the Second 
World War, or perhaps simply because the plan was never enacted, though that is 
not to say it failed.116 Those works that do deem it worthy of mention either 
express no opinion on the plan, simply referencing it as a station through which 
the foreign policy train was passing; fail to see in it the same merit as Charmley; or 
only mention it when examining the dynamic of the Churchill-Eden relationship. 
Thorpe’s biography is a good example of the first,117 and Dutton’s suggestion that, 
looking back “Eden was setting out to resist the inevitable. In the context of 
Britain’s war effort, however, his stance seems more reasonable”118 appears a good 
example of the second. Broad’s biography and Barker’s examination of the 
Churchill-Eden relationship are both good examples of the third case.119 Dutton is 
interesting, however, as when discussing the Four Power Plan in his biography, he 
offers no suggestion of Eden being a visionary, and whilst acknowledging that his 
attempts to create a foreign policy seemed more reasonable at the time, though 
more reasonable than what is unclear, he doesn’t give the impression that the 
policy deserved much merit.120 The fact that in the following chapter of the same 
book he forgets about it entirely also suggests he had a low opinion of the plan.121 
That said, in his chapter on Eden in Thomas Otte’s ‘The Makers of British Foreign 
Policy’, he notes how it had been usual to criticise Eden for lack of vision, but 
suggests that Eden was “perfectly capable of long-term planning when time 
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allowed”,122 and when it came to post-war policy “showed a greater awareness of 
the need to plan for the longer-term than some of his critics have allowed”.123 This 
perhaps suggesting that Eden’s visionary efforts were time or subject specific, and 
the Four Power Plan simply came at a time when Eden was too burdened with 
responsibility to focus on this, but was on a subject where he was keenly aware of 
the need for planning to occur.  
This leads to another debate, over how involved Eden was in policy 
formation at this time, especially given his additional role as Leader of the House. 
There were frequent complaints by officials, particularly Cadogan, on the limited 
time Eden actually spent at the Foreign Office. This is something that is picked up 
in the secondary work, which somewhat weakens Charmley’s argument of Eden’s 
visionary status. It is almost a consensus that the burden of responsibility on Eden 
at the end of 1942 meant that he had little time for the daily affairs of his 
Department. Cadogan complained that his workload as the almost de facto head of 
the Foreign Office in Eden’s absence had become intolerable, and that “it took two 
Office Keepers to carry in my boxes!”.124 Indeed there are numerous references in 
his diary to the working relationship between himself and Eden with Cadogan 
frequently complaining at being called to Cabinet meetings in Eden’s’ absence, or 
only seeing Eden for brief moments at a time to conduct any Foreign Office 
business.125  
The crux of the argument against Eden being a visionary, and consequently 
the gap in Charmley’s argument, can be found in the archives. The documents 
show the significant role played by the Economic and Reconstruction Department, 
but most notably Jebb, in the creative and formative stages of this plan. He was the 
man responsible for writing most of the ‘Relief Machinery’ paper. After some 
encouragement and numerous critiques and comments from other Foreign Office 
Officials he re-wrote the plan, and it became the ‘Four Power Plan’ after input and 
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re-drafts from other key Officials. Undoubtedly, had Churchill been Foreign 
Secretary at this time, Jebb would not have been able to put the time and effort into 
the plan that he did, so Eden’s role was of particular importance in allowing Jebb 
to create his “tour de force [Italics in original]”,126 something noted by Greenwood in 
his biography, and alluded to by Jebb in his memoirs.127 Eden’s actual input in the 
process, however, was limited. On 3 October he commented on an early draft that 
“I like this paper which seems to me a good piece of work”,128 and on 7 November 
he commented, via Cadogan, that he approved Mr Law’s amended version of the 
Four Power Plan, and would like it to be circulated to the Cabinet.129 There appears 
little other evidence in the file associated with the Four Power Plan, aside from a 
few signatures indicating he had read minutes, that Eden was actually involved in 
the creation of this policy. Whilst it was presented to the War Cabinet as a 
memorandum from the Foreign Secretary and as a foreign policy plan from the 
Foreign Office, this is not sufficient to claim that the ideas and visions as set out 
were Eden’s own. Whilst he clearly agreed with the proposal, was keen to see such 
a policy pursued, and indeed became the champion of the policy in the War 
Cabinet, in the House of Commons and at international conferences and meetings 
with allied leaders, he was in this case, as Barker asserts, “the protagonist of the 
ideas and policies of his department … rather than their creator”.130 That is not, 
however, to diminish the role of the protagonist. Eden was to be a key champion 
for Jebb and his department’s plans, and his continued interest and belief in the 
topic was to pay dividends into 1943, as shall be seen in the following chapters.  
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10) The Future Remains Elusive 
 
As 1942 drew to a close, the Foreign Office were tantalisingly close to having 
a fully thought out and generally approved foreign policy. Discussions had been 
held with American officials by Law, the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department was in full swing under Jebb’s stewardship, and its brainchild, The 
‘Four Power Plan’, had finally been seen by the War Cabinet. Comments and 
critiques had been raised, yet it was approved as the general line that policy 
should follow, subject to some modification to include the ideas expressed in the 
similar memorandum produced by Cripps. On top of this, they had seen their luck 
turn in France, with the removal of Darlan and his replacement by the more 
favoured, though that is not to say favourite, candidate in Giraud, and the military 
operations were proceeding, if slower than hoped. They had also seen, though in 
part thanks to Churchill’s personal diplomatic efforts, a temporary thawing in 
their relations with the Soviet Union, which had allowed breathing space to focus 
on developing their foreign policy idea. As the year turned, they were further 
refining their ideas, and over the course of the year new plans would grow out of 
the ‘Four Power Plan’ initiative. This chapter will examine one of these, the United 
Nations Plan, as well as its rival in the shape of Churchill’s foray into post-war 
planning, ‘Morning Thoughts’. It will also look at the Casablanca Conference, the 
attempts to resolve the French Question, and Eden’s visit to Washington to consult 
with Roosevelt, particularly on post-war issues.  
 
In light of this on-going progress, Eden was determined to ensure the topic of 
post-war stayed at the forefront of the political agenda. With King George VI 
having used his speech when opening Parliament to praise the United Nations and 
emphasise its active role in the process of post war preparation,1 Eden took an 
opportunity to make a speech during a related debate on International 
Reconstruction to further push this policy agenda. The speech was drafted by Jebb, 
and as it turned out, had not been shown to Churchill for approval, which helps 
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explain the strength of content it included.2 Whilst fully reproduced in ‘Freedom 
and Order’,3 it is not picked up to a great extent by the wider historiography, which 
seems a shame as there are ideas presented that are significant when examining 
the development of British foreign policy. Eden notes in ‘The Reckoning’ that there 
were two conditions laid down by this speech for any international organisation to 
work, in fact, there were three. “To my mind there are three indispensible 
attributes … First, it must be fully representative of the powers which meant to 
keep the peace … Second the Powers themselves must have the unity and the 
determination to arrive at agreed and positive decisions. And the third, and 
perhaps the most important of all, is that they should have the force behind them 
to give effect to their decisions”.4 Throughout the speech Eden referred back to the 
League of Nations, and suggested areas where it had failed, which appear to be in 
meeting the ‘indispensible attributes’, and saying that Britain needed to learn the 
lessons of the past. If it could do this, and could convince both the United States 
and Russia to do the same, and be prepared to put the effort into the World 
Organisation after the war, then he felt there was every opportunity that the 
United Nations could succeed.5 Approximately three quarters of the speech was 
dedicated to publicising the Four Power Plan, to a significantly wider audience 
than just the War Cabinet. It is interesting that Eden looked to the past, both when 
considering errors that needed to be avoided, and also for ideas as to how the 
peace should be managed. The ideas quite clearly harked back to the era of balance 
of power politics and great Power collaboration, and it certainly seems that Eden’s 
thinking might have been influenced by this. His vision looks rather like an 
evolved and modernised version of the Congress of Vienna and the Quadruple 
Alliance, only with the United States and China replacing Austria and Prussia, and 
the United Nations replacing the Concert of Europe.6 Indeed one only needs to 
look at the opening chapter of C.J. Bartlett’s ‘Peace, War and the European Powers 
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1814-1914’ to be able to draw comparisons between Eden’s ideas and diplomacy, 
and those of Lord Castlereagh during his stint as Foreign Secretary.7   
Eden also used the speech to re-emphasise the importance of the role of the 
Foreign Office during the war, stating that “Here and there there is a tendency to 
suggest that foreign policy is in abeyance in war-time. If anybody would spend a 
day at the Foreign Office he would learn that that is not so”.8 Despite the burden 
placed upon him as Leader of the House, Eden still recognised the need for a 
strong Foreign Office as part of the war effort, and from what has been seen so far, 
little satisfactory work would have been done had foreign policy been completely 
neglected in pursuit of ultimate victory, given that the successes were often 
achieved against the will of Churchill. Despite Eden’s assertion, however, the 
occasions during the war when Churchill took over the Foreign Office do not 
appear to have made him realise the importance of the department or its role in the 
war effort.  
On top of this Eden set out one of the key realisations that had come from the 
development of the ‘Four Power Plan’, that Churchill’s assertion that peace could 
be organised after victory was wrong, and that “In fact, the manner in which and 
the extent to which we succeed or fail to succeed in co-operating with our Allies 
now will, to a very large extent, determine the course of post-war foreign policy”.9 
In December 1942, Eden would not have known just how true these words would 
become, and it is important to note that it was he, not that great visionary 
Churchill, who foresaw the significance of any acts, gestures, or failings, made by 
any of the allies towards the others during the war, as part of the process of 
developing a working peace-time Grand Alliance and World Organisation after 
the War. As it turned out, even before the end of the war the allies were not fully 
co-operating: there was no unified plan for the liberation of Europe, and no agreed 
grand strategy, so it looked unlikely that there would be continued agreement on 
working together, something which resulted from necessity rather than genuine 
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desire. That said, at this point post-war planning was very much at a nadir, and in 
the spirit of discussions in the Commons, and the earlier War Cabinet decision on 
the Four Power Plan, the Foreign Office and other departments continued to work 
on drafting some future strategy, and there were several plans submitted to the 
War Cabinet, though it appears they were never examined.  
 
One of these plans was the ‘United Nations Plan’. This, from Eden on behalf 
of the Foreign Office, was the new, improved, and interestingly, shorter, ‘Four 
Power Plan’. After the War Cabinet in November, Jebb and other officials had re-
examined the plan, taking on board some suggestions encompassed in the plan by 
Cripps, in an attempt to create one unified policy. They had also taken on board 
feedback from the Treasury, the Admiralty, The Ministry of Labour, the Air 
Ministry and Dalton, in an example of that unfortunate process when working by 
committee – trying to please everyone.10 In fact, the only person not pleased was 
Cripps, ironically, given he retracted most of his criticisms after reading the full 
‘Four Power Plan’. But eventually, after working with David Owen, one of his 
advisors, a relatively acceptable draft was reached, and it was felt that Cripps 
could like it, or be told to like it by Eden.11 The new plan, comprising only 28 
sections to its predecessor’s 55, still attempted to cover much the same ground, 
though there were some notable omissions. The American sections at the start of 
the plan were dropped, in favour of a simple statement of Britain’s aims and its 
current position along the lines of those in the ‘Four Power Plan’; the in-depth 
discussion of the position of the great powers was dropped in favour of a 
statement that they must work together, and alongside this the assumptions of the 
‘Four Power Plan’ were stated, again without the analysis of whether they could 
be applied to each power; the discussion of regionalism was reduced in favour of a 
greater examination of the economic problems facing allied unity after the war; the 
‘Doubts’ and ‘Alternative Policies’ sections were largely shelved in their entirety; 
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the ‘Conclusions’ section disappeared as a distinct part of the plan, though a 
couple of the clauses were altered to fit the new plan, and the ‘Grand Strategy’ 
section was reduced to simply stating the desire to implement the plan.12 More 
emphasis was placed on the occupation and disarmament of Germany, and the 
plan also included a diagram suggesting how the bureaucratic structure of the 
proposed World Organisation and its associated Council’s would look.13 In 
essence, it suggested a similar proposition to the ‘Four Power Plan’, but with a 
greater insight into how the Four Powers would work within the larger United 
Nations organisation, how it might be structured, and some of the requirements 
that would fall upon it. Due to the similarity of intent and policy, there is little 
need to analyse it in the depth afforded to the ‘Four Power Plan’, but it is 
important to have offered a brief evaluation of it as it was undoubtedly a stepping 
stone in the Foreign policy process, and was to form the basis of ideas that would 
arise after Eden and Jebb visited Washington a few months later. 
There appears to be essentially no coverage of this plan in the historiography. 
The fact the plan was a refined and updated version of two plans already 
approved by the War Cabinet may be reason for this, that the plan was never 
discussed by the War Cabinet is another fairly logical reason as to why it isn’t 
considered important. This, however, begs the question, is something unimportant 
because it doesn’t succeed? In this case the memorandum was a Cabinet approved 
attempt to hone Foreign Office plans and allow them to plot the course that foreign 
policy should follow. It was also a policy that, based on Eden’s aforementioned 
speech, appeared to have wide support: Eden notes in The Reckoning that it was 
“the policy which the nation wanted”;14 it was not alone in spirit either, as post-
war planning was not just occurring in foreign policy. Around this time the 
Beveridge report was being prepared, which, like Eden’s plans, proposed a set of 
aims and ideals that were intended to shape the future. These things would 
suggest some level of importance for this document. The fact it discussed the 
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United Nations should also have made it important, as this was a concept to which 
Britain had subscribed and which they were expecting to be a major party in as it 
developed. The fact plans such as this have been neglected suggests there is no 
significance in the topic, but given the size, scope and role of the United Nations 
today, it is surprising that there is not more discussion of this topic as part of the 
broader history of Second World War foreign policy. Given Eden was a potential 
candidate for the role of UN Secretary General,15 it is also surprising his own 
biographies fail to examine his involvement in the planning and development of a 
workable United Nations in more detail, most jumping from the Four Power Plan 
to the Foreign Ministers Conference, which shall be examined later. Aside from 
Eden mentioning in his memoirs that he sent the paper to Cabinet for their 
consideration in January, and highlighting a few of its key points,16 only Dutton 
mentions Eden’s role in the formation of the United Nations and the submission of 
this paper, and Greenwood and Barker make references to the United Nations 
Plan, though these are subtle hints at best.17 Woodward’s history reproduces the 
plan, and in fact offers some interesting insights as to its significance. Not only was 
the plan an attempt to finalise a policy before consulting with the American and 
Russian Governments, but it was also considered a political necessity.18 Victory 
appeared far closer in January 1943 than it had in late 1942, with the successes of 
Torch, including El Alamain, and the turning tide at Stalingrad, and the Foreign 
Office were concerned that no unified allied policy might have been reached by 
the end of the war.19 It was this concern, linked with the urgent matters of needing 
a plan to deal with Germany upon its defeat; a process to restore national 
sovereignty to subjected powers; and a decision about how this transition was to 
be managed, that led to the submission of this new plan.20 In reality, it was 
probably that perennial problem for Eden – timing – that led to its limited 
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evaluation, as it was submitted on 16 January 1943, a time when the attention of 
the politicians, and of the historians studying them, was turning to the meeting 
between Churchill and Roosevelt at Casablanca.  
 
To some extent, post-war planning was the big topic in early 1943, evidenced 
by the fact that even Churchill became involved, though this was very much to the 
annoyance of the Foreign Office. The Casablanca Conference, whilst not strictly 
post-war planning, was intended to discuss key questions about future strategy, 
and in light of the death of Darlan provided an opportunity to settle the dispute 
over the policies towards France. It also afforded Churchill the opportunity to 
examine the post-war landscape from his point of view, in what became known as 
his ‘Morning Thoughts’. It should, quite importantly, be noted that Casablanca 
almost didn’t get off the ground. During the previous months there had been 
repeated communications with Stalin about holding a tripartite conference. 
Despite their best efforts, neither Roosevelt nor Churchill could persuade him to 
leave Moscow; the most he would agree too was the need to meet in the future.21 
Even when they hung the question of a European Second Front on the meeting, his 
response was no more forthcoming.22 Roosevelt, frustrated by Stalin’s lack of co-
operation, suggested to Churchill that the meeting should go ahead, in Stalin’s 
absence if necessary,23 and thus, on 13 January, Churchill arrived at Casablanca, 
followed by Roosevelt the following day. There are many accounts of Casablanca, 
from Churchill’s detailed account in ‘The Hinge of Fate’, to more overview accounts 
such as in Charmley’s ‘The End of Glory’,24 so it seems superfluous to delve into the 
details of the whole Conference. Instead, given the scope of this thesis, it seems 
more prudent to examine the implications the decisions made regarding strategy 
had on foreign policy, the efforts to resolve the de Gaulle situation, and Churchill’s 
Morning Thoughts.  
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With Stalin absent, it would be fair to say, given his insistence on a European 
Second Front, that the decisions reached did not reflect the attitude and preferred 
strategy of the Grand Alliance as a whole.25 In fact, as with his visits to 
Washington, it seems it was a remarkable victory for Churchill and the British 
strategists. Having successfully persuaded the Americans to follow a Germany 
first strategy, then to invade North Africa, it might be presumed that the British 
had used up most of their excess of wartime diplomatic nous and political 
leadership, and given the continuous increase in American strength, it would not 
have been a surprise had the Americans gone to Casablanca and dictated the 
future military strategy to the British. The Americans were, however, disorganised 
and still at odds over the Germany first strategy,26 so despite trying to present a 
plan for a cross-channel invasion of Europe, they were bettered by the British, who 
arrived with an array of in-depth logistical and statistical studies to show the folly 
of this enterprise. As Colonel Albert Wedemeyer put it, “We came, we saw, we 
were conquered”.27 This, coupled with the plans the British had already settled on 
before the Conference, Churchill’s determination to press home the advantage in 
North Africa, (and perhaps, though this is hard to prove, firm up British Imperial 
possessions in Africa and the Middle East), and Roosevelt’s decision to take the 
easy route by utilising the troops and equipment from Torch, led to the American 
acquiescence in Operation Husky – the invasion of Sicily from North Africa.28 It 
was also announced at the end of the Conference that the allies would seek to 
demand “unconditional surrender” from their enemies.29 The timing of the 
announcement appears to have surprised Churchill, but the issue had been 
discussed, and Churchill had consulted the War Cabinet about its inclusion in the 
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joint statement, to which they had approved, so he should not have been as 
confused or surprised as he claimed to have been.30  
 
Although the intention of the Conference was to deal with military matters, 
both leaders found themselves quickly involved in the French political squabble. 
With Darlan out of the picture, there was a gap in the civil authority in North 
Africa, and the Americans hoped that it could be filled by Giraud, who arrived in 
Casablanca the day after Roosevelt. Eden, however, saw in the Conference a 
chance to put an end to the squabbles, as it would provide an opportunity for the 
two leaders to meet Giraud and de Gaulle and hopefully bring them to co-operate 
with each other.31 Despite the seriousness of the French situation, and the trouble it 
had caused in the preceding years, this effort became the subject of jokes between 
Churchill and Roosevelt, on the need for the ‘bride’ and ‘bridegroom’ to have a 
‘shot-gun’ wedding.32 Given his status, not to mention his considerable ego, it is 
unlikely de Gaulle would have taken kindly to being cast as the bride, but, as with 
any wedding, the bride turned up late, much to the annoyance of the two men to 
whom, to a greater or lesser extent, he owed the existence of his movement. 
Having initially not been told about Casablanca, de Gaulle was invited by 
Churchill and Roosevelt to join the Conference, meet with Giraud and attempt to 
negotiate an agreement with him.33 There had actually been negotiations ongoing 
between de Gaulle and Giraud since the death of Darlan, aided by General 
Catroux and the Foreign Office, with de Gaulle suggesting a meeting of the two 
Generals, but Giraud stalling, and suggesting instead a preliminary meeting of 
military officials.34 In light of this, de Gaulle showed “no pleasure” in the message 
received from Churchill, and felt he should not be summoned to negotiate at the 
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whim of the other allies when he was dealing with the situation.35 He was 
particularly adamant that nobody could invite him to meet anybody on French 
soil.36 Despite the best efforts of Eden and Cadogan to convince de Gaulle of the 
opportunity in front of him, and the potential to achieve his aim and hold talks 
with Giraud, the General remained dismissive – earning himself the comment that 
“He is a species of mule” in Cadogan’s diary entry for the day.37 In a further 
meeting with Eden that evening, he re-emphasised these points, saying he was 
unwilling to negotiate under pressure from the allies, and in his reply to Churchill 
noted that he would continue to communicate with Giraud in an effort to arrange 
a meeting.38 Eden, who had been working behind the scenes to try and alleviate the 
American suspicions of de Gaulle and the Free French must have been particularly 
annoyed at this, but managed not to show it in his meetings with the General.39  
It seems de Gaulle had now pushed Churchill too far, and such was his 
displeasure when de Gaulle refused the invitation, that he threatened that British 
support for his movement would need to be reviewed if he remained at its head, 
unless he accepted the “unique opportunity” open to him.40 Eden was, yet again, 
tasked with breaking the bad news to the General, with Churchill suggesting he 
should “knock him about pretty hard”.41 Though the War Cabinet amended the 
message before it was given to Pleven, de Gaulle having refused to receive the 
response personally, its terms were quite strong.42 Churchill had suggested that 
Eden could alter the message, so long as it maintained its seriousness, the War 
Cabinet draft was actually stronger, suggesting that “If with your eyes open you 
reject this unique opportunity, the consequences to the future of the Fighting 
French Movement cannot but be grave in the extreme”.43 For once, we see Eden 
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taking a line that was as strong, if not stronger, than Churchill’s towards de 
Gaulle, something which had not usually been the case. One potential reason for 
this can be seen from Eden’s foreign policy plans. Thinking about the post-war, 
and with France a concept that was, as far as Eden was concerned, to be included 
in the peace settlement and the United Nations, he was more worried about 
ensuring Britain did not lose out on one of its key war aims and foreign policy 
goals rather than pushing the position of de Gaulle. Eden perhaps recognised that 
it was in the interests of post-war France that agreement was reached early on 
between its rival power bases, and thus felt the need to take this stronger line. 
Usually, when crises occurred, Eden shared the opinion or approved of the actions 
of the Fighting French, and stood up for them against Churchill. This time 
Churchill was trying to enact Eden’s idea of a meeting to unify the French allied 
forces, so Eden was not at odds with the Prime Minister. Thus, with pressure put 
on de Gaulle from the man who was usually his supporter, he eventually relented 
and accepted the invitation to Casablanca. This change of role for Eden makes this 
an interesting episode in Anglo-French relations, as usually Eden was the mediator 
between de Gaulle and Churchill or the Americans, this time he was pushing the 
hard line. It could well be that his determination to see his foreign policy goal 
come to fruition became his over-riding concern, rather than ensuring de Gaulle 
remained friendly to the British.  
Unfortunately, having ensured de Gaulle made it to Casablanca, Eden had no 
control over what happened next. In a snub which still frustrated de Gaulle many 
years later, he was not met by any guard of honour, or a car, upon his arrival, and 
things continued to go downhill.44 When he reached the Conference, he was 
greeted by an angry Churchill, who gave him a stern dressing down, but de Gaulle 
was un-moved and stalked out of Churchill’s villa with his head held high, as if he 
were “Stalin, with 200 divisions behind his words”.45 Despite his anger and 
frustration, Churchill’s sense of admiration for the General still shone through, 
perhaps recognising a man very much the spirit of France as Churchill had been 
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the spirit of Britain during 1940 and beyond. Given Churchill’s stance, that he had 
not become “the King’s First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British 
Empire”,46 it would seem hypocritical for him to chastise de Gaulle for essentially 
making the same point, that he had not kept France in the war on the allied side to 
see the liquidation of French sovereignty, and Churchill confided later to Wilson 
that he recognised that “France without an Army is not France. De Gaulle is the 
spirit of that Army”.47 Churchill’s memoirs contain a short, almost reminiscent 
section, suggesting how he truly felt about de Gaulle, in spite of the angry words 
in the telegrams, which lends weight to the argument that above all else he 
respected de Gaulle as a great and unconquerable Frenchman.48 Despite the rough 
start, Churchill endeavoured to help facilitate an agreement between de Gaulle 
and Giraud over the coming days, and he and the British staff attempted to work 
with de Gaulle to come up with an agreeable compromise. Roosevelt, despite 
laughing when de Gaulle rejected the initial invitation, was reported to have been 
“kindly and paternal” at his initial meeting with de Gaulle, with Churchill 
suggesting they got on “unexpectedly well”.49 This did not help proceedings, 
however, as by the press conference at the end of the Casablanca Conference no 
agreement had been reached on the communiqué, let alone the fusion of the two 
French groups. A cunning piece of stage management did, however, lead to 
photographs of the two Generals shaking hands, though Churchill admits that 
looking back, these photo’s cannot be viewed without laughing.50 Eventually, the 
two Generals agreed to a limited joint declaration, espousing the need to reach a 
union quickly and for liaison between the two groups to achieve the liberation of 
France.51 Whilst this was not the best result, it was more progress than may have 
been expected, especially since at one point breaking with de Gaulle entirely was 
considered, and it was to be the catalyst for efforts over the following months to 
achieve the union of the two Generals. Or at least, until it was discovered shortly 
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afterwards that Roosevelt had signed documents which recognised, on behalf of 
the United States and Great Britain, “in the Commander-in-Chief [Giraud] … the 
right and duty of preserving all French interests . . . They bind themselves to aid 
him by all means in their power”.52 This was not well received by Harold 
Macmillan, the Resident Minister at Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers, who 
informed Eden, the latter passing this information to Churchill, who had no 
knowledge of the documents. After some consultation with Robert Murphy, 
Roosevelt’s minister to French North Africa, and the Foreign Office, Churchill was 
able to get the documents amended so they were essentially nullified, re-opening 
the door for continued efforts towards French unity. For Eden, it was a sharp 
reminder of the perils of letting America influence British foreign policy and, for 
once, he managed to encourage Churchill to deal with a problem which could 
have had serious implications for post-war France, not to mention British relations 
with de Gaulle and the Fighting French, and Churchill’s own relations with 
Roosevelt.     
 
With the conference behind him, Churchill was now free, after a protracted 
argument with his Cabinet,53 to travel around North Africa, and also visit Turkey 
in an effort to convince them of the need to enter the war alongside the allies. 
Whilst the meeting with the Turks did little to improve their willingness to enter 
the combat, one thing of interest did come out of Churchill’s visit, and that was his 
‘Morning Thoughts’.54 Having been requested to accompany Churchill on his 
travels, Cadogan noted that on 31 January Churchill had dictated his paper on the 
future of the world, and intended to present it to Ismet Inönü, the Turkish 
President. In spite of the Foreign Office’s recent work, Cadogan, noted that he 
“didn’t see anything much wrong with it”,55 perhaps showing a greater aversion 
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towards long term planning than his colleagues.56 When word of this reached the 
Foreign Office, however, they were not as sanguine. Given Churchill’s 
obstructions over post-war planning, it is unsurprising that offense was taken at 
the sudden appearance of these proposals. He provided no evidence he had 
caught the ‘Hare’ required for the recipe to be implemented, as the Germans had 
not yet surrendered at Stalingrad, and whilst the Torch landings had been 
successful it would still be several months until Rommel was defeated in North 
Africa. His proposals differed greatly from those produced by the Foreign Office, 
and which had been loosely agreed by the War Cabinet. Harvey was displeased by 
both these issues, and also that the document was not transmitted securely, so the 
Germans would probably have been able to see it.57 Similar concerns were raised 
by Jebb, who must have felt a particular sting given his involvement in the 
development of the plans. In a lengthy minute, he criticised Churchill’s method 
and his views, noting that they “differ fundamentally and indeed in most essential 
points from those of the Foreign Secretary. The only hopeful feature is that where 
the Prime Minister’s proposals are vague they are (like the Atlantic Charter) 
capable of being adapted to almost any concrete scheme for a world system that 
may eventually be approved by the Cabinet, and where they are specific are, to put 
it mildly, rather impracticable”.58 Not exactly a positive commentary, and one that 
time did little to mellow, as in his memoirs Jebb reproduces sections of this minute 
to support his critique of Churchill, using stronger language at points, though 
admitting at the end that “perhaps my feelings were too violent”.59 After this 
general criticism, Jebb’s minute proceeded to tackle ‘Morning Thoughts’ point by 
point, arguing against each one, though mentioning the odd crumb of comfort he 
found, such as the fact the victorious powers would remain armed.60 The most 
troubling sections of Churchill’s plan, according to Jebb, were the pseudo-revival 
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of the League of Nations, the super Versailles style peace conference at the end of 
the War, and an ill-defined European Government that could include Russia and 
Turkey.61 There was little contention over the contents of Jebb’s minute, though 
Cadogan held it up thinking it an over-reaction, and that whilst Jebb might be 
right, Churchill’s pronouncements wouldn’t do much harm.62 The idea that Jebb 
was right does not come across in Cadogan’s diary, however, as he notes that it 
was a “ridiculous minute”, and that even Eden did not feel it was as bad as Jebb 
was making out.63 So irritated was Cadogan by this, and his rather unpleasant 
return flight to England, that he suggested the “little quill-drivers” should “go 
abroad – and stay there”.64 This hope, or at least the first part of it, came true a 
month later, when Jebb accompanied Eden to Washington, ironically in place of 
Cadogan who was too ill to travel.  
Whilst Jebb’s outburst may have been over the top, ‘Morning Thoughts’ led 
to another diplomatic conundrum. Given that the Turks had the document, that 
the Germans had probably seen it, and Churchill had transmitted it to Roosevelt,65 
should it be communicated to the Russians? This was not controversial, but caused 
more debate than should have been necessary given the clauses of the Anglo-
Soviet Treaty, and it took several days for agreement to be reached. Warner, 
particularly after a conversation with Clark Kerr, who was home on leave, 
advocated showing the Russians, though ensuring they realised it was an 
unofficial document.66 Likewise Jebb felt that in the spirit of co-operation the 
Russians should be informed, suggesting it could be raised as part of the 
discussions that Clark Kerr had been authorised to conduct on his return to 
Moscow.67 Sargent, however, argued strongly that it was in the interests and spirit 
of Churchill’s mission that the document was not shown to the Russians, as it was 
specifically designed to try and bring Turkey into the war, a result felt less likely if 
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Moscow was informed of its contents.68 The issue was resolved a couple of days 
later, as Churchill decided to communicate ‘Morning Thoughts’ to Moscow, with 
suitable explanations.69 In reality, it seems the only difference between ‘Morning 
Thoughts’ and the Foreign Office concept was the detail of how certain things 
would be achieved. Both plans, as Charmley ascertained, presented a vision of 
Britain as a great power, and having achievements to show for the heavy exertions 
of the war effort.70 Whilst the plans may have given Britain different roles, both 
Eden and Churchill essentially saw Britain as the elder statesman, using its 
wisdom to guide the up and coming powers. For Eden, it was in shaping and 
running the United Nations, for Churchill it was as part of the Government of 
Europe. Whilst the plans differed in specifics, in essence they shared a common 
outlook and aim, that Britain would have an important role in the post-war world. 
With little more being said about ‘Morning Thoughts’, the Foreign Office was able 
to continue the development of its own plans, and also to prepare for Eden’s 
upcoming trip to Washington, but first it had to deal with the Russian fall out from 
Casablanca.  
 
On 26 January Churchill and Roosevelt sent a joint message to Stalin, 
informing him of the decisions made at Casablanca. The telegram set out the 
British and American strategy for the coming months, particularly forthcoming 
military operations to be undertaken against the Axis. It noted that the defeat of 
Germany was the priority; that every effort would be made to divert German 
forces away from the Russian front whilst sending Russia the maximum possible 
amount of supplies; that the allies intended to clear the Axis out of North Africa, 
open up the Mediterranean, and then conduct amphibious operations in the area; 
that troops would be concentrated in Britain ready to re-enter the continent of 
Europe; that the allied bomber offensive against Germany would be increased and 
to maintain the initiative in the Pacific against Japan.71 It also stated that both men 
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believed that “our ruling purpose is to bring to bear upon Germany and Italy the 
maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be physically applied” and that 
“these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring 
Germany to her knees in 1943”.72 Small wonder that Stalin’s initial reply was 
positive, as he made what appears a logical assumption, that these statements 
meant the allies would be launching a European Second Front in 1943.73 
Unfortunately, upon receiving the follow-up telegram74 with the additional 
information he had requested, he found it less to his liking, and his response 
reflected this. He bemoaned the delays both in North Africa, as well as in the 
suggested cross-channel invasion of France, and felt that these decisions had 
allowed Hitler to transfer more divisions to the Eastern Front.75 At the same time 
Eden received an account of an interview with Maisky, in which Maisky was 
critical of the Casablanca decisions, deeming them too vague, and felt Britain 
needed to act soon or risk leaving the impression that they had left Russia to win 
the war for them.76 Maisky had also badgered Churchill on this issue, taking him 
to task for the lack of preparation for a cross-channel operation, only to find that, 
to his surprise, the Americans had only transported one division to Britain since 
November, and that Churchill had no idea how many they may actually send to 
participate in a cross-channel operation.77 The communications between Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin on the Second Front question continued unsuccessfully, and 
despite their best efforts to placate him, Stalin was still unsatisfied with the lack of 
a Second Front. The communications were, however, overtaken by the 
postponement of the supply convoys, with Churchill, alone despite Roosevelt 
offering to send a supporting message,78 informed Stalin on 30 March that, owing 
to German naval concentrations around Narvik, it was too risky to send any 
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convoys via the northern route. He also bore the bad news that they could not be 
resumed until September, especially in light of the shipping required for Husky.79 
As on previous occasions when supply convoys were postponed, Stalin sent an 
angry telegram, complaining that the other allies were not pulling their weight, 
and that this “unexpected […] catastrophic cut in the delivery of strategic raw 
materials  […] cannot but affect the position of the Soviet troops”.80 The convoy 
issue proved to be only a brief distraction, however, as its significance was 
reduced somewhat by the German announcement of the war graves discovered at 
Katyn, in Poland, containing the bodies of thousands of Polish Officers murdered 
by the NKVD.81  
 
It was this backdrop that greeted Clark Kerr on his return to Moscow. As if 
returning to an unfriendly Russia wasn’t bad enough, he also had to deal with 
different directives as to his actions upon his arrival. His meeting with Churchill 
before he left London contained what is perhaps the most unusual directive given 
to an Ambassador, as when Churchill was asked for instruction by Clark Kerr, he 
responded “I don’t mind kissing Stalin’s bum, but I’m damned if I’ll lick his arse!”, 
Clark Kerr, showing his class, simply responded “Thank you, Prime Minister, now 
I quite understand”.82 He also received detailed instructions from Eden regarding 
the efforts he should make to engage the Russians in talks about the post-war 
world. They suggested that he should float the idea with the Russians of 
conversations on the whole field of post-war reconstruction, and particularly post-
war Europe, which it was felt did not require American input, using the positive 
nature of recent speeches by Stalin, particularly those referencing co-operation, as 
his way into such discussions.83 Once conversations had begun he was instructed 
to discuss a wide range of topics, including Germany, a Customs Union, Eastern 
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European Confederations and Poland.84 Despite the unfavourable political 
situation arising from Casablanca, Clark Kerr managed to make some progress. 
Very efficiently upon his return he engaged Molotov as per his instructions, and 
had a relatively successful talk, though seems to have scared Molotov by pointing 
out some disparity between a few of Stalin’s remarks towards Germany. As a 
result, the conversation was brought to an end, and upon receiving Clark Kerr’s 
account the Foreign Office minutes expressed surprise and pity that this question 
had frightened Molotov.85 That said, they expressed general approval at his 
approach, and his idea to put further questions in writing for Molotov to consider, 
even suggesting items that should (if not already) be covered by such written 
communication.86 Clark Kerr also met Stalin a few days later, and despite the 
difficult circumstances, appears to have gone on the offensive about his position as 
Ambassador, and the restrictions placed upon him which completely differed to 
the free role Maisky held in London. Stalin, according to the Ambassador’s report, 
was unimpressed by this approach, simply grunting occasionally, but was 
sufficiently moved by Clark Kerr’s argument to agree to help him gain greater 
access to people and institutions with whom and which he wanted to engage.87 So 
far, so good, and there were further positives to come, as Clark Kerr had another 
meeting with Molotov after seeing Stalin, where the two worked through more 
points from Eden’s directive, and had a discussion on three-power consultations. 
Whilst Molotov was unable to answer directly, Clark Kerr suggested his reply 
indicated that the Soviet Union would not be opposed to this idea, and that 
Molotov was rather surprised that the Russians had been approached on this 
subject before the Americans.88 Despite the positive response from the Foreign 
Office to his efforts – though now not to their form89 – the written response from 
Stalin to the letter submitted to Molotov drew Churchill’s attention to the 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, Clark Kerr to FO, record of his conversation with Molotov, 21 February 1943. 
86 Ibid, Unsent Foreign Office reply to Clark Kerr’s telegram of 21 February, Undated but associated 
minutes suggest circa 24 February 1943. 
87 TNA, Inverchapel Papers, FO 800/301, Clark Kerr to Warner, 28 February 1943. 
88 TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/ 35338, Clark Kerr to FO, 25 February 1943. 
89 Eden commented “What do we say to this?!” on Stalin’s written response to the letter from Clark 
Kerr to Molotov, and suggested that “we should have been wise to leave this alone”. Ibid. 
213 
proceedings, and with that the approach quickly ground to a halt. Clark Kerr was 
informed that he should stop his written correspondence on this issue, and not 
mention anything further about post-war discussions.90 Although trying to 
alleviate Churchill’s concern, Eden’s minute was conciliatory, apologising for the 
fact Clark Kerr had gone too far, but trying to suggest that this had been rectified, 
and that there had still been some positive responses.91 A letter from Warner to 
Clark Kerr served to further highlight the different viewpoint of Churchill when it 
came to anything beyond the war effort. He noted that whilst Eden had authorised 
the instructions to Clark Kerr, he had not informed the Prime Minister, who, upon 
finding out, “emitted a series of vicious screams from his sickbed and ordained 
that the whole subject of post-war matters should be dropped at once like the 
hottest of hot bricks”.92 Warner in particular felt “a great opportunity has thus 
been missed with the Russians”.93 Gillies argues that in taking this approach, the 
British actually gave the Soviets time, in the wake of their victory at Stalingrad, to 
formalise their own thinking, and without the restraints of tri-partite conversations 
or agreements, allowed them to exercise a relatively free hand in Eastern Europe.94 
The free hand being granted to the Soviets was further evidenced by the 
British attitude towards the Katyn Massacre. Whilst undoubtedly tragic, it was 
also a testament to the ability of Anglo-Soviet relations to take a firm hit and carry 
on. Given the close relations between Britain and Poland, especially since the 
Polish Government in Exile was residing in London and Britain had gone to war 
over Polish sovereignty, it would have been unsurprising had the British backed 
the Pole’s stance upon the discovery of the mass grave. As it was, despite the 
distaste at the discovery, and the general feeling that the Soviets were responsible, 
Eden, Churchill, Clark Kerr and others felt that military and political necessity 
made it a greater priority to maintain the Anglo-Soviet alliance than support the 
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Polish calls for a Red Cross investigation.95 Despite the Soviets breaking off 
relations with the Sikorski Government, relations with Britain remained stable, 
though for some the recognition that Britain had essentially endorsed a war crime 
because it had been committed by an ally was a painful pill to swallow.96 The lack 
of reference to this in Eden’s memoirs suggests unease at the topic as a whole, 
something Carlton picks up on,97 and is unsurprising given the efforts Eden had 
put into Anglo-Soviet relations. Churchill had no such qualms, it seems, as in May 
he was sending Stalin jokes about trading Poles for German and Italian soldiers, 
thinking it would amuse Stalin.98 This sort of interaction highlights that, despite 
the seriousness of Katyn, winning the war was the priority, so friendly relations 
continued. The Polish question remained unresolved, however, and would rumble 
on throughout the year. 
 
The American Mad House 
 
With de Gaulle back in London, Clark Kerr back in Moscow, and Churchill 
home and sufficiently recovered from his post-Casablanca pneumonia to take over 
the Foreign Office, Eden was at last able to embark on his much delayed trip to 
Washington. This would be Eden’s first meeting with Roosevelt since 1938, and his 
first visit to Washington since becoming Foreign Secretary. That he visited 
Moscow before Washington may be a telling sign of his exclusion from the Anglo-
American relationship, but it was a pleasant opportunity for him to attempt to 
rekindle some of the positive feeling he held for America during his last visit, a 
feeling that had been gradually replaced by suspicion during the course of the 
war. The visit, long hoped for by the Foreign Office,99 was an opportunity for Eden 
to discuss key issues for British relations with the United States, most notably the 
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situation with France and the field of post-war planning. As there are lots of 
accounts of Eden’s visit – undoubtedly one of the highlights of his time in office – 
this examination will focus on specific ideas, rather than the broad sweep of the 
visit, and look particularly at the difficulty of dealing with the Americans, and the 
discussions about France, Russia and post-war organisation.100 One interesting 
point that will become relevant in the next chapter is that Cadogan fell ill a few 
days before travelling, so Jebb was selected to replace him. Whilst in Washington 
Jebb and Strang, who was also accompanying Eden, held many conversations with 
members of the State Department on post-war topics, particularly armaments, 
Germany, collaboration with Russia and a proposed United Nations Armistice 
Commission,101 and the knowledge gained from these discussions would shape 
some of Jebb’s future ideas.   
After an uneventful, though uncomfortable flight, the British arrived in 
Washington, where they were greeted by Halifax and Sumner Welles. Notably 
Winant, who had returned to Washington for Eden’s visit, had not met the party 
upon arrival, as, in the first example of the complications of American political 
dealings Welles refused to tell Winant where Eden would be landing, in revenge 
for Winant being invited to the first dinner between Roosevelt and Eden.102 This 
trend was to continue throughout the visit, with different people attending 
different meetings, though notably Hopkins seems to have attended most of 
them.103 Harvey makes reference in his diary to the role of Hopkins, seeing him as 
the “éminence grise” of the President, and states that “he does everything here. He 
is like the secretary to the Cabinet, the private secretary to the President and 
general coordinator all in one”.104 This made him a useful ally, as he was friendly 
to Britain, and always encouraging of Eden during the visit. Eden also recalled the 
usefulness of Hopkins, and the number of times he was involved in the various 
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discussions.105 That Hopkins carried out such a role was incredibly beneficial to the 
British, especially given the divisions in the American policy process. Eden 
remembered how “There was a strange dichotomy in the conduct of American 
foreign affairs, the President preferring to work through Sumner Welles, yet 
having regard for his Secretary of State’s authority”.106 He also noted how Welles 
was not invited to parties thrown by Hull, and that he only saw them together 
once, at his most formal meeting with Roosevelt, when both men were 
accompanied by their advisors.107 This division led to Eden confiding in Harvey 
that “it is all rather like a mad house” here, and he felt “more at home in the 
Kremlin. There at least they meant business”.108 That this was the American 
manner, as Thorpe suggests, goes some way to explain why the British had 
difficulty dealing with the Americans when it came to something other than direct 
correspondence with Roosevelt.109 As Churchill occupied this channel, the Foreign 
Office almost always had to deal with the slower and far less coordinated State 
Department. Harvey recalled Hopkins telling Eden that Roosevelt, Hull and 
Welles would all have different viewpoints, so it is easy to see why, particularly on 
difficult issues such as France, where Britain held different views to the 
Americans, there was very rarely any agreement.  
The ‘mad house’ did have its advantages though, as Eden was able to spend 
plenty of time in discussion with Roosevelt, free from the drama of the Hull – 
Welles relationship. It was in these conversations that the real purpose of his visit 
could be discussed, and both parties could expatiate on the topic of post-war 
considerations. Eden had been hoping for this visit for some time, and saw it as an 
opportunity to outflank Churchill and the Cabinet by demonstrating how far 
ahead the Americans were, and push them to finally allow the Foreign Office to 
really set to the task of fully defining Britain’s post-war role.110 Eden was pleased 
to find that, on many aspects, he and Roosevelt were broadly in agreement. Both 
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saw the necessity for an American world role after the war, both agreed in 
principle to a four-power council at the head of a World Organisation, and both 
agreed on the need to deal sufficiently with Germany to prevent it becoming a 
threat in the future.111 There were some differences, however, as Eden still felt 
China was not suitable for a role as a great power,112 and was concerned about how 
the liberated countries would be run, preferring the reinstatement of the 
Governments in exile or other civil authorities, rather than Roosevelt’s suggestion 
that they should initially be run by the allied liberating forces.113 He found that 
Hull and Welles were also, separately, forthcoming on the post-war topic. Hull 
expressed the view that “the future of the world depended on our ability to 
understand each other, and to work together in collaboration with Russia” and 
that it was imperative to avoid another “Wilson Fiasco”,114 while Welles put 
forward a similar idea to Roosevelt’s of a four power executive committee at the 
head of the United Nations, with regional structures underneath, and a general 
assembly where all powers could be represented.115 On reporting his visit to the 
War Cabinet, Eden certainly presented a positive light when it came to outlining 
the conceptions for a post-war World Organisation, suggesting that “he saw little 
in this lay-out in which our ideas differed from those of the President”, and he was 
encouraged by the fact that Roosevelt saw the need for wider discussions with 
representatives of other nations on such an important topic, rather than Britain and 
America simply agreeing this amongst themselves.116 
Equally as encouraging for Eden were the discussions about Russia. Having 
previously been averse to the idea of an agreement with Russia that incorporated a 
decision on their western frontiers, Eden was pleased, and rather surprised, to find 
the President willing to agree to the Soviet frontier demands, having accepted that 
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there would be little that could be done to turn her out of the Baltic states,117 
though Hopkins records of a later conversation suggest otherwise.118 He was also 
reassured by Roosevelt’s suggestion that proper consultation was needed between 
Britain, the United States and Russia, particularly on issues such as Poland, as this 
would help alleviate Russian fears of an Anglo-American conspiracy, and would 
demonstrate the willingness of the powers to work together, especially as 
Roosevelt seemed to have accepted the Russian idea of territorial change for 
Poland.119 It seems Eden was also able to alleviate some of the American fears of 
working with the Russians. He was asked by Roosevelt what he thought about the 
concern that Russia intended to communise all of Europe after the war. Whilst 
noting that no definite view could be given, Eden replied that even if this was the 
Soviet intention, though he did not believe it was, “we should make the position 
no worse by trying to work with Russia”120 and that “one of the best ways of 
avoiding this was [...] to keep on good terms with Russia”.121 These ideas, Eden 
reported to the Cabinet, gained general agreement, and Roosevelt suggested that 
he would try and ensure better communication with Russia in the future.122  
On the subject of France, however, there was significantly less agreement. 
This was raised during Eden’s first dinner with the President, and persisted to the 
press conference after he had left for Canada. Eden faced most hostility from Hull, 
and recorded in a telegram to Churchill how Hull “unburdened himself of his 
grievances”, which mostly revolved around the fact the British Press, and the Free 
French, had criticised his pro-Vichy policy.123 Given that both the United States and 
Britain were democracies with free speech, it is odd that Hull expected people who 
opposed his view not to criticise his policy, though his complaint was largely 
because the British had acquiesced, albeit reluctantly, to the American policy of 
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maintaining contact. Eden did his best to convince Hull that the British public felt 
no sympathy for Vichy and that no matter what anybody said this wouldn’t 
change, and while not stating the following outright, it seems the implication was 
that their attitude certainly would not change because a few Americans were 
unhappy about press coverage.124 He reported to the Cabinet that Hull’s insistence 
on this line was due to his hatred of de Gaulle, something that would certainly 
explain American policy towards France. Despite the rather frustrating exchange 
of views, Eden wrote in his memoirs that he liked Hull, and confided to Hopkins 
that, whilst he was difficult to talk to and obsessed with the problems of the Free 
French, the two men saw eye to eye on the major world problems.125 Eden was to 
find similar difficulty over France when talking to Roosevelt. Here he found 
British policies decidedly at odds with the views of the President, who favoured a 
more opportunistic policy based on dealing with individuals, and taking different 
approaches in different areas, such as the French Pacific colonies.126 This was in 
conflict with the British policy, which was to work with a single, unified French 
authority.127 There was also contention over the American idea to rank France as a 
lower class power by treating her in much the same way as any other liberated 
European power, and not allowing her a position of prominence in the World 
Organisation, or even its European aspects, something which Eden felt was overly 
harsh, and would raise strong opposition.128 This point in Eden’s telegram 
prompted the response from Churchill that “A proposal to rank France lower than 
China even in matters affecting Europe, and to subjugate all Europe after 
disarmament to the four powers, would certainly provoke lively discussion. I feel 
sure that whilst listening politely you have given no countenance to such ideas. 
You were quite right to protest about France”.129 So Eden was, as Harvey put it, 
between the hammer and the anvil – on the one hand the Americans were pushing 
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a multifaceted and non-committal policy towards France, on the other Churchill 
was praising him for standing up for France, yet at home frustrating Eden for 
trying to aid de Gaulle and the Fighting French.130 The differences over France 
were strong enough that they gave Eden reason to doubt the likely success of 
future Anglo-American co-operation.131 Perhaps Hull’s hatred of de Gaulle caused 
Roosevelt to be dismissive towards the Fighting French, or maybe Roosevelt 
genuinely thought France was defeated and there was no need for de Gaulle 
continuing to have a presence and act like a national hero, but either way the 
American attitude hadn’t to this point, and wouldn’t prove to ever, really warm to 
de Gaulle, or the British efforts to see a unified French organisation keeping them 
in the war. Perhaps the championing of Giraud was a sign that America were 
trying to ensure that post-war France had a Vichy style Government, which would 
transfer its subservience to the United States.132 Whatever the reasoning, this 
attitude showed a complete lack of understanding of French national feeling, and 
could explain why the Americans never understood the strength and importance 
of de Gaulle.  
On the whole, and certainly at a personal level, the visit was considered a 
success. Eden had made many useful and significant contacts, and built up good 
relations with key personnel, most notably Roosevelt. Harvey commented that 
“Roosevelt is developing a passion for A.E.” and later that Eden had made a 
personal friend of the President.133 Halifax and Hopkins both sent messages to 
Churchill informing him of the success of the visit, with Halifax stating that “from 
the first, he clicked with everyone from the president downwards, both in private 
and public. He has never put a foot wrong […] I am sure that his visit, both from 
the short-term and long-term point of view, has been immensely useful”.134 Those 
historians who have studied this visit come to similar conclusions, though make a 
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point of noting where there was division, and evidence Eden’s report to the 
Cabinet, where Eden highlighted the difficulties faced as well as the political 
achievements. Given the potential for Eden and Roosevelt to be working together 
as Heads of State, helping run and maintain the post-war peace they were 
currently trying to shape (at this point nobody knew Roosevelt would not live to 
see the peace, that the Conservatives would be beaten in the 1945 election, or, for 
that matter, that Churchill wouldn’t relinquish the reins until 1955), it was very 
important that the two developed a strong relationship.135 This must also have 
given Eden confidence to return to London and press forward with his efforts to 
shape the World Organisation, and bring to an early end some of the disputes 
already flaring relating to post-war issues.  
  
Whilst it can not be definitely stated that the allies would have worked 
together after the war had a different course been pursued up to this point, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that, had certain decisions been different, there would 
have been more goodwill and respect amongst the allied powers, and that they 
could have worked together. Most notably had there been a decision at Casablanca 
that the priority was a cross-channel invasion of Europe rather than Husky, the 
British would have been saved some of Stalin’s wrath, and equally could have 
been on stronger ground when it came to negotiations with the Russians over 
strategic direction, and post-war issues such as the Polish frontiers. They would 
also have found Stalin more co-operative, as, to put it simply, the British would be 
able to quote combat figures to prove they were actually shouldering their share of 
the war effort. Likewise had Churchill left the Foreign Office to develop its foreign 
policy, without putting the brakes on, or leaping off on his own tangents, it is 
likely that this would have been further forward by the time Eden went to 
Washington, and potentially some agreements could have been reached that may 
have allowed the process of fully forming the United Nations to have begun in 
1943, rather than late 1944. It seems unlikely that any progress could have actually 
been made on the French problems, as despite negotiations it is doubtful that de 
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Gaulle would ever have subjugated himself to Giraud. That said, had Hull been 
able to let go of his vendetta against de Gaulle, and the Americans been prepared, 
as they reluctantly were later in the year, to consider France as an important power 
and work with a single, unified administration, a good deal of the difficulty in 
Anglo-American relations could have been alleviated, allowing them to 
concentrate on bigger issues, and the prosecution of the war. Likewise, some of the 
difficulty of dealing with America could have been eased had Churchill not 
believed so fervently in his relationship with Roosevelt, and put its maintenance 
above British strategic requirements. Had he been willing to stand by de Gaulle all 
the while, his uncountable persuasive oratory skill could well have helped swing 
American opinion more behind de Gaulle, possibly allowing for either an earlier 
French union, or even better for the British, a unified allied backing of de Gaulle 
and the Fighting French. Obviously little is gained by dwelling anymore on 
conjecture, but given the more limited coverage of the development of this strain 
of foreign policy, it is important to see that there were alternatives to the course 
that was followed, and that these alternatives could have yielded results, some of 
which could have been more satisfactory than those that were actually achieved. 
These ‘what-ifs’ will remain apparent during the following chapter, where it can 
certainly be seen that events could well have been allowed to follow a different 
course.   
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11) The Foreign Office’s Finest Hour? 
 
Having had success during his visit to Washington, Eden was eager to try 
and build on this, though there were still many difficulties to negotiate. For the 
Foreign Office, Churchill’s forthcoming visit to Washington to discuss military 
strategy in light of Torch and early successes with Husky offered an opportunity 
to make some progress on foreign policy without the interference of the Prime 
Minister, or at least ensuring he was as far away as possible to make Cabinet 
discussions smoother. Whilst some progress was made, most of 1943 was to be 
spent dealing with the persistent French drama, which became a major headache 
for the Department, particularly due to the continued interference of Roosevelt. 
With Allied military success in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front, and 
private meetings on strategy between Roosevelt and Churchill, came further 
Russian demands for a second front, as well as displeasure at being left out of the 
loop, making Eden’s calls for tripartite conversations, and the Foreign Office plans 
for the future seem all the more urgent. These issues were all to come to a head 
during the great conferences at the end of 1943, at Quebec, Moscow and Tehran, 
each having important consequences for the war, and the peace.   
 
Eden had taken Jebb and Strang with him to Washington in March, and 
whilst he was consulting the President, they were busy holding detailed 
discussions with American Officials from the State Department, and also the 
American Advisory Committee on post-war foreign policy.1 Here they were able to 
discover more fully American views on certain topics, particularly post-war 
armaments, and the future of Germany. It seems Roosevelt’s suggestion that only 
the Four Powers should be armed was not a widely shared view, as this was, 
amongst other things, economically impractical, and that opinion was moving 
towards an international police force.2 It was also discovered that the Americans 
                                                 
1 James Dunn, Ray Atherton and Norman Davis in particular, State Department Adviser on 
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had no firm views about Germany and on certain topics, such as German 
dismemberment, the range of views was quite varied. Despite the President 
favouring it, as he told Eden, it seems the Chiefs of Staffs and Hull were uncertain 
as to its merit,3 and there was, equally, disagreement about zones of occupation, 
though discussion of this topic was ahead of the Foreign Office, who had only 
moved as far as accepting that Germany would have to be occupied.4 Jebb took the 
opportunity in these discussions to raise an idea he had, which was for the creation 
of a United Nations Commission for Armistice and Post-Armistice Problems,5 
which was received favourably and considered worthy of further study.6 The idea 
was to co-ordinate the armistice work of the three powers to create unified plans 
both for armistice terms and for the restoration of order in Europe. All agreed that 
this would provide a strong opportunity to involve the Russians, and show them 
that Britain and America were willing to continue working with them into the 
peace.7 Unlike Eden, Jebb was not engaged for the entirety of the visit, and was 
able to spend time working on his latest revision to his post-war planning work.  
Building on the ‘United Nations Plan’, ‘Suggestions for a Peace Settlement’ 
took note of comments made on its predecessor, and the American views 
encountered during the conversations in Washington. The plan, running at a 
tangent to its predecessors, removed some of the more British focussed sections in 
favour of more generalised statements, and rephrased sections so their terms were 
“more acceptable to the Americans”.8 This appears to have occurred for two 
reasons. Firstly, Jebb was easily influenced by American opinion where it was 
along similar lines to his own, and thus felt this should be incorporated into the 
Foreign Office work; and second, after Eden’s visit there seemed a strong prospect 
of America being involved in some form of World Organisation. Given the Foreign 
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Office’s aim was to get the Cabinet to approve a policy so Eden could begin 
consultation with the Americans and the Russians, it made sense to have a draft 
that was relatively acceptable to two of the powers right off the bat. Some notable 
differences between the ‘United Nations Plan’ and the ‘Suggestions’ plan included 
a new clause referencing the Atlantic Charter, the removal of statements about 
British goals, the redefinition of the roles of the Executive Committee of the World 
Organisation and an expanded role for the United Nations Commission for 
Europe.9 There was one notable omission from ’Suggestions’, as it contained no 
reference to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which was a key feature of previous plans.10 
Whilst these changes did little to alter the overall theme and guiding aims of the 
plan, they were subtle nods to Britain ceding ground to America in post-war 
planning. Given the American conception was so similar (in part as the British 
Four Power conception had been borrowed from America to start with), it was felt 
this was not a problem. Jebb suggested that some sections that were less aligned to 
American thinking had been left vague so they could be more easily “reconciled 
with President Roosevelt’s views” without the British having to make sacrifices, 
and the suggestion that the organisation would be provisional until it was proved 
to work offered flexibility for future changes if required.11 The paper did not make 
it past draft form, as at a meeting the next month between Eden, Cadogan, Jebb, 
Sargent, Strang, Harvey and Malkin, post-war thinking was overtaken by 
Cadogan’s suggestion for the need to focus on the particular machinery required 
for dealing with the practical issues that would arise after the war regarding the 
agreement and implementation of armistice terms.12 Cadogan felt agreement with 
the Americans and Russians on these matters was the priority, and if it were 
achieved it would allow for the easier formation of other machinery.13 It was thus 
agreed that the Dominions would be consulted over the ‘Suggestions’ paper in an 
effort to understand how they would fit into the scheme, but that attention would 
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focus on the drafting of a Cabinet paper dealing with the creation of a United 
Nations Commission for Europe.  
The paper, rather swiftly compiled by the Economic and Reconstruction 
Department, was based on the lines Jebb had discussed for such a commission in 
Washington, and was circulated to the War Cabinet on 25 May, though it appears 
not to have been considered until mid-June, by which time Churchill had returned 
from Washington. Its central theme was that: “There should be established a 
supervisory body entitled "United Nations Commission for Europe," composed of 
high-ranking political representatives of the three major Allies, of France and the 
minor European Allies, and possibly of any Dominion prepared to contribute to 
the policing of Europe. The Commission should be situated at some convenient 
point on the Continent. The Commission would act as the supreme United Nations 
authority in Europe to direct and co-ordinate the activities of the several Armistice 
Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and any United Nations civilian 
authorities that may be established; and to deal with current problems, military, 
political, and economic, connected with the maintenance of order. A "Steering 
Committee," consisting of the representatives of the three major Allies and of 
France, if she recovers her greatness, should be established as the directing body of 
the Commission”.14 It was considered that, by undertaking such a commitment, 
harmony could be achieved between the three allies, the danger of Russia 
concluding separate armistices would be reduced, and it would, for the time being, 
avoid awkward topics such as the future of Germany being discussed, requiring 
only an acceptance of great power co-operation for consultation to begin.15 The 
Cabinet, including a notably quiet Churchill, agreed to the general lines of this 
paper, save for the section on the Occupation of Germany which they felt required 
further examination, and instructed Eden to make an informal approach to Winant 
and Maisky as a first step, which he did in early July.16  
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With the process started on the Commission, attention turned once more to 
the wider plan for peace and world organisation, made necessary by Churchill’s 
recent trip to Washington. Despite the conference being concerned with military 
strategy, Churchill hosted a lunch party at the British Embassy on 22 May where 
he held forth on the structure of the post-war settlement, and later presented a 
record of this conversation to the War Cabinet.17 His views, although moving 
closer to those of Eden, were still further away than those of the State Department 
and America more generally. Whilst there was less adverse reaction to this latest 
round of interference, Jebb and Webster were put out.18 It is also interesting that 
Halifax sent Eden a letter from Washington about Britain’s position in the future 
Churchill was proposing, noting his concerns that “the British outlook … might 
easily be swamped” by the strength and dominance of America in such an Anglo-
American partnership.19 Eden and Jebb concurred, and work continued on the 
World Organisation, rather than Churchill’s ideas, though Jebb did find time to 
write a satirical paper critiquing Churchill’s views, entitled ‘Early Morning 
Thoughts’. This paper set out the extreme of anti-Foreign Office views, with 
suggestions for a merged Anglo-American Empire, run by the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff from Washington, Councils of Europe, Asia and the Americas all subservient 
to this, and a boycott of Russia.20 Jebb, however, makes a serious point when 
looking back, and realising that the reality of Europe by 1948 was far closer to the 
suggestions in this paper than any official plan, and stating that the reality of Cold 
War, a world ideologically divided between its two Superpowers, was exactly 
what the Foreign Office had been trying to avoid.21 Worryingly, the same 
sentiments were to be found in Churchill’s speech, given at Harvard after the 
Quebec conference later in the year, showing how out of step Churchill’s views 
still were with those of the Foreign Office, and how little awareness he appeared to 
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have of the likely impact of such a vision on the post-war world.22 In hindsight one 
could argue that this showed Churchill’s greater awareness of the Russian danger, 
but this ignores the fact that, if Britain sided with America and left Russia out, it 
would have increased Russian concerns and their historic suspicion of the Anglo-
Saxon powers. Given the concern Russia had shown to this point of being 
excluded, such a situation would make a post-war division more likely than 
attempts to work with Russia and resolve some of the concerns.  
Despite this interlude, the ‘Suggestions’ plan was revised once again, and re-
titled The ‘United Nations Plan for Organising Peace and Welfare’ (though the last 
two words were dropped when presented to the Cabinet). This dealt with the 
suggestions made by Churchill in Washington, the concerns raised in the 
Armistice and Related Problems memorandum and also took onboard advice from 
Webster, whose close relationship with Jebb meant he had a strong influence on 
the shape of this and future papers. His expert knowledge of Castlereagh, the 
Congress of Vienna and the Paris Peace Conference made him an incredibly 
suitable academic to advise the Foreign Office on post-war planning, something 
which could add weight to the notion that the Department was actually being very 
clever, and learning from the past how best to cope with the future. Jebb 
considered it “much improved” from the ‘Four Power Plan’, combining the best of 
the previous plans, opinions from America and Webster, and managing to vaguely 
include a Council of Europe in an effort to show some compromise with 
Churchill’s views.23 Greenwood noted how the influence of Webster, though a 
Great Power man like Jebb, gave the plan a new level of innovation and 
sophistication, allowing it to remain a Great Power plan, but appear to give voice 
to the smaller powers through an Assembly and with a Secretariat to organise 
regular meetings.24 He also proposed the need for Judicial and Arbitral machinery, 
such as a World Court.25 This conclusion was also reached by Reynolds and 
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Hughes, whose work on Webster shows that he was actively involved in the work 
of the Foreign Office before the formal creation of the Foreign Office Research 
Department in April 1943, and they note that his “deeper understanding of the 
problems of international organizations and a greater sensitivity to the feelings of 
smaller powers” meant his note on Jebb’s draft was taken seriously, and led to 
amendments being made before the paper was presented to the Cabinet.26  
 
The paper was circulated to the Cabinet on 7 July, though it was never 
discussed. Instead, Churchill proposed that it and similar ‘post-war’ memoranda, 
including one of his own, should be considered by a small Cabinet Committee, 
which would then report to the War Cabinet.27 Unfortunately, this never happened 
as, by September, the Committee had stopped meeting, probably due to the 
decisions made at Quebec, though on 5 August and 11 August it did discuss the 
paper, and suggested it should be taken as the basic statement on foreign policy.28 
The paper, in its new and slightly expanded form, was an incredibly detailed piece 
of work, and is worth examining despite its lack of progress beyond a Cabinet sub-
committee.29 Unlike previous plans, the new plan set itself against the Atlantic 
Charter, and the clause relating to this is interesting, as it highlights the dichotomy 
of British foreign policy planning: “The principles embodied in the Charter will be 
the basis of any international world order after the war. But they will need to be 
applied and interpreted so as to provide definitely both for a world security 
system and for world economic arrangements”.30 This statement shows British 
adherence to the Atlantic Charter, but also their belief that it should be interpreted 
vaguely so as not to upset world security or the world economy. In other words 
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this is a suggestion that the British, as Churchill had asserted previously, didn’t 
think the Charter applied to them in its full terms, and that whilst its principles 
were sound, its universal application was not considered beneficial. From this 
point it followed a similar structure to the previous plans, with a General 
Considerations section analysing the need for international co-operation and a 
body to replace the League of Nations; the status and duties of the World Powers, 
and the potential ranking of other powers including France and the Axis powers 
and the structure and function of a World Organisation.31 This was followed by a 
section examining the Economic and Social Considerations to be taken into 
account, including relief and reconstruction and the development of backward 
countries, then sections examining how the plan would be applied, firstly in 
Europe but also in the Far East.32 It finished with a section espousing the ideal view 
of the World Organisation, covering a discussion of regionalism and regional 
defence systems, where the colonial structures would fit, representation of the 
smaller states and methods for organising meetings and communications of the 
organisation.33  
The plan in this form offered new suggestions to the previous version, some 
of which were courtesy of Webster, others a result of increased work on armistice 
problems and responses relating to previous papers. Included in this revision was 
a more detailed assessment of the functions of the World Council: which in essence 
were to smooth friction between the World Powers, and to take such dispositions 
as required to maintain peace within the general security system; together with a 
provision for inclusion of smaller Powers both by regional elections, and for 
consultation where their interests were directly involved.34 This paper also 
contained a new expanded clause on armaments, which was particularly 
interesting given it was designed to cover the small powers, whose allowance 
would be determined by their level of usefulness during the war and in 
maintaining the peace, but was also supposed to apply to the World Powers too. It 
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is hard to imagine the Soviet Union, or some of the smaller Powers, agreeing to 
have their allocations dictated too them by the World Council.35 The increased 
examination of Armistice Problems meant the plan also made greater reference to 
the idea of a United Nations Commission for Europe, with emphasis placed on its 
role in controlling and administering Germany after the war, and even suggested 
that it may eventually morph into a Council of Europe with the caveat that Britain, 
the Soviet Union and the United States would have to be represented to prevent its 
dominance by Germany.36 Similar considerations would also be applied to the Far 
East.37 Its final section was also expanded from previous plans, offering a more 
detailed idea of the whole concept of a World Organisation, and this was the area 
where Webster’s influence was most notable. This section now allowed for 
regional groupings, but was worded so as to prevent the creation of spheres of 
influence by the World Powers, and also provided a clearer idea of how the 
regional structures would work in the system with a general Assembly and a 
World Council. The ‘Four Power Plan’ would still be the heart of any system, but it 
was now a broader and more open system, making it harder to criticise the World 
Powers for dictating the peace, though that, in effect, was what they would be 
doing, at least initially.38 On top of these major changes, there were other, smaller 
ones, such as the inclusion of Judicial and Arbitral Machinery; a greater 
examination of post-war Economic and Social Considerations, and a clearer 
statement of post-war status of Germany, Japan and Italy.39  
It is a great shame that more attention was not paid to this plan, as not only 
was it detailed and thorough, it was an incredibly visionary piece, setting out a 
structure and method by which peace could be maintained after the war. In fact, 
given the way the United Nations would develop, many of the ideas set out in this 
paper were to become part of the United Nations Charter, agreed upon in 1945 but 
                                                 
35 Ibid, Section A, Paragraph 7. 
36 Ibid, Section C. 
37 Ibid, Section D. 
38 Ibid, Section E. 
39 Ibid, Sections A and B. 
232 
based on proposals discussed in 1944.40 Jebb said of his ‘Four Power Plan’ that it 
“served as an essential basis for the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, out of which 
emerged, largely unscathed, the eventual charter of the United Nations”.41 Whilst 
Greenwood notes that this was an exaggeration as the plan, at that stage, 
contained barely a shadow of how any proposed organisation could function, had 
Jebb made this statement about the ‘United Nations Plan for Organising Peace’, 
such an accusation would be significantly harder to level.  
 
The study of these plans is important, not least because very few others seem 
to have felt this necessary or relevant to studies, either of the Second World War, 
the formation of the United Nations, or the history of European integration or 
collaboration. They show that important work was happening in the Foreign 
Office, in collaboration with staff in the State Department, towards the 
achievement of a system for preserving peace at the end of the War. Reynolds 
suggests that the post-war efforts were intrinsically flawed due to the uncertain 
future of the Soviet Union, but makes this statement looking back through the 
medium of the Cold War.42 Taking this stand, such efforts would seem in vain and 
thus unworthy of serious study, potentially explaining his comment in an earlier 
work that no serious planning for peace or the future of Germany took place until 
summer 1943.43 Looking from 1943, where victory had been secured in North 
Africa, where Stalin had broken the German offensive, first at Stalingrad and then 
at Kursk, and where Italy was close to collapse under increasing allied military 
operations, these plans cannot be regarded as insignificant. Jebb noted the 
difficulty of co-ordination by telegrams and indeterminable minutes, and the 
concern that, without some form of integrated plan amongst the allied powers, 
further difficulties would arise, such as over Italian armistice plans, hence Eden’s 
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paper to the War Cabinet in May. Roosevelt was talking about Four Powers and an 
international police force, Stalin had made positive references to collaboration and 
had signed the Alliance with Britain, so the prospects of continued collaboration 
did not seem beyond the realms of possibility, especially as nothing in the Foreign 
Office plans contradicted, to their knowledge, anything Stalin thought or had 
stated on the topic.44 It was hoped that such schemes, if enacted, would also 
provide a means to deal with difficult topics, such as Poland, that could hamper 
allied relations, and thus they seemed like a productive method for improving 
allied collaboration and co-operation during the war, and making the Grand 
Alliance a genuine diplomatic alliance, rather than a militarily convenient one. 
Britain had been urged in 1941 and 1942 to take the lead on post-war planning, 
particularly regarding Europe,45 and these plans show that the Foreign Office 
made a very good effort at making this a reality.   
 
A Special Brand of Obstinacy 
 
These plans were not developed in isolation, work taking place alongside the 
attempted unification of the French groups into one movement, a battle that was to 
occupy Eden for much of 1943, despite the promise shown at the end of the 
Casablanca Conference. Negotiations between the two French Generals continued 
for some time, with neither willing to make concessions. No general agreement 
was reached, but in March the French National Committee presented a proposal to 
Giraud, suggesting the fusion of the two movements should be based on a 
repudiation of the armistice; the restoration of fundamental freedoms; the 
reestablishment of republican forms of Government and an assurance that nothing 
would be done to prejudice the eventual decision to be made by the French people 
                                                 
44 TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/32918. File contains several reports and memorandum from 
the end of 1942 detailing Russian attitudes to the Post-War settlement, War aims, France and 
confederations. TNA, Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/36992 contains similar documents from 1943. 
45 Barker, Churchill and Eden, pp. 214-215, Greenwood, S. Britain and European cooperation since 1945, 
(Oxford, 1992), p. 7, Eden, Reckoning, p. 341. 
234 
with regard to their elected Government.46 Giraud initially rejected this, though 
later made a speech which essentially accepted these clauses, and followed this by 
inviting de Gaulle to Algiers.47 The War Cabinet, encouraged in Eden’s absence by 
Law, considered this a good basis for agreement, and both Hull and Churchill 
made positive statements about the speech.48 Thus only issues of personality, 
rather than policy, remained, but eventually, with efforts from Catroux, Macmillan 
and Jean Monnet,49 the two Generals moved closer to an agreement. In April de 
Gaulle reported to Eden that the French National Committee and Catroux had 
reached two proposals for communication to Giraud, both of which were 
acceptable to him. These would allow for a union of Giraud and de Gaulle, 
whereby Giraud could maintain his role of Commander-in-Chief, but assume no 
political role, or should he prefer a political role, he and de Gaulle would be co-
Chairs of the Committee.50 De Gaulle suggested that he envisaged a reconstituted 
National Committee, with Giraud and himself as equal members, and including 
some of Giraud’s collaborators such as Monnet.51 These were considered positive 
proposals by Eden, who had seen Churchill earlier that day and gained his 
acquiescence to recognise a committee formed along the lines proposed by de 
Gaulle.52 Cadogan remained suspicious, however, and there are several references 
in his diary around this time to the notion that Catroux may have been double 
crossing de Gaulle.53 After initially rejecting these proposals, Giraud changed his 
mind, and was prepared to accept Cabinet collective responsibility and joint 
presidency, though not the expulsion of ex-Vichy figures or the subordination of 
the military to the civil structure.54 An outburst from de Gaulle quickly followed a 
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meeting with Churchill, almost resulting in the resignations of Catroux and René 
Massigli,55 and Giraud threatened to break off relations, but the day was saved by 
Macmillan and Murphy who convinced everyone to calm down, and helped draft 
a response from Giraud.56 Catroux, was, therefore, able to bring news in May that 
Giraud would be happy to come to an agreement with de Gaulle.57 
Unfortunately, this was timed perfectly to coincide with the arrival from 
Churchill of a large and dubiously packaged American spanner, a gift courtesy of 
Roosevelt and Hull, who saw de Gaulle being afforded a chance of prominence, 
and thus felt the need for a dramatic over-reaction. Unlike their previous visitor, 
Churchill, in Washington for strategic discussions, proved far more willing to 
listen to, and more worryingly agree with, American anti-Gaullist protestations. 
The unimportance of France and French policy to Churchill is demonstrated by the 
singular paragraph he devotes to the American protestations and his conflict with 
the Cabinet during this visit, and this is only a paraphrasing of the telegram he 
sent to the War Cabinet.58 On 21 May, the day Catroux brought the news from 
Giraud, Churchill gave in to the persistent nagging of the President and sent the 
War Cabinet a strongly worded telegram on the de Gaulle situation. Calling de 
Gaulle a “marplot and mischief-maker” Churchill felt he had “missed his market 
in North Africa”, that he was “absorbed in his own personal career which depends 
on a vain endeavour to make himself the arbiter of the conduct of all Frenchmen” 
and that we should now “eliminate de Gaulle as a political force”.59 The telegram 
suggested that he should be prevented from going to North Africa so he couldn’t 
squabble with Giraud or the ex-Vichyites, and also referred to several complaints 
against de Gaulle, one of which was his supposed plan to assassinate Giraud.60 The 
War Cabinet appear to have found this tirade, and its associated memoranda 
essentially ridiculous, and the meeting spent little time discussing Churchill’s 
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point of view. Contrary to Barker’s suggestion that this was the first occurrence of 
Eden rallying the Cabinet against Churchill in his absence (a statement she 
contradicts within a few sentences),61 the Cabinet again rallied against Churchill, 
and the meeting focussed on critiquing the American position, and drafting three 
separate responses to Churchill dealing “effectively with the odds and ends 
brought up against de Gaulle”.62 The telegrams addressed all the flimsy slights 
Churchill and the Americans had raised, reminded them of the firm agreements in 
place, and also highlighted the practical difficulties which would be experienced if 
they broke with de Gaulle.63 It was the Cabinet’s considered opinion, they 
informed him, that the American policy towards France was and had been 
consistently wrong, that they were continuing to pressure for the removal of de 
Gaulle to mask this fact, which was becoming more obvious in the United States, 
and that taking such a course would in fact be to make a martyr of de Gaulle.64 It 
seems in trying to rectify their failed policy the American efforts would only serve 
to more swiftly facilitate the realisation of their fear of a strong de Gaulle. 
Churchill replied that he wouldn’t mar his relations with Roosevelt by arguing the 
Cabinet line, and would discuss it with them when he returned, in light of the 
developments between the two Generals.65 Eden was probably buoyed by a 
message received the following day from Halifax which showed the folly of 
Churchill’s indictment of de Gaulle, and that Eden had been correct in the line he 
had taken. Halifax noted his concern at the President’s attitude to de Gaulle and 
the potential of Britain sacrificing its own policy to please America, furthermore, 
American public opinion actually preferred the British policy to the one being 
pushed on it by the White House and the State Department.66 Churchill paints the 
picture in his memoirs that “time and patience afforded tolerable solutions”67 to 
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this problem, and whilst this was the case, he neglected to mention that time and 
patience came about because the Cabinet put him in his place regarding agreed 
British and Anglo-American policy, and refused to let the American influence 
override British interests. Churchill, perhaps, would have been wise to consider 
acting in the manner of the advice he would later give Eden: that “It is a great 
mistake always to want to do things. Very often they will do themselves much 
better than anyone could do them”.68 
Time and patience on the part of the French did yield results and, in what 
must have been a satisfying moment for Eden, Churchill was there to witness it. 
Having finished his discussions in Washington, Churchill travelled to North 
Africa, taking with him General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United 
States Army, in an effort to convince him on the Mediterranean strategy he had 
been less successful promoting in Washington. He arrived in Algiers shortly before 
de Gaulle, and kept himself updated on French affairs using an old friend, General 
Georges, who was working with Giraud.69 Anticipating trouble, he had summoned 
Eden, on the premise that he was “much better fitted than I am to be the best man 
at the Giraud-de Gaulle wedding”.70 No doubt this was the case, given that of the 
two men Eden was in favour of French union and Churchill, in the hangover from 
his Washington visit, still somewhat against. Unintentionally, Churchill had 
invited Eden to be present to witness the triumph of his policy, something that 
should have given Eden great satisfaction; though it seems from his memoirs to 
have been lower on the scale than bathing and touring the front lines.71 After a 
rocky start to negotiations, and with Eden, but more importantly Churchill, 
touring the battlefields, the French were able to come to an agreement, though 
some outside help was needed from Macmillan and Murphy. The first meeting 
had ended abruptly, with de Gaulle storming out, mostly over a personal dispute 
with Georges, though the lack of any agenda or items to discuss didn’t help, and 
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Macmillan took it upon himself to provide these for the following meeting.72 The 
tension and mutual dislike was significant, with Catroux at one point commenting 
that he was stuck “between a madman and an ass”,73 but Macmillan and Murphy 
worked hard to convince all parties that negotiations should be continued. 
Unfortunately, before the next meeting, a new dispute arose over the resignation 
of Marcel Peyrouton, the Governor-General of Algeria. De Gaulle, having never 
favoured his appointment due to his Vichy connections, and without consulting 
Giraud, quickly accepted, as did Giraud when he later received the letter of 
resignation. De Gaulle later informed Giraud of his action, which, for some reason, 
caused chaos. It seems bizarre that this almost led to the arrest of de Gaulle and his 
associates, given both generals had been sent the letter of resignation, both had 
accepted and made similar offers of a future position for Peyrouton, and both had 
done so without consulting the other.74 Yet Giraud was apparently astonished that 
de Gaulle had done exactly what he had done, and requested Admiral Muselier 
join his Cabinet to keep order against a possible Coup. More peacemaking was 
required, and Macmillan, after “heroic” efforts, managed to convince de Gaulle of 
the folly of missing this opportunity, believing that if he acted honourably, he 
would be able to acquire in due course power for himself and his supporters.75 
With everyone suitably mollified, the two parties met the following day, and 
agreed on the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL), 
essentially along the lines of the proposals given to Giraud by the French National 
Committee in March.76 A celebratory lunch was held the following day, toasting 
the new committee. Intentionally or not, but presenting a nice image of the 
differing policies, this was a British event, and no Americans were invited.  
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Roosevelt, keenly sensing this latest snub to his desire to break with de 
Gaulle, sent Churchill an angry message, complaining about positive publicity and 
wishing Churchill “Best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headache”.77 Despite 
Churchill’s reply that things were looking more positive,78 continued squabbles 
over the French military command led to Roosevelt resuming the attack, and 
Churchill once more sided with his friend.79 After several telegrams from 
Roosevelt, some of which Churchill requested Macmillan adhere to,80 a long, 
“hysterical” telegram arrived on 17 June, which even Churchill could not defend.81 
The repeated assertion that everyone should break with de Gaulle showed Eden 
that “we shall be hard put to it to keep in step with the Americans, or rather pull 
them into step with us, over the French business, and not commit some folly which 
will give de Gaulle a martyr’s crown or control of the French army or both. 
F.D.R.’s mood is now that of a man who persists in error. It has all that special 
brand of obstinacy, like Hitler at Stalingrad”.82 Fortunately, he and Attlee secured a 
compromise reply from Churchill, though this was somewhat ambiguous, praising 
the President’s instructions to Eisenhower to keep military control with Giraud, 
whilst also stating that he did not favour breaking up the committee, apparently 
unaware that the former would likely result in the latter.83 Cadogan considered 
this a sign that Roosevelt had lost his head.84  
Eden was saved a continued fight over this issue by an American who 
commanded enough respect to swing even Churchill’s mind. This American was 
not situated in Washington, however, but in North Africa, and was working with 
Macmillan to resolve the French command issue, both men having decided to 
interpret their instructions more as guidelines than rules. Eisenhower felt the best 
method for resolving the situation was not allied dictation, but a discussion setting 
                                                 
77 Roosevelt to Churchill, R-278, 4 June 1943, in Kimball, Alliance Forged, pp. 229-230. 
78 TNA, Avon Papers, FO 954/8B, Churchill to Roosevelt, 6 June 1943.  
79 Charmley, End of Glory, p. 541. 
80 Woodward, British Foreign Policy, Vol. II, pp. 438-441. 
81 Eden, Reckoning, p. 394. 
82 Eden’s diary entry for June 18th, quoted in Eden, Reckoning, p. 394. 
83 Barker, Churchill and Eden, pp. 78-9 and Carlton, Eden, p. 219. 
84 Dilks, Cadogan Diary, 18 June 1943, p. 537.  
240 
out basic military necessities, and leaving the details up to the French.85 Whilst de 
Gaulle was unhappy at this further interference in French affairs, Eisenhower only 
discussed military matters when he met the two generals, informing them that he 
“would not intend to interfere with any internal organisation that the French 
Committee might decide upon”, and appealed to them both as soldiers to accept 
the military requirements of a fellow soldier.86 Shortly after, a decision was 
reached that was acceptable to Eisenhower, though maybe not to Roosevelt, 
whereby a permanent military committee was established, with de Gaulle as its 
chair and Giraud a member, and military command split so Giraud was 
Commander-in-Chief for North Africa, and de Gaulle for the rest of the French 
Empire.87 Macmillan considered this satisfactory, recommended its support by the 
British, and for Churchill to recommend its acceptance to Roosevelt.88 Given the 
trouble de Gaulle was to cause after the war, it could be suggested that Roosevelt’s 
demands should have been met. However, as the alternative was the generally 
unpopular Giraud, and as de Gaulle proved manageable when he was treated 
fairly, it is dangerous to draw a line backwards from the post-war world to the 
situation in the war. This is especially the case given that de Gaulle’s bad 
behaviour was often a result of being excluded from decisions, or from being 
openly snubbed by Churchill, so to suggest he should have been excluded because 
he was trouble masks the reality that he caused trouble because he was excluded, 
mainly at the insistence of Roosevelt. Equally, he remained on good terms with 
Eden, the latter visiting de Gaulle in Paris on several occasions after the war, 
suggesting that an antagonistic de Gaulle was a symptom of the Anglo-American 
special relationship, and not entirely a character defect in the General.  
With the Committee unified, temporarily at least, and organised so as not to 
interfere with allied military operations, there remained one final question to deal 
with, and that was its formal recognition. This was initially raised because, soon 
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after its formation, the FCNL sent a note to Eden asking for its formal recognition 
as the qualified body to represent and defend French interests and manage the 
conduct of the French war effort.89 This arrived the day after Churchill informed 
Roosevelt that the formation of the committee effectively brought to an end his 
formal ties to de Gaulle, and that the arrangements of the British Government 
would be transferred to the new committee.90 He formally proposed this action in 
the House of Commons on 8 June, including a statement about forthcoming 
recognition.91 Due to continued squabbles, this idea was shelved for a few weeks, 
though some background discussions with Halifax and the State Department did 
occur,92 but in early July Eden felt the situation more favourable, and submitted a 
paper to the War Cabinet pressing for “some form of recognition” as the best 
means of helping build up the civil authority, something agreed in a previous 
Cabinet meeting.93 Eden’s hand should have been strengthened by the knowledge 
that the Soviet Union intended to recognise the Committee, but with no British 
decision to do the same, Churchill asked Stalin to delay, and the latter, with some 
confusion, acquiesced.94  
Weight of opinion was building, however, as Halifax was pushing for 
recognition from Washington, and Macmillan reported from Algiers that Murphy 
and Eisenhower were also in favour.95 This, coupled with continued pressure from 
Eden, culminated in a potential crisis between Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary. A heated Defence Committee meeting on 8 July prompted Churchill to 
ask Roosevelt’s advice in dealing with the “sudden” swell of demands for 
recognition, and also a proposed Foreign Office formula for recognition, 
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essentially stating the FCNL was replacing the French National Committee, and 
would ensure the continued French War effort.96 The President’s response was to 
send Churchill the directive issued to Eisenhower, that he was not to recognise the 
Committee under any condition.97 Eden was growing impatient, however, 
resulting in a heated dinner with Churchill on 12 July. The two reportedly argued 
until the early hours, and both prepared memoranda on French policy for the War 
Cabinet.98 Thus, after a thirteen month interlude, Churchill and Eden resumed 
their memoranda duel over France. The two papers had similarities, with both 
arguing for a strong France and the need to afford recognition to the committee 
(though disagreeing on timescales), but whilst Churchill’s was concerned with the 
American attitude, and his relationship with Roosevelt, Eden’s took into account 
the bigger picture of British foreign policy objectives, putting particular emphasis 
on the importance of France to Britain in the post-war world.99 The paper served to 
further emphasise Eden’s post-war vision, and helps explain the continued 
developments towards such a policy in the plans examined earlier. Eden set out 
that “Our main problem after the war will be to contain Germany. Our treaty with 
the Soviet Union, which is designed to secure the collaboration of the Soviet Union 
for this purpose on Germany’s eastern flank, needs to be balanced by an 
understanding with a powerful France in the west […] Our whole policy towards 
France and Frenchmen should therefore be governed by this consideration … In 
dealing with European problems of the future we are likely to have to work more 
closely with France even than with the United States […] Europe expects us to 
have a European policy of our own, and to state it”.100 In the end, fearing they were 
coming to a break, Churchill invited Eden to a formal meeting. Though it is 
unclear exactly what happened, neither paper went before the War Cabinet, and 
the matter was resolved by a Cabinet decision that Eden should hold limited 
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discussions with Winant on the issue.101 Churchill subsequently informed 
Roosevelt that recognition was required, and that if a formula could not be reached 
Britain may have to proceed without American agreement, likely accompanied by 
the Soviet Union.102 Eden had gained Churchill’s agreement on the need for 
recognition, but was soon to find that this would not yield an easy result, as the 
quickly approaching Quebec Conference was to demonstrate.  
Whilst the achievement of this stand against Churchill was considered a 
success by Eden, with Harvey making a particularly enthusiastic diary entry,103 it 
may not be this clear cut. Eden had been trying for some time to obtain agreement 
on the need for recognition, and this was eventually achieved, but his actual goal 
had been to offer said recognition to the Committee, and on this basis his efforts 
were unsuccessful. This has resulted in some mixed reviews of Eden’s efforts. 
Dutton feels this episode showed Eden was no push-over against Churchill and 
had in fact won him round, whereas Carlton suggests that Eden had been tactically 
outplayed by Churchill, who was then magnanimous in victory.104 That this 
episode is widely covered in the historiography suggests some importance is 
attached to it, though this is often in terms of the Churchill-Eden relationship 
rather than foreign policy direction. Although not the focus of this work, the 
Churchill-Eden dynamic is undoubtedly interesting, and it seems important to 
note that, whilst Churchill may have tactically out played Eden to an extent, the 
Foreign Secretary had not surrendered to Churchill’s view, but established that 
one tactic did not work, yielded and moved on to another. Realising a showdown 
in Cabinet would be an embarrassment for both men and undermine the war 
effort, Eden opted for sapping and mining as Harvey put it, and the subtler tactics 
eventually yielded partial results.105 Although his efforts were still thwarted by 
Roosevelt, Eden proved that he was no yes-man to Churchill, and was determined 
to stand up and fight for the policy he believed to be right, even if, with Churchill 
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back in the country, the Cabinet stayed somewhat quieter than it did in his 
absence.  
In terms of foreign policy, this was a victory for Eden, though a smaller one 
than he would have liked. The determination to have a strong France, and have 
that France play a role in Europe in the future can be seen in all the post-war and 
world organisation plans that have been studied, and in his July memorandum to 
Churchill, so by this criteria Eden’s actions had prevented the collapse of this pillar 
of his foreign policy. Having seen de Gaulle’s position threatened after Casablanca 
by Roosevelt, he was determined that continued pressure from the President 
would not influence British policy, consequently preventing the wider danger 
Eden foresaw of Britain losing control of its foreign policy.106 Whilst he may not 
have achieved formal recognition for the FCNL, he had convinced Churchill of its 
political requirements, with the latter noting by the end of July that his goal was 
for “the recognition of the Committee […] and its eventual inclusion […] in the 
array of the United Nations”.107 This was not a solo victory, however, and Eden 
had others to thank for the progress made. Cadogan stood by him in the Defence 
Committee meeting on 8 July, and received personal criticism from Churchill as a 
result.108 Macmillan worked towards Eden’s goal from Algiers, refusing to give 
into the Prime Minister’s bullying telegrams, receiving criticism from Churchill for 
being too Gaullist.109 Halifax too had played his part, being surprisingly pro de 
Gaulle over recognition, adding weight to arguments that the American policy was 
wrong and the British one correct.110 Ultimately, it seems likely that Eden’s quest 
would have been for nought were it not for “that wise American”111 Eisenhower, 
who ignored his President’s directives and worked with the British. It seems that 
his willingness to discuss issues with Giraud and de Gaulle helped end their 
squabbles over the military control, thus stabilising the military concerns in North 
Africa, and the news that he favoured recognition finally persuaded Churchill to 
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put the matter to Roosevelt. Eden had been helped by some powerful allies on the 
French issue, which not only prevented a breach with the Prime Minister that 
could have cost him his Office, but also ensured that, for the moment, Britain 
retained some say in the outcome of this part of its foreign policy, and that one of 
the cornerstones of the broader post-war policy the FO was trying to construct 
remained intact.  
 
‘Exceptional Difficulties’ 
 
As if dealing with the difficulty of French Union and post-war plans wasn’t 
enough for the Foreign Office, they also had to contend with a further fluctuation 
in British relations with the Soviet Union. Their involvement in these affairs was, 
however, reduced because of the military nature of the argument that was 
ensuing, meaning it was Churchill who had to suffer the wrath of Stalin and try to 
diplomatically argue the British case. Having been unimpressed by the strategic 
decisions of Casablanca, Stalin was unhappy to hear that Churchill would be 
visiting Washington in May to discuss the next steps of allied strategy, once again 
without the inclusion of any Soviet representative.112 He was, understandably, 
increasingly frustrated with his fellow allies when the results of those discussions 
were revealed to him in a post-conference communiqué. This set out that the 
enemy submarine threat was the primary consideration; that bombing efforts 
against axis targets would be intensified; that Italy was to be knocked out of the 
war as soon as possible; and lastly that forces would be transferred to England for 
an assault on the Continent in spring 1944.113 Though assistance to the Soviet 
Union was put on a level footing with dealing with the submarine menace, this 
was little consolation to Stalin. In fact, Stalin saw little to be pleased about in the 
allied decisions, save for the fact they had notified him about them directly, and 
                                                 
112 Personal letter from Roosevelt to Stalin, reproduced in USSR, Stalin, Roosevelt, pp. 63-64. 
113 Communiqué on decisions made at Trident, sent from Roosevelt to Stalin, received 4 June 1943, 
reproduced in Ibid, pp. 67-69. 
246 
replied in very negative terms.114 In his message he criticised the contradictions 
with the decisions made at Casablanca, the further delay of the Second Front from 
1942 to 1944, and the fact this had been decided without the Russians being 
present.115 It would, he argued, have implications for the morale of the Soviet 
Union, as well as cause “quite exceptional difficulties” in their ability to continue 
their “nearly singlehanded” war effort on behalf of the allies.116 All of these were 
reasonable points as far as the Soviets were concerned, if not entirely accurate. The 
suggestion that they had been and would continue to be fighting almost 
singlehandedly for the entire allied cause was, however, a step too far, and was 
considered grossly unfair even by Harvey.117 Given that Harvey was more 
sympathetic than most towards the Russia cause, if he felt this too far, Churchill, 
who had a propensity for violent emotional outbursts, must have done very well 
to hold himself and act in a correct manner, as the reply he sent to Stalin, delayed 
by Roosevelt’s indecision whether or not to concur, was well measured and 
reasonable.118 Churchill’s reply set out the allied case against launching a cross-
channel invasion, the advantages in taking out Italy, and offered seemingly sincere 
compassion for the exertions of the Soviet Union and its leader. He also suggested 
his willingness to take any risk and go to any place in order to have a tripartite 
meeting of the allied leaders.119 Stalin remained unmoved and once again treated 
Churchill to a diatribe of apparent indiscretions by the allies, at the same time 
criticising their lack of suffering compared to the Soviet Union, and concluding 
that he could have little confidence in his allies.120 A firm rebuff from Churchill led 
to a temporary suspension in correspondence between the two, and also resulted 
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in the Soviet leader taking the major step of withdrawing his Ambassadors in 
London and Washington to Moscow for consultation.121 
It should be noted that Stalin also ceased correspondence with Roosevelt, 
though for less time than with Churchill, as Roosevelt steered clear of engaging 
Stalin over the Second Front, leaving Churchill to fight this battle for him. Perhaps 
this approach was supposed to differentiate Roosevelt from Churchill,122 as the 
former had been attempting for some time to convince Stalin of the need for a 
meeting between the two, with Churchill not attending.123 Stalin responded 
warmly to this approach, and agreed to a meeting during the summer, though 
military conditions on the Soviet front caused the meeting to be postponed.124 
Churchill was not informed of this correspondence until 24 June, and sent 
Roosevelt a response resembling that of “a jealous suitor who had just learnt that 
the object of his affections had arranged a date with a richer, more handsome 
man”.125 The message suggests Churchill was seeing, though not believing, the 
realities Eden had predicted about the possible decline in position of Britain 
relative to the United States and the Soviet Union were it not to stand firm and act 
on its own policy. Now, Churchill was watching his special relationship with 
Roosevelt being replaced by Roosevelt’s desire to seek an understanding with 
Stalin. Despite deceiving Churchill by saying that Stalin had proposed the idea, 
Roosevelt still extolled its virtues and, with Stalin’s wrath over the Second Front 
still stinging, Churchill reluctantly agreed to the merits of such a meeting.126 
Maisky and Clark Kerr often complained that the British consulted the Americans 
and then informed the Russians,127 but it appears the only one listening was 
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Roosevelt, who sought to employ this strategy with Stalin, and then invite 
Churchill to a conference afterwards.128  
Given the nature of the correspondence it was Clark Kerr rather than the 
Foreign Office who had the most direct involvement in the flow of messages 
between the two leaders. During the communication with Stalin, Churchill had 
sought Clark Kerr’s advice on some of his replies, trusting in the man he credited 
with getting him to Moscow in 1942. These messages often contained the 
frustration that he managed to leave out of the official message to Stalin, and make 
for a more realistic impression of his true feelings towards the Soviets. The 
responses from Clark Kerr were largely positive about the nature of Churchill’s 
replies, and he suggested that Churchill should try to ignore the tone of the 
messages from Stalin, understand the genuine pressure the Russians felt they were 
under, and try to extend his patience with the bear. 129 Churchill felt this response 
rather too pro-soviet, and encouraged Clark Kerr to be robust in the face of 
criticism, and suggested he should drop a friendly hint to Stalin that it would be 
dangerous to offend the Western powers.130 Clark Kerr was measured in his 
responses, and claimed that it was his duty to report the whole picture, even when 
he did not agree with all aspects of it, implying that he would not make for a very 
good Ambassador if he did otherwise.131 His recommendation was that, whilst 
allowing things to simmer for a few weeks, Churchill should continue the 
correspondence, despite him fearing it had, perhaps, outlived its usefulness. This 
advice was also given to Churchill by Maisky before the latter’s return to Moscow. 
Having enquired if Churchill had any message for Stalin, Maisky was informed 
that Churchill was “tired of being scolded” and did not see any point maintaining 
his personal correspondence just as a means of recrimination.132 Maisky advised 
him to ignore tone; that Stalin’s blunt messages were simply him expressing 
himself under stress; and nothing more sinister should be inferred. In fact, Maisky 
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thought the best correspondence was that where both parties could speak bluntly 
to each other without causing offence.133 The meeting ended on a friendly note, 
with Churchill even offering to send Eden to Moscow once again were it felt 
desirable, suggesting he had not entirely given up on Anglo-Soviet relations. It 
could also have been a sign of the danger the British felt at the recall of Maisky, as 
both Eden and Churchill expressed surprise and concern at his withdrawal, maybe 
thinking it was a signal of a changing Russian attitude towards collaboration.134  
Despite the difficulty, correspondence was resumed in early August, as the 
Anglo-American conference in Quebec was approaching, and with it increased 
calls for the arrangement of a tri-partite meeting. It would still be a few months 
before it would occur, but the paths were beginning to wind together, and the final 
part of this chapter shall examine outcomes of the Quebec, Moscow and Tehran 
conferences, and their implications for British foreign policy objectives. For the 
time being, it seems the British were working on a damage limitation project with 
the Soviets, as relations were slowly deteriorating with each chastisement from 
Stalin, but they were doing what they could to keep Soviet anger and distrust to a 
minimum, though this appeared insufficient, meaning when the conferences 
occurred, it looked unlikely that the Soviets would be particularly forthcoming.  
 
The Big Three in Conference 
 
The first of the Conferences was held in Quebec, and went ahead despite 
originally being the consolation prize for Churchill after the proposed Roosevelt 
Stalin meeting which never materialised.135 There was, however, still a debate as to 
whether or not Stalin should be invited to attend, or to send a representative. 
Eden, having initially felt they should be informed of the talks with him going to 
Moscow after to explain the outcomes, appears to have been swayed by Clark 
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Kerr’s protestations that the Russians would not accept this ruse to keep them out, 
and would be highly critical of such action, so suggested to Churchill that perhaps 
the lesser of all evils was to inform the Russians in advance of Quebec, and invite 
them to attend.136 For Eden, who would be going to Quebec in order to discuss, 
amongst other things, the recognition of the FCNL, it would have been useful to 
have a Soviet representative there to help him convince the Americans that this 
was a correct step to take. Unfortunately, Churchill was disinclined to acquiesce to 
this suggestion, stating that he’d rather the conference did not go ahead than have 
the Russians involved, and told Eden to be bold and push his initial idea on 
them.137 This decision seems to have been made due to Churchill’s assumption 
that, were a Russian representative present, it would have tipped the balance on 
military decisions towards the Second Front, and away from the Mediterranean.138 
With this decision from Churchill, and Roosevelt’s apparent willingness to 
continue without Stalin, the British set out for Quebec in the middle of August, 
though Churchill had gone ahead having decided to travel by sea, intending to 
meet Roosevelt in Washington before the conference began.  
Eden and Cadogan arrived to represent the Foreign Office on 18 August, in 
time for the main conversations, though work had already begun between the 
Chiefs of Staff.139 Whilst Churchill, Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staff argued over 
military strategy after the successful results of Husky, Eden and Cadogan were left 
to battle with Hull over recognition of the FCNL. Both make references to these 
long and difficult conversations, though Eden’s are more diplomatic than 
Cadogan’s, who described Hull as “A dreadful old man […] and rather pig 
headed”.140 The impression gleaned from these references, along with messages 
sent back from Quebec, is that the American, and particularly Hull’s, obsession 
with de Gaulle had not been abated by time or patience. After three meetings, 
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where no progress was made, the two ‘politicians’, failing to become ‘Statesmen’ 
as they could not agree, decided the best course of action would be separate 
proposals, with the British deciding to offer recognition with only implied limits 
on its scope.141 Churchill had, however, finally been won round by Eden’s 
persistence, and had written to Roosevelt, begging him to go as far as he could 
regarding recognition, and in a later conversation with Eden he agreed with the 
line his Foreign Secretary had taken over France with Hull.142 His plea appears to 
have fallen on death ears, as Roosevelt didn’t intervene to help the British, and 
suggested afterwards that he could have made more progress on France without 
Eden’s presence.143 Despite serious American opposition, Eden had, finally, been 
successful in achieving one of his goals, and ensuring the recognition of the FCNL. 
In a broader scale, this had significance, not just as a policy achievement, but as a 
sign that, when an impasse was reached, Britain could, albeit at great effort, carry 
out their own policy in areas of direct British interest, even against the wishes of 
the United States. In terms of post-war foreign policy goals, having a unified 
French committee added extra weight to Eden’s suggestion that they should be 
associated with any post-war settlement, and for the moment at least, removed a 
source of friction between the British and the Americans. That Roosevelt felt he 
could more easily influence Churchill is no surprise, as Churchill’s emotional 
investment in the special relationship brought with it greater loyalty to the 
President, whereas Eden remained more remote. This being the case shows how 
important Eden was for France and de Gaulle, as he was powerful enough at 
home, and in diplomacy, to achieve results for their cause when it was aligned 
with British foreign policy goals. It may have taken three years, but Eden had 
managed to pull the Americans away from Vichy, and then Giraud, so there was 
hope that they could be successful at influencing American opinion on less 
controversial topics.  
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The other important outcomes of Quebec for foreign policy were the 
decisions about Italian armistice terms and future strategy, particularly the 
reaffirmation of Overlord for 1944,144 both of which necessitated further contact 
with the Soviet Union. Eden had come to Quebec prepared to go on to Moscow,145 
but this became unnecessary, as Stalin broke his silence, acknowledging the 
Quebec meeting, and replying to joint messages sent by Churchill and Roosevelt. 
Stalin’s responses to the messages about Quebec were both troubling and positive 
in equal measure. On the one hand he criticised the decisions on Italy being made 
without consulting him, and used a similar line of argument to Clark Kerr, that the 
USA and Britain make a decision, then inform Russia as if it were a passive third 
party.146 On the other, in light of this, and his personal difficulty attending a 
tripartite meeting, he suggested it would be expedient that both an allied military-
political commission be set up to deal with the Italian Armistice situation, and that 
a meeting of responsible representatives should take place. Given his previous 
rejections of tripartite meetings, this opened the door for such meetings to occur 
instead of, or possibly before, a meeting of the big three, and possibly showed that 
Stalin realised he could not continue complaining about being left out whilst also 
refusing to participate when invited.147 This was encouraging for Eden, who had 
been pushing for some kind of inter-allied commission to discuss European 
matters, and so this meeting would afford an opportunity for such consultation to 
occur, but on a grander scale. Jebb particularly was pleased, as he had been 
pushing for similar talks and combined planning for peace since his visit to 
Washington with Eden, and was in Washington again at this time to liaise with 
American post-hostilities planners, so felt the time had definitely come to involve 
the Russians in such important discussions.148 It would also fit in well with an 
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American proposal, seen by Jebb and Eden, which was for a Four Power Joint 
Declaration covering the allies’ responsibilities in war and peace.149 The draft 
suggested allied agreement to: united action in the prosecution of the war and the 
organisation and maintenance of peace and security; disarmament of enemies and 
occupation of their territory; act against violation of requirements imposed on 
enemies; establishing a World Organisation; the creation of technical commissions 
to deal with military problems; no unilateral military action and finally to work 
together to regulate armaments.150 This was put to the Cabinet by Eden upon his 
return, and it was agreed that a slightly amended version should be put to the 
Americans, with a view to their raising it at the Foreign Ministers Conference 
tentatively being arranged for October.151 The contents of the declaration meant it 
was highly supported by Eden, as it set out in simple terms many of the core 
arguments that had found their place in the ‘Four Power Plan’ and its descendents.  
With one of the agenda items now agreed and the British working on more, 
including a tacit agreement on Russian frontier claims that Eden had tried to 
encourage Hull to accept in Quebec, there was, unfortunately, an argument over 
the location of the Foreign Ministers conference. Eden and the Cabinet preferred 
London, Roosevelt either preferred somewhere in Britain that wasn’t London 
(which Eden found insulting152) or somewhere remote in North Africa, Churchill 
was happy to accept any of these suggestions, but Stalin was adamant that it 
should be held in Moscow.153 This argument, as Eden recalled, was to run for much 
of September as Roosevelt changed his mind, first agreeing to Moscow, then 
agreeing on London after deciding Hull had to attend the conference, though by 
then Stalin considered it too late to make alterations as the conference was to start 
in the middle of October.154 
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So Eden found himself on his way to Moscow once more, although 
apparently he almost didn’t go after an argument in Cabinet, referenced in both 
Harvey and Cadogan’s diaries; though not in the official records of the two 
Cabinet meetings on the subject.155 Eden had prepared diligently, with the Cabinet 
approving briefs on many topics, including the future of Germany, Russian 
frontiers and the scope of Stalin’s proposed Politico-Military commission, and 
indeed his level of preparation was often cited as one of the reasons he was able to 
make the conference a success.156 The conference was, as it turned out, one of the 
most successful Eden attended in an executive capacity, and was more 
businesslike than any other war-time conference.157 Although a significant portion 
of time was taken up by the Second Front issue, with Molotov and the Russian 
delegation making this their major topic of discussion, the British military advisors 
successfully answered all the questions put to them, and confirmed that Overlord 
would go ahead in 1944.158 The topic came up a couple more times throughout the 
conference, as Eden’s telegrams to Churchill demonstrate, but despite being the 
dominant issue it did not affect the productivity of the conference.159 Even when 
Churchill interfered, asking Eden to show Stalin documents that he felt altered the 
likelihood of Overlord due to developments in Italy, Eden notes Stalin was in good 
humour and did not offer any recriminations or complaints, though didn’t change 
his mind as to the necessity of Overlord.160 There was little agreement on the 
Russians other points for discussion, as neither Britain nor the USA could see 
much merit in trying to induce Sweden into the war, and neither felt able to offer 
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such assurances as would be required to try and lure Turkey into active 
participation, though did agree its belligerency would be desirable.161 
With the military nature of the Russian topics dealt with, the Foreign 
Ministers were able to move on to political issues, though controversial subjects 
such as Poland and Soviet Frontiers were not discussed, although Eden did discuss 
these privately with Molotov. Here the conference made significant progress, 
coming to agreement on most matters and making definite decisions on some. For 
Eden, undoubtedly the highlight was the formation of the European Advisory 
Commission, which would be a high level political commission based in London 
to discuss the problems arising in Germany and elsewhere with the collapse of the 
Nazi regime. This was the sort of body Eden and others had been suggesting as a 
necessary vehicle both to improve allied co-operation, and facilitate decisions that 
could be both enforced and maintained. Jebb, however, felt this fell short of his 
vision for such a commission.162 Many commentators on Eden did consider this a 
major achievement163 even though the commission would prove largely 
unsuccessful, its adoption, not necessarily something favoured by the other allies, 
was a testament to Eden’s abilities as a diplomat, and Eden himself felt such a 
result was justification alone for holding the Foreign Ministers Conference.164 This 
was not the only success of the conference. The Four Power Declaration, proposed 
by Hull, also saw agreement, albeit in a rather longwinded fashion. The Russians, 
prior to the conference, rejected the proposal, thinking it irrelevant given only 
three powers were attending, which prompted the following minute from 
Churchill to Eden: “you see they do not want to be mixed up in all this rot about 
China as a Great Power anymore than I do”.165 Despite this objection, Hull brought 
up the declaration during the conference, and it was discussed sufficiently for 
Eden to send a set of amendments for Cabinet approval after the meeting on 21 
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October, then an agreed text of the declaration on 26 October, only to inform them 
on 27 October that the declaration had been dropped. It was signed three days 
later.166 Its composition was similar to the document shown to Eden and Jebb in 
August, save for the omission of the clause about technical commissions.167 The 
conference had many minor achievements alongside these, including a decision 
over the future of Austria – it was to be independent whether it wanted to be or 
not; a decision to create a commission to deal with Italy - which would include a 
representative from Russia and also the FCNL; Eden raised the topic of Poland in a 
private talk with Molotov and the two managed to be diplomatic enough that it 
didn’t torpedo the conference; Eden secured consent from Churchill to offer the 
Russians a share in the captured Italian fleet as a gesture of goodwill, and he 
managed to neutralise any fallout from Stalin over the supply convoys, which 
Churchill had potentially caused by refusing to accept a telegram from Stalin on 
the topic, much to the confusion of the new Ambassador, Fedor Gusev.168 Given 
the lack of enthusiastic participation by Hull, and the relative stubbornness of 
Molotov for a significant portion of the conference, it was down to Eden that the 
conference was a success. It is often considered, because of his influence on the 
proceedings, that this was the last major allied conference where the British not 
only sat at the top table, but actively took the lead amongst the allied powers.169 
Gillies implies that this was a last hurrah for British power, which came, ironically, 
as Britain was rapidly sliding into decline, so this was even more, as Cadogan 
commented, “his [Eden’s] show – and a very good one” to maximise the use of 
British influence.170 Harvey commented that Eden was carrying the Americans, 
and Eden recalled Hull’s lack of support, and his lack of standing with Stalin such 
that Hull authorised Eden to discuss matters with the Soviet premier on his 
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behalf.171 Perhaps, under the strains of the war and working under Churchill, Eden 
may have been even more successful as a diplomat, but that is a question for a 
different project. 
 
The other notable achievement from Moscow, and again something where 
Eden holds a significant portion of credit, was that he convinced Stalin of the need 
to personally attend a meeting of the Heads of Governments, though 
unfortunately could not sway him on location.172 In his private meetings with 
Stalin he was able to highlight the practical necessities of a meeting of the three 
leaders, as they would be able to discuss and reach agreements on issues that even 
the Foreign Ministers could not. It seems this was what swayed Stalin to agree, 
though he initially suggested sending Molotov in his stead if the location was not 
agreeable to him, but Eden, perhaps relying on his generally positive relations 
with Stalin, told him bluntly that this would not do, and that the other leaders 
would not travel so far to only meet Molotov.173 Thus, after several months of 
communication, Eden had managed to gain Stalin’s full agreement on the need to 
meet, and all that remained to be decided was the location, with Eden 
understanding Stalin’s desire to go somewhere where he could stay in touch with 
Moscow, but also noting that Stalin seemed sincerely concerned that a meeting 
should happen.174 Consequently, with Churchill and Roosevelt suggesting 
everywhere but Tehran, Stalin’s only agreeable location, Eden proposed, after a 
conversation with Hull, that the President and Prime Minister base themselves 
somewhere, but “make a descent for a day or two on Tehran solely to meet U.J.”, 
and with Churchill being willing to travel anywhere this would rely on the 
President, who would be responsible for the meeting failing to occur should he 
reject this proposal.175 Churchill agreed, and Eden encouraged him to press the 
idea on Roosevelt. Eventually this was accepted by Roosevelt, and plans were 
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made for Anglo-American discussions in Cairo, to be followed by a short trip to 
Tehran to meet Stalin.  
Churchill’s desire for Anglo-American agreements before Tehran was, 
however, thwarted by Roosevelt, who successfully outmanoeuvred him by 
inviting the Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek, to Cairo, then arriving two days late, 
leaving no time for combined talks, much to Churchill’s annoyance.176 His mood 
was little improved at Tehran, where he was ignored by Roosevelt who, in 
attempting to prevent the impression of ganging up on Stalin, joined with him in 
mocking Churchill, causing the latter to walk out of one of the meetings.177 
Roosevelt’s insistence on wooing Stalin led to public Anglo-American policy 
arguments, and added to the impression gained by most that Tehran was a rather 
haphazard conference, and one where Britain was relegated to its realistic place as 
the least of the big three.178  
 
The conferences were to serve as the turning point in relations between the 
allies, as it became apparent that Britain’s international standing was declining, 
and that the future would be decided mainly between Russian and America. 
Whilst Eden had managed one last push of British influence at Moscow, this was 
quickly reversed by Tehran, with Churchill largely shut out by Stalin and 
Roosevelt. In fact, the first meeting of the big three was a disaster for Churchill, but 
can, paradoxically, be seen as a victory for Eden. It saw the end, in one sense, of 
the ‘special relationship’, as Churchill began to realise that he did not fit 
Roosevelt’s version of the future, and began to realise how small Britain was, 
likening it to a Donkey between the Buffalo and the Bear.179 It also suggested that 
Eden’s scepticism about putting all Britain’s eggs in the American basket had been 
correct, and that Churchill’s determination to base relations on his friendship with 
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Roosevelt did not yield political results for Britain when it mattered, notably at 
Tehran but also in Moscow where Eden received little support from Hull. The key 
decision of Tehran was the setting of a date for Overlord, but politically, the 
decision on Poland was significant. Having made visual representations with 
matches, and then argued over maps,180 it was decided that Poland was to be 
moved West, a significant step given that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt had thus 
far been willing to agree to any Soviet frontier demands, and was, therefore, 
another point on which Eden could claim partial victory for his ideas and 
arguments over those of his chief.181 He was, however, left alone by Churchill to 
argue with Molotov over the specifics, such as the independence of Lvov, which 
wouldn’t break the heart of his chief were it ceded to the Russians, although 
Carlton notes this was to have significance later.182 That Roosevelt gained Stalin’s 
agreement to his Four Policemen idea and the United Nations183 suggests that 
Eden had been correct in taking up this policy in 1942, and had its development 
been less restricted and more supported by Churchill, far more progress could 
have been made. Despite these successes, Eden, though minimising the negatives 
in his memoirs, won’t have looked back on Tehran with much fondness. Upon 
arrival he was used as the “decoy duck” to ensure the security of Churchill, and 
due to Churchill’s presence his involvement and role were somewhat minimised, a 
trend that Rothwell and Sidney Aster note, suggesting Eden was generally a 
passive witness at gatherings where Churchill was present.184 This was not so true 
of Quebec, however, where Eden had lengthy discussions with Hull and also the 
President over France. Eden also recalled being disturbed by Stalin’s policy shifts 
and the American unwillingness to work with the British,185 further evidence that 
British influence was declining and that America and Russia no longer needed 
Britain to determine the political direction of the allies.  
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Overall the year 1943 was one of undoubted success for Eden and his policies, 
highlighted perhaps by the result of his struggle ever since regaining the Foreign 
Office to successfully prevent France being thrown to one side, and to ensure that 
the enigmatic, if challenging, character of de Gaulle was preserved and his 
position secured. This was probably Eden’s biggest political victory, not least 
because it was pulled off, but because by this action France was to assume a role in 
the post-war world which was to be created at conferences the following year. 
Eden also managed success in 1943 through his vision, or more accurately in 
championing the vision of his Department, which actually began in 1942, of 
planning for the post-war world. Though much of this work was to get no further 
than a Cabinet paper, it was clearly on the right lines, with Roosevelt also pushing 
for a world organisation, and Tehran brought home the realisation that Britain had 
to be part of such a system to maintain its status as a great power, which the Four 
Power Plan set out in November 1942. In a historical sense, there is great irony 
here, as Churchill was famed for his vision, yet he was the obstacle to British 
progress on this topic, as his ideas differed from those of the Eden, Roosevelt and, 
tentatively, Stalin. Over Russia, Churchill could be an asset, as his personal 
correspondence with Stalin helped reduce some of the criticism coming in about 
the lack of Second Front, and also helped induce a meeting of the Big Three, thus 
assuring Britain’s involvement in the international order for a bit longer. Eden’s 
role here should not be understated, and his efforts with the Russians in Moscow, 
rather than Churchill’s in Tehran, were probably the last great victory for the 
British in the political arena. Whilst counterfactuals never get very far, it is 
interesting to look back at 1943 particularly, and wonder whether or not, had Eden 
had his way, it was likely that Britain, having stood alone in 1940, would not have 
had to stand aside in 1943.186  
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12) Conclusion 
  
This thesis set out to study an under-examined and often ignored aspect of 
the history of the Second World War, the British foreign policy that never was. 
This is an inaccurate description, however, as this foreign policy did indeed exist, 
and its development can be traced quite clearly through the period under 
investigation. Whilst not starting life as a vision of post-war collaboration as part 
of a great World Organisation, this was what was to become Foreign Office 
thinking during 1942 and 1943, built on the foundations of Anglo-Soviet co-
operation and alliance; support of the Free French Movement; traditional British 
foreign policy; and the necessity to examine Britain’s own war aims to enable 
discussions on the topic with other powers. This, once taking on board Roosevelt’s 
Four Powers concept, and the sterling work of Gladwyn Jebb and the Economic 
and Reconstruction Department, resulted in a series of plans designed to examine 
Britain’s role in the post-war world, and attempt to shape that world to one of its 
liking. That this was the case begs the question why this has not been studied in 
any great detail before. Historians have been taken in by the Churchillian legend, 
and the opening of the Second World War papers appears to have done little to 
change their perspective, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned.  
Two quotes illustrate the problem and apparent assumptions about foreign 
policy quite nicely. Reynolds suggests that “The differences of approach between 
Churchill and the Foreign Office were real, but they should not be exaggerated 
when it came to concrete policy”,1 and Charmley asserts that “Eden wanted 
Britain to have a foreign policy of her own, and he would have liked to run it 
himself; in neither endeavour was he successful”.2 What has clearly been seen 
through this thesis is that these suggestions are largely incorrect. There was a 
definite difference between the approach of Churchill and the Foreign Office, not 
to mention Eden, and contra to Reynold’s statement this did lead to a difference in 
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policy. Whilst Churchill’s may have been the concrete policy, as he wouldn’t allow 
the Foreign Office vision to come to light, the Department, under Eden’s 
stewardship, developed its own policy, one in line with traditional British foreign 
policy goals and the thinking of Britain’s allies, and tried very hard to make it 
Britain’s official policy. The ‘Four Power Plan’ was a key example of this, and was 
actually approved by the War Cabinet, subject to some modification, and thus 
should have been taken as the official principles which were to guide British 
foreign policy. This also disproves Charmley’s first statement, as whilst Eden may 
not have had a direct hand in crafting policies such as the ‘Four Power Plan’, he 
was quick to champion them, and highlighted on numerous occasions the need for 
Britain to have its own policy and not become subservient to the United States. As 
the ‘Four Power Plan’ was approved it can be argued that Britain did have a 
foreign policy of its own, just one that Churchill disapproved of and did his best to 
interfere with and de-rail. Whilst this was ultimately not to be the official policy, 
which was retained by the Churchill strategy, Eden was still doing his best to run 
foreign policy himself. The numerous disagreements with Churchill, starting as 
early as 1941, and continuing throughout the period under investigation and 
beyond on topics relating to both wartime and post-war strategy, suggest that 
Eden was, as best as possible, running foreign policy how he wanted. Whilst 
Charmley’s assertion that he was unsuccessful in running overall foreign policy is 
correct, as Churchill, or the United States, regularly frustrated his efforts, it has 
been seen throughout this work that Eden was not taking a back seat and willingly 
letting Churchill run the show. Over France, for example, we can see Eden being 
tenacious and determined in his often solitary support for de Gaulle, and through 
his tactical skill he was regularly able to force Churchill to hold back on threats or 
re-think demands to break with the General. The victory of this policy came in 
1943 with the Union between Giraud and de Gaulle, an outcome that would have 
been unlikely had Eden not been there to resist Churchill and Roosevelt. 
That Tehran was in many respects to see Eden’s arguments and policy ideas 
come out victorious highlights his under-emphasised visionary qualities, ones 
which are certainly, though undeservedly, over-shadowed by Churchill’s in the 
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historiography. Churchill’s reluctant realisation that Britain was the least of the 
big three, and would thus need to work with its allies to avoid post-war 
irrelevancy, had been preached by Eden in early 1942 along with the need for an 
agreement with Stalin over Soviet Frontiers, which Roosevelt had blocked, though 
he subsequently agreed to it at Tehran. Although Eden was the Department’s 
mouthpiece, on post-war foreign policy its star visionary was Gladwyn Jebb, who 
drafted some incredible papers, both serious and counterfactual, which presented 
detailed visions of the future, and Britain’s likely part therein. In the ‘Four Power 
Plan’ he predicted Britain’s position as an American outpost, and with the Cold 
War and Britain’s failure to integrate fully with the European Union, it is not hard 
to present an argument that this is Britain’s position today. He was also the man 
who predicted the likely result of an ideological conflict after the war, and whilst 
Foreign Office efforts were not specifically directed towards preventing this, it 
was hoped that one result of creating a post-war system of collaboration, either in 
Europe or on a Global scale, was that such a set of circumstances could not arise.  
The fact a Cold War occurred makes it almost unfashionable to suggest that 
contemporary thinking was for great power collaboration and a post-war alliance 
with the Soviet Union, which of course Britain held since May 1942, and could 
well be one reason this sort of foreign policy thinking is not examined. Likewise 
the fact the ‘Special Relationship’ was to dominate British policy for decades to 
come makes its explanation seem more historically relevant than the policy 
examined here. Given the controversy of Suez and the creation and expansion of 
the United Nations, for example, the lack of study given to this area is all the more 
surprising. Many suggest Eden had lost his grip on the international situation or 
was acting rashly when trying to defend British interests in Suez, but his actions 
can be traced back to his post-war thinking, where we see him trying to assert and 
defend Britain’s interests, thinking like many of his peers that Britain was and 
would remain a great power with an independent foreign policy. It was 
unfortunate that, when he became Prime Minister, the situation he had tried so 
hard to prevent during World War Two was in full effect, and Britain did not have 
the independence of action Eden felt it warranted. Had Britain been allowed, 
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either by Churchill or Roosevelt, to more clearly follow its own foreign policy 
course during the war, Suez may not have been the historically fascinating and 
controversial topic it is today, or spelled the end of Eden’s Premiership leaving a 
black mark on his reputation, but just another episode in a long history of Britain 
defending its global interests. Similarly the fact the Foreign Office drew up a plan 
for a workable organisation of the United Nations in 1943 as a global body to 
maintain peace is surprisingly overlooked, even in works on the history of the 
United Nations, most of which start with Dumbarton Oaks in 1944. Whilst this is 
in some senses logical, as the first conference to deal with this topic, Eden and Jebb 
had been discussing it and pushing it since 1943, and some of the ideas in the 
United Nations plan were to be incorporated into the eventual charter and 
structure of the body that developed. All this clearly shows that Eden and his 
Department were pursuing a policy that was more relevant to both British and 
allied interests once Churchill’s ‘Grand Alliance’ had come into being, and that the 
policy of the Foreign Office, whatever the motives behind it, was ultimately the 
one that would have been in Britain’s best interests.  
 
This was not the initial intention of the Foreign Office, though is a testament 
to its ability to adapt to the ever changing circumstances of the war. When Eden 
returned, the British priority was survival and to that end diplomacy and the 
maintenance of key relations was the order of the day, especially those where 
military advantage may be obtained. Once Churchill’s ‘Grand Alliance’ came into 
being, the ‘end of the beginning’ had arrived, and it became logical to look 
forward as victory was now felt to be inevitable, and something would have to be 
done with the results of that victory. Not only did the military alliance and its 
likely results mean his sort of thinking became essential, but the political situation 
also factored into its necessity. Having to deal with the Soviet Union from 1941 
meant the Foreign Office also became involved in the subject of war aims, having 
to try and establish what the British aims were so that they could have the 
discussions the Russians wanted over their own. This process led them to think 
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about the shape of the post-war world so they could understand how the war aims 
would fit with ensuring a peaceful Europe, and particularly a restrained Germany.  
Coupled to this, Churchill’s dominance in the American sphere, and the 
traditional Foreign Office antipathy towards the United States meant that this 
thinking was very much tinged with an anti-American caution, with the plans 
allowing for the fact the Americans may not want to be part of them. The irony 
that the Foreign Office, through the Four Power concept, was to end up 
championing Roosevelt’s vision has been discussed, but it is important to note that 
this does not devalue the British project. Although cautious about American 
involvement, it was hoped they would realise, as Roosevelt appeared to, that 
America needed to be part of the worldwide system to ensure its own safety as 
much as that of Europe, and these plans built on his loose vision to provide a 
workable version of the League of Nations concept that could, if it had been 
allowed to develop more fully at an earlier stage, have been in a stronger position 
at the end of the war to ensure that the post-war world was one of greater stability 
and balance than was experienced. That Churchill was still resisting discussion of 
such topics in 1945 suggests how little conception he had about the post-war 
world, and makes one wonder whether his ‘vision’ of the Anglo-American alliance 
was, in reality, a self-fulfilling prophecy that was sustained by the march of 
events, and his efforts to curb any other thinking when he saw moves away from 
the American line.    
Though these external influences are undoubtedly important, internal factors 
should not be discounted, most importantly, British foreign policy tradition, 
which was in fact very much alive during this time. British foreign policy had a 
traditional ‘balance of power’ outlook, and the effect on this was often the 
determining factor in British action or inaction. Eden’s policy bares a striking 
resemblance to this. The ‘Four Power Plan’ talked of the need for a balance of 
power in Europe, though admittedly one directed against Germany, and it was 
often argued that France was needed to aide Britain in counter-balancing the likely 
post-war strength of the Soviet Union. The influence of Webster, an Historian with 
a specialised knowledge of the Vienna settlement, also suggests British policy was 
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concerned with history. Although it could be argued that this looking back and 
longing for alliance systems and great power diplomacy was out of date, and had 
even been a cause of conflict in the past, it had also been one of the main features 
of the relative European peace for a century since 1815. Indeed, it is not hard to 
imagine that, had America been willing to play a part after Versailles, the League 
of Nations system could have been far more successful than was the case. Wanting 
to collaborate with allies and other powers was also in keeping with the historic 
traditions of British policy, and by going down this route Eden was following in 
the footsteps of another of Britain’s principle Foreign Secretaries, Viscount 
Castlereagh. He, like Eden, believed peace could be best reached then maintained 
by the co-operation of the interested powers, and had helped develop the congress 
system which Webster had so extensively studied, and so there are natural links 
between Britain’s policy in 1815 and 1942. Though this definitely suggests foreign 
policy thinking had not moved very far, for a country with such a long history as 
Britain, much of which had been spent as the great world power, traditions such 
as these were not easily discarded, and thankfully so, as they helped influence the 
shape of the policies that the Foreign Office were correctly, if unsuccessfully, to 
pursue during the war.  
 
Ultimately, as Charmley rightly asserts, Eden’s vision “foundered on his 
inability to challenge Churchill”,3 though this, as demonstrated, was not for want 
of trying or lack of vision. Consequently, Britain could not continue to operate as a 
great power, despite Churchill believing it to be one, and was unable to maintain 
an independent foreign policy. Had it been able to do so, there are some 
interesting possibilities of a future that never came to pass. The Empire, or at least 
a significant portion of it, could perhaps have been maintained had Britain not 
been bound so closely to the Atlantic Charter and the hypocritical American 
attitude towards Imperialism. The integration of Europe could, as suggested on 
several occasions during the war, have occurred under the guidance and 
stewardship of Britain, rather than coming about through the difficult 
                                                 
3 Ibid, p. 48. 
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circumstances and need to survive squashed between two Superpowers. Equally 
had the United Nations been in place, and had Britain agreed to Stalin’s 1941 
frontiers in 1942, the Soviet Union could have been far more co-operative after the 
war, having gained the security it desired, and there may not have been a post-
war power struggle that pushed the world to the edge of destruction through the 
nuclear arms race. These are all ‘what ifs’, but are important, as the historical 
picture we are presented with is the inevitability of the Anglo-American alliance 
and the Cold War.  
 
Churchill’s writing, an exercise in both vanity and Whig history, paints the 
picture of his grand vision of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, a 
relationship beneficial to Britain because it facilitated military victory, and which 
came to pass as a result of Churchill’s determination and dedication to its cause. It 
is presented as if there were no other options, and the lack of investigation on this 
point suggests historians have believed this to be true. This thesis has argued, in 
an exercise in anti-Whig history, and concludes with the argument, that there were 
other options available to Britain; that Churchill’s vision only succeeded because 
he made sure that no other vision could, not because his was inevitable; that the 
lack of success of these policies does not make them historically irrelevant; and 
that the effort of Eden and the Foreign Office’s work was both important, a 
valuable addition to Britain’s war effort and something worthy of historical study 
in its own right. Surveying the scene in 1945 Eden wrote that Britain’s foreign 
policy was a sad wreck.4 It was a sad wreck not because Eden and the Foreign 
Office had been inactive or had no vision, but because Churchill had allowed the 
Americans to steer the ship onto the rocks, apparently unconcerned at the results 
as, after all, he would write the history, so he could make these up as he went 
along. 
                                                 
4 Eden’s diary, 23 March 1945, in Eden, Reckoning, p. 525. 
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